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A Brief Introduction to Representations of Children 
When it comes to the study of children, psychologists have been traditionally 
concerned with development; striating children by age and gender, while focusing on 
the disparity between current performance and the functioning adult (Siegel & Kim, 
1996; Prout & James, 1997).  The work of developmental psychologists is inherently 
valuable; however, it also subsumes a perspective that regards the child as an 
incomplete adult, as the term developmental implies.  This is a uniquely adult 
perspective on child behaviour.  As such, there is an intergroup dimension to the 
perspective, because it entails one, powerful, higher status group regarding a second, 
weaker, lower status group.  This facet makes it important to identify and critically 
evaluate the assumptions that adults impose on children.  What exactly do children 
represent to us as adults (e.g., Jenks, 2005; Mills & Mills, 2000; James & Prout, 1997) 
and how does this affect the way in which we interact and think about children, or 
affect the processing of information when our representations of children are 
activated? 
This chapter presents a brief review of the extant literature concerning mental 
representations of children and attitudes towards them.  In addition, this chapter 
reviews some of the historical precedents that gave rise to current environments for 
the child.  A large body of the theory and research considered in this review is from 
the field of sociology.  I will highlight portions of this work that can be investigated 
by empirical means.  Extant psychological literature on attitudes and values regarding 
parenting are also presented for a more complete consideration of the topic. 
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A Brief History of Childhood 
To begin understanding mental representations of children, we need to 
consider historical and cultural changes over the last 500 years or more because these 
changes have given birth to current perspectives on children and childhood.  Levine 
and White (1986) highlight four major transitional periods that affected the role of the 
child in the family, and these periods are relevant to our current attitudes.  Primary 
among these was the shift from agrarian to urban—and later industrialized—societies.  
In (largely) self-sufficient agrarian communities, children are economically reciprocal 
in that they can help with the labour of sustaining the community and help look after 
the old.  A child is an asset to productivity and often would learn all their skills from 
their parents and immediate family, in order to carry on the traditional work.  In 
contrast, urbanization forces people to travel to where employment was available.  
The workplace becomes removed from the home, and family-based self-sufficiency 
gives way to monetary opportunities outside of the home.  Because of the separation 
of work from the home in an urban environment, parents often cannot pass on their 
work skills to their children.  Children have to acquire these skills elsewhere in order 
to enhance employability later in life.  This change forces parents to cede a great deal 
of supervisory control to teachers in school, or to supervisors in places where children 
perform apprenticeships or menial labour.  In some cases, especially where child 
labour occurs, the potential for child abuse is high.  For this reason, child labour was 
eventually abolished in many parts of the world, and child rights were instigated in 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
 As described by Levine and White (1986), urbanization and the desire to avoid 
abuses within child labour contributed to a cultural transition to mass schooling.  
Schooling became compulsory in Britain from 1840-1890, but was available to the 
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middle and upper classes for hundreds of years beforehand.  The authors argue that 
education changed the parent-child relationship in several ways.  It minimised the 
economic contribution of the child, while increasing their cost via the provision of 
schooling and consumer tastes acquired outside the home.  Children’s power in the 
familial relationship increased as parents realized that a well-educated child could 
lead to an increase in social status, and a child with access to new information asserts 
themselves more within the family.  Thus, the focus of childhood became the 
preparation for adulthood, and the parental response was to have fewer children and 
invest more in each one in order to maximise child opportunity (Levine & White, 
1986, p. 19). 
 Heavier investment in fewer children was also made possible by demographic 
transitions over the last 500 years, such as decreases in mother’s death at childbirth, 
reduced infant mortality, safer nutrition (e.g., water treatment, pasteurization), and 
innovations in healthcare.  According to Levine and White (1986), the result of these 
events was a final transition in parental attitudes towards children.  Because the 
economic benefits granted from parent to child are often never reciprocated, parents 
come to benefit from a subjective satisfaction and identification with children who 
compete successfully (e.g., Henz, 2008; Nauck, 2005). 
 Some sociologists argue that there was no concept of childhood until the 17
th
 
century (Ariès, 1960) and far less parental investment.  However, other sociologists 
present evidence that, at least as far back as the 16
th
 century, adults have recognised 
“the child” as “different from adults… physically and mentally immature and 
dependent on adult protection” (Pollock, 1983, p.98).  From her study of parental 
diaries and first-hand accounts, from 1500-1900, Pollock found that parents found 
“comfort” (Pollock, 1983, p.98, 100) and “emotional satisfaction” (Wrightson, 1982, 
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p.104, as cited in Pollock, 1983) in their children in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, 
suggesting relative consistency in parental subjective satisfaction towards children 
over time.  
Feelings of Ambivalence 
While there is a great deal of comfort and affection that parents can receive 
from their children, this is juxtaposed with the economic and time-consuming burden 
of their care.   This duality may help to explain why Pollock (1983) found 
increasingly prevalent examples of parental ambivalence regarding their children 
from the 16
th
 to 19
th
 centuries.  Increased ambivalence expressed by the 18
th
 and 19
th
 
century diarists reflected an increased emphasis on providing children with the skills 
for success in adulthood and the difficulty of doing so.  There were also mounting 
fears about inadequate parenting.   
An interesting question is whether this ambivalence has actually grown over 
time.  Some authors have argued (Ariès, 1960; Stone, 1977) that, if attitudes towards 
children have changed over the past 500 years, it might not be the affective 
satisfaction of being a parent or the degree of care and protection provided by parents 
that has changed.  Although Pollock (1983) noted that 18
th
 and 19
th
 century parents 
express a greater concern for the training of their child and analyse the state of 
childhood more so than earlier diarists, Pollock also pointed out that 18
th
 and 19
th
 
century diarists may have been more articulate and capable of providing more 
analytical appraisals of their parenting, because writing as a form of expression may 
have been more familiar than to the earlier 16
th
 and 17
th
 century diarists.  
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Attitudes towards Parenthood 
If parents can feel ambivalence toward children and child-rearing, is this 
ambivalence reflected in whether or not people will become parents in the first place?  
Several studies have investigated this topic and consistently found that major factors 
affecting likelihood of becoming a parent are (a) one’s perspective on autonomy, 
particularly women’s autonomy, and (b) the ‘proper’ work of women (Henz, 2008; 
Jones & Brayfield, 1997; Moors, 2008; Nauck, 2005).  For instance, people who 
possess liberal non-traditional views towards women’s work tend to perceive having 
children as less centrally important to a meaningful life (Jones & Brayfield, 1997).  In 
contrast, traditional views of woman’s roles predict early motherhood (Moors, 2008).  
In relationships where household labour is divided equally, or where the man’s 
contribution is greater than the woman’s, couples are older when they have their first 
child (Henz, 2008).   
It has been suggested that this effect emerges because lower female 
contribution lowers the affective and utility benefits of the child for women, which are 
conferred instead by their partner (Henz, 2008; Nauck, 2005).  Consistent with this 
view, an important predictor of having children is the affective value placed upon 
children.  Women with ambivalent attitudes towards the value of children are less 
likely to become a mother (Moors, 2008).  People who place high affective value 
upon children are more likely to be parents, regardless of perceptions of the costs to 
the parents (Henz, 2008).  These parents are adults who expect emotional satisfaction 
(or emotional utility, Nauck, 2005) from their children through the formation of 
intense lifelong bonds.  
Of interest, marriage per se appears to be only weakly predictive of attitude 
towards motherhood.  Specifically, views on marriage were not associated with 
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beliefs that children are central to life satisfaction in six European countries (Jones & 
Brayfield, 1997).  Marriage in itself, along with employment, was seen as a more 
important goal (Moors, 2008).  Religious affiliation was associated with increased 
perception of centrality of children to a fulfilled life (Jones & Brayfield, 1997).  
Consistent with the evidence for a role of employment focus, high levels of education 
were negatively associated with the centrality of children in most of the sampled 
European countries (Jones & Brayfield, 1997). 
Representations of Children 
To understand attitudes towards children, it is useful to consider in more detail 
how adults mentally represent children.  Sociologists have described specific ways in 
which these representations have changed over time, with shifts in popular religious 
ideology, and changing academic perspectives.  Several sociologists have offered 
their own categories of extant child representations (e.g., Benton, 1996; Brown, 1993; 
Hendrick, 1990; Jenks, 2005; Mills & Mills, 2000).  James and Prout (1997; see also 
Jenks, 2005, and Heywood, 2001) discuss how early discourse on children has 
primarily focused on the state of children’s “(ir)rationality” and “naturalness,”  while 
making certain assumptions about the “universality” of these representations, and this 
has shaped the history of childhood studies in itself.  The authors welcome challenges 
to the orthodoxy of thinking about children as incomplete adults, and advocate that to 
understand children and childhood requires less focus on the socialization of the child, 
and more on the world of the child in and of itself, as experienced by children.  
Supporting their view that scholarly interest in understanding children and childhood 
necessitates a shift in focus from the structural features of child development, to 
understanding the world of children from their own perspective, James and Prout 
(1997) reference historical sources, perspectives by educational sociologists (e.g., 
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Hargreaves, 1967; Young, 1971, both cited in James & Prout, 1997), psychologists 
(e.g., Donaldson, 1978; MacKay, 1973; Richards, 1986, all cited in James & Prout, 
1997), anthropologists (e.g., Benedict, 1935, as cited in James & Prout, 1997) and 
semiological studies (James, 1979a, 1979b, as cited in James & Prout, 1997) to 
corroborate this view.  Many of the authors observed the same key representations, 
and there is a degree of category overlap.  I will therefore try to offer an overview of 
the important and distinct representations. 
 The moral nature of the child.  In the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries in Europe, there 
was debate regarding the innate nature of the child.  On the one hand, people of 
Puritan faith believed that children were tainted by Original Sin, and it was the 
purpose of adult society to break the innately evil will of the child (Stone, 1977; cf. 
Pollock, 1983, ch. 4 for arguments about the degree of this claim).  Historical diary 
evidence suggests this view was more common in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, but 
certainly existed into 19
th
 century, and probably to present day (Pollock, 1983).  On 
the other hand, some religious perspectives held that children are innately good and 
closer to God, because their souls have most recently been in His Company.  
Theologians such as Rousseau (1762) and writers such as Wordsworth (1800) and 
Eliot (1861) helped to solidify this image in public thinking in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 
century (Pollock, 1983).  In between these two conceptions of the child are 
conceptions such as John Locke’s (1694) tabula rasa, proposing that children are not 
born inherently good or evil, but have the capacity for both sin and virtue.  In this 
middle ground view, the emphasis is again on the parent to raise the child 
appropriately.  Although this view was present at least since the time of Aristotle, it 
saw a revival in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries through the Baptist faith in Northern 
Europe.  
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Child as natural.  The early 17
th
 and 18
th
 century moral philosophers such as 
Hobbes (1651), Rousseau (1762), Hume (1739) and Locke (1694), framed their 
discussions about the morality of man in a “State of Nature”, that is, in a world pre-
dating society and civilization.  Though they disagree to the extent that Reason exists 
as a guiding moral force for “the Natural man,” framing the debate in this way gave 
rise to the juxtaposition of ideas between the rational, civilised world of modern man, 
and the pre-rational world of the natural man.  The representation that civilization is a 
progression from irrationality to rationality is mapped onto the socialization and 
education of the child that marks the progression from the natural state of the child to 
the rational state of the adult.  Rousseau (1762), in particular, stressed the importance 
of preserving the “nature” of the child by focusing early learning experiences on the 
sensual, rather than the intellectual;  keeping them in “complete ignorance of those 
ideas which are beyond his grasp” (p. 141). 
This perspective of the natural child associated children with Nature itself.  
Expression of this image can be found in the diary entries of parents—at least as early 
as the seventeenth century, but was even more prevalent in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, 
when parents described their children as “plants,” “lambs,” and “flowers” (Pollock, 
1983, e.g. p.111).  Indeed, this was a recurrent theme in the works of William 
Wordsworth, such as “the Lucy poems” (Wordsworth, 1800). Jenks (2005) further 
argues that childhood’s transient inclusion of every human being makes it easier to 
represent childhood as a natural period of growth.  This perspective may lead people 
to frame questions regarding childhood around maturation and development, rather 
than focusing on childhood in and of itself. 
Child as animal.  Fitting in with the overarching themes of “naturalness” and 
“rationality” that have been foundational assumptions in our representations of 
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childhood, children can also be represented as animalistic (or as Jenks, 2005, prefers, 
as “savages”).  This may stem from lay beliefs that socialization equates to 
civilization (Mills & Mills, 2000).  Just as pre-civilized societies are conceptualized in 
western thinking as more savage than civilized ones (e.g., cf. the noble savage of 
Dryden’s, The Conquest of Grenada, 1672, as cited in James & Prout, 1997), so too 
can childhood be represented as the more animalistic state of human existence, to 
which socialization is the solution.  Representing children as animalistic or basal may 
remove them from the full consideration and regard afforded other humans (Jenks, 
2005; Mills & Mills, 2000). Because children lack experience of socialization, they 
may lack the civil skills that are perceived as helping to make humans different from 
animals. 
There is evidence from psychological literature that this perception of children 
as animalistic is still a common one (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007).  In studies of 
outgroup derogation, participants tend to deny outgroups either uniquely human traits, 
such as being polite, broadminded or cold, or human nature traits, such as being 
curious, sociable or aggressive (e.g., Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). Outgroups that are 
denied uniquely human traits can still be perceived to possess the human nature traits 
that humanity shares with animals; in other words, they are seen as being simplistic 
and passionate, but lacking the capacity for subtle and varied emotions.  In contrast, 
outgroups perceived as possessing many uniquely human traits, but few human nature 
traits, are seen as cold and machine-like (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007).  Children fall 
into the former category: they are perceived as more animalistic than adults, as many 
uniquely human traits are acquired through socialization (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007).  
Interestingly, more recent research has shown that outgroups “possessing” few 
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uniquely human traits (i.e., traditional vs. modern societies) can be perceived as more 
child-like, as opposed to more animal-like (Saminaden, Loughnan, & Haslam, 2010). 
Child as vulnerable.  The physical vulnerabilities of children demand that we 
protect them from harm.  Childhood also refers to a state of naïveté about certain 
topics, such as sex, death, money, violence and social relations (Postman, 1983, as 
cited in Mills & Mills, 2000).  The acquisition of this knowledge is gradual and comes 
from different sources, but it helps to mark the change from child to adult.  Diary 
evidence from 16
th
-19
th
 century parents shows enduring parental concern and care 
during times of illness, as well as a fear among some parents that their children will 
grow up too fast (Pollock, 1983). 
Of importance for social psychology, there is a relevant disparity between 
Western media representations of the “wholesome and life-enhancing” child in 
Western nations, and children who are “pitiful in image, if not in reality” in 
impoverished, non-Western nations (Mills & Mills, 2000, p.25).  Most Western media 
representations of children from other nations focuses on those who are most 
vulnerable – those who are orphaned, starving, or are victims of war, mutilated 
begging syndicates, and child prostitution.  Kitzinger (1990, cited Mills & Mills, 
2000) labels this as implied racism: childhood is represented by a white child; 
suffering is represented by the black child.  The contrasts between the Western child 
and portrayals of non-Western children highlight the “universality” of assumptions of 
childhood in Western thinking: to the extent that Western ideas of childhood become 
normative, the experience of the non-Western child is seen as an underprivileged 
version of childhood, while failing to consider the relevant socio-cultural environment 
and the child’s interaction with it.  Richards (1986, as cited in James & Prout, 1997) 
criticizes this view, that Western representations of childhood “were supposed to hold 
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good across all societies and at all historical times” and this “misrepresent[s] the 
relationship between individual and social worlds” (Richards, 1986 p.3, as cited in 
James & Prout, p. 20).  
Social child (Child as Apprentice).  Childhood is perceived as a time of 
“becoming,” when a child’s experiences shape the future individual.  “Growing-up” is 
the socialization of children at appropriate developmental milestones, providing them 
with relevant skills to function effectively in the larger social context of adulthood.  It 
is important to appreciate how from this perspective, the adult state is seen as 
desirable and complete, and childhood as a “biologically determined stage on the path 
to full human status” with “rationality as the universal mark of adulthood” (p.10 
James & Prout, 1997).  The adult world “extends a welcome to the child, invites him 
to cast off… his differences, and encourages his acquiescence” (Jenks, 2005, p.8).  
The pervasiveness of this idea is best highlighted by the great volumes of 
developmental work that followed in the Piagetian trend: that childhood can be 
thought of a series of distinct developmental milestones in creating the rational adult 
from the irrational child.  As a result, cultural transmission is perceived to be in the 
hands of adults, causing the dynamic and creative power of the learner to be 
overlooked (Waskler, 1991).  When radical originality emerges from the youth, the 
old label the young as “deviants” (Mills & Mills, 2000).  This perspective focuses on 
competitive education and on achieving social hurdles to improve future outcomes.  
Relevant to this perspective, Pollock’s (1983) analysis of diarists’ entries about 
children describes an increased trend over time for parents to concern themselves with 
training and preparation of their children for adulthood and the increased expression 
of anxiety in trying to meet this demand.  This perspective has an implicit cultural 
bias (Danziger, 1970, as cited in James & Prout, 1997) about the universality of the 
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socialization process.  In her studies of the Zuni, Dobu, and Kwakiutl, Benedict 
(1935, as cited in James & Prout, 1997) notes the cultural differences in the 
socialization process from the different responsibilities children have, and their degree 
of subordination.  
Children as persons in their own right.  “If too much attention is paid to 
what the child will become, then childhood itself is devalued” (Mills & Mills, 2000, 
p.21).  Waskler’s (1991) uses examples of children at play in make-believe scenarios 
to highlight that children can exist both as full social beings of their wider culture in 
situations with which they are familiar (i.e., working knowledge of gender, age and 
professional roles), and exist as beings of their own world.  That is, their actions do 
not always conform to adults’ expectations, and is not always for the practice of 
becoming an adult, but is often focused on the experience of the present moment 
(Donaldson, 1978; Hardwood, 1973; James, 1979a, 1979b, cited in James & Prout, 
1997; Waskler, 1991).  In the traditional Piaget (1972) “number conservation task” 
children are asked if two rows containing an equal number of counters are indeed 
equal.  One row of counters is then spread out and the same question is asked again.  
Failure of children to report that the number of counters is still equal was taken as 
evidence of the pre-operational child’s inability to conserve numbers.  Donaldson’s 
(1978, as cited in James & Prout, 1997) explanation of the failure of some children at 
the traditional “conservation task,” was that children aim to please the experimenter 
and so take the second asking of the question to mean that their initial answer was 
wrong.  When the counters are spread out by a “naughty teddy” and not the 
experimenter, children have a clearer reason for being asked again, and children as 
young as four years old correctly report equal numbers of counters.  James’ (1979a, 
1979b, as cited in James & Prout, 1997) study of the language and concepts used by 
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children reports that “when it is no longer necessary to describe behaviour as pre-
rational it becomes possible to contextualize it as expressive of their social world” (p. 
19, James and Prout, 1997). 
The main images of children in this representation are two-fold.  First, unlike 
the representation of the Social Child above, this perspective suggests that children 
are not just passive recipients of adults’ intended socialization, but are unique (in 
terms of experiences and processing of experience) and active participants in the 
shaping of their personalities.  Second, the personhood of the child exists in the 
present, and is fundamentally distinct from the person the child will become as an 
adult.  This perspective advocates a shift from the traditional structural concerns in 
education to teacher-pupil interactions and child-centred learning, changing the 
representation of pupils as objects of socialization to active participants (Young, 
1971, as cited in James & Prout, 1997).  The focus, therefore, is less on the intended 
lessons of socialization, than children’s direct interpretations of the experience, or as 
Mills and Mills (2001) put it, on “being” rather than “becoming” (p.21). 
Areas for Psychological Enquiry 
 The different ways in which children can be represented raises interesting 
questions about how information processing in adults might be affected, depending on 
which mental representation(s) are active.  Motivations, attitudes, and behaviour 
might be influenced by which representation of children is currently active.  For 
example, activation of the child-as-vulnerable representation might elicit pro-social, 
helping motivations leading to attitudes that are more sympathetic to those in need 
(and not just children in need) and greater benevolence toward others.  The near-total 
neglect of adult representations of children in psychology leaves open abundant 
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avenues of investigation that may or may not lead to important applications to 
intergroup dynamics and increasing pro-social behaviours.   
Part of the issue may be due to certain assumptions about the universality of 
representations and attitudes towards children as discussed above.  These assumptions 
may have led to a kind of institutionalized “childism,” which has presupposed the 
exploration of this area. This may explain why controversy emerged among 
sociologists following Ariès’ (1960) assertion that there was no conception of 
childhood prior to the 18
th
 century (see, e.g., Heywood, 2001; Jenks, 2005; Mills & 
Mills, 2001; Pollock, 1983).  It may have seemed intuitively unlikely that there have 
rarely been consensually shared views on the nature of childhood. As Heywood 
(2001, p.12) puts it: “most people assume their own ideas and practices concerning 
childhood are ‘natural’, and are shocked to discover that other societies diverged from 
them” (his quotations). Coupled with children not having a voice for themselves, it is 
easy to imagine why assumptions about shared views of children have led to their 
neglect in legal and societal discourse (e.g., Webb, 2004).   
Before outlining the key questions that will be examined in this dissertation, 
however, it is useful to review the recent empirical psychological research that has 
examined adult mental representations of children.  Some of these studies emerged 
during my dissertation research, and other evidence existed just before my dissertation 
research.  All of the recent psychological studies are informative, but, as I will show, 
they had limited utility for the questions investigated here. 
Discrimination against children. In a series of papers, Gilbert, Spatz Widom, 
Browne, Webb, and Janson (2009) review studies that investigate the extent of child 
maltreatment in high income and Eastern European countries, finding that despite 
efforts to provide care to abused children (including psychological abuse and neglect) 
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there remains a discrepancy between rates of maltreatment reported by child 
protection agencies, and self-report and parental reports of rates of maltreatment, 
meaning some maltreated children never receive support.  For instance, one study 
examined reports that only 5% of physically abused and 8% of sexually abused 
children received support from protection services (MacMillan, Jamieson, & Walsh, 
2003, as cited in Gilbert et al., 2009).  It is estimated that one in 30 children in the UK 
are physically abused of those reported to social services, only one in 250 of 
physically abused children are appropriately monitored (Woodman, Pitt, Wentz, 
Taylor, Hodes, & Gilbert, 2008, as cited in Gilbert et al., 2009 ).  Worldwide 
estimates of sexual abuse are at about 5-10% for girls, and 1-5% for boys (Andrews, 
Corry, Slade, Issakidis, & Swanston, 2004, as cited in Gilbert et al., 2009), with rates 
of psychological abuse being roughly the same (Edwards, Holden, Felitti, & Anda, 
2003, as cited in Gilbert et al., 2009).  Approximately a fifth of maltreated children 
referred to child protection agencies in the US and UK receive repeat referrals within 
24-27 months (Fluke, Shusterman, Hollinshead & Yuan, 2008; Hamilton & Brown, 
1999, both cited in Gilbert et al., 2009), though this may indicate better monitoring by 
social services.  Scandals in a number of European countries has brought to light that 
even once children are taken into residential care, the possibility of maltreatment is a 
prevalent risk factor (Pinheiro, 2006, as cited in Gilbert et al., 2009), with perpetrators 
comprising institutional staff, but also other (typically older) residents (UNICEF, 
2001, as cited in Gilbert et al., 2009).    
Implicit and explicit measures of attitude toward children.  People tend to 
be reluctant to express negative attitudes towards children, and there seems to be 
some general social and parental consensus on the importance of children. At the 
same time there is marginalization of children in rights legislation and general health 
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planning (Webb, 2004).  In an attempt to explain this dissociation some work has 
already been conducted investigating attitudes towards children, but focusing on 
potential differences between explicit and implicit measures of adults’ attitudes 
towards children (Maio, Karremans, Webb, & Leygue, unpublished c.2009).  Implicit 
measures of attitudes tap automatic evaluations and are less susceptible to social 
desirability biases (Fazio and Olson, 2003), because they measure and compare speed 
of association between the attitude object (children) and words of either positive or 
negative valence.  Implicit measures of attitudes are also better predictors of 
spontaneous behaviours than self-reported evaluations (Dovidio, Kawakami, & 
Gaertner, 2002).   
Explicit measures of attitudes towards children used by Maio et al., 
(unpublished c.2009) include attitude thermometers, open-ended attitude and 
emotions towards children measures.  The authors also included an indirect measure 
of attitudes towards children; a questionnaire about participants’ willingness to 
interact with different people (including children) in hypothetical situations (Towles-
Schwen & Fazio, 2006, as cited in Maio et al., 2009).   
Implicit measures of attitudes included the Simple Association Test (SAT, 
Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales, & Christie, 2006), in which participants are tasked with 
matching stimuli words (e.g., “boy,” “man”, “chair”) that appear in the centre of a 
computer screen with the appropriate category labels that appear, paired, in top right 
and top left of the screen.  The categories included the target attitude objects (“child” 
and “adult”), evaluative valence (“pleasant”, “unpleasant”), and two neutral 
categories (“furniture”, “middle”).  Over four test blocks each attitude object was 
paired with an evaluative category to form a joint category (i.e., child or pleasant; 
child or unpleasant; adult or pleasant; adult or unpleasant), which shared a keyboard 
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button for participants to correctly categorize stimulus words to these labels.  A 
different keyboard key was used to categorize stimulus words if they belonged to the 
two neutral categories, which also appeared paired, on the other side of the screen 
(furniture or middle).  By observing speed of responses in categorizing words to the 
appropriate joint categories, taking into consideration error rate and general 
processing speed, four separate implicit association strengths for child and positive 
words (C+), child and negative words (C-), adult and positive words (A+), and adults 
and negative words (A-) can be calculated.   
Significant positive correlations between C+ and C- on the SAT were 
obtained, with no correlations of any other target-valence pairings (A+ A-; C+ A-; C- 
A+) reaching significance.  This means participants were similarly fast (or slow) at 
categorizing child words when the category of child was paired with “unpleasant” or 
“pleasant”, and is indicative of ambivalence in attitudes towards children when 
measured using implicit tests (Maio et al., c. 2009).  Analysis of the explicit measures 
by Maio et al., (unpublished c.2009) bore out the assumption that people express more 
positive attitudes towards children than they do negative attitudes (p <.001); and 
express more positive attitudes, and fewer negative attitudes, towards children than 
attitudes towards adults (ps<.001).  This preference for children over adults was not 
found using the implicit measures.  Regression analyses revealed participants with 
less positivity towards children on the C+ index expressed more positivity in attitudes 
towards children on the thermometer scale; and participants with greater negativity 
towards children on the C- index reported feeling more negative emotions elicited by 
children (Maio et al., unpublished c. 2009).  There were no significant correlations 
between implicit or explicit measures of attitudes and willingness to interact with a 
child, but participants were less willing to interact with a child than a stranger.  Taken 
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together, these results are suggestive that, although explicitly people tend to report 
more positive attitudes towards children, implicit measures indicate that attitudes 
towards children are ambivalent.  Furthermore, participants who explicitly claim 
greater positivity in their attitudes towards children may hold relatively weaker 
implicit associations of children with positivity.   
 Effects of children on values.   Given the many ways children might be 
conceptually represented, interesting questions arise as to what effect the presence or 
even the mere thought of children (whether abstract or a specific known child) may 
have on adult social cognition and behaviour.  I will attempt to answer this question in 
this dissertation, but some work completed recently sheds light that children can, in 
fact, have an effect on adults’ social cognition.  A recent set of experiments 
investigating the effects of child salience on values reported a general trend of child 
salience increasing self-transcendent values (Maio, Foad, Karremans, & Gebauer, 
2012), which are associated with more caring, benevolent, pro-social behaviours 
(Schwartz, 1992).   
In Experiment 1, Maio et al., (2012) primed childless Dutch students in the 
child salience condition (write about what it would be like to have a child, what 
she/he would look like, and what kind of personality this imaginary child would have) 
vs. no prime in the control condition; before all participants completed an adapted 
version of the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992).  There was a significant 
main effect of priming condition on endorsement of self-transcendent values, such 
that participants in the child salience condition endorsed self-transcendent values 
more strongly than participants in the control condition.  Underlying this was a 
significant interaction between prime and sex, such that men’s endorsement of self-
transcendent values increased following the child prime, but not women’s (although, 
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this was likely due to a ceiling effect in this sample).  The circular structure of 
Schwartz’s (1992) values model contrasts motivationally opposing higher-order value 
dimensions (e.g., openness vs. conservatism; self-transcendence vs. self-
enhancement) and research suggests that participants who attach particular 
importance to one higher-order value domain tend to accord lower importance to the 
contrasting value dimension (i.e., participants who emphasise the importance of self-
enhancement value orientations attach less importance to self-transcendent value 
orientations, and vice versa; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995).  In line with this theorizing, 
Maio et al., (2012) found main and interaction (again with sex, male value differences 
underlying the effect) effects of child salience prime on decreasing endorsement of 
self-enhancement values (Experiment 1).   
To test that the effect was not accounted for by activation of nurturing motives 
in particular following the prime, Maio et al., (2012) changed the priming 
manipulation and added additional comparison conditions in Experiment 2. 
Participants in the two child priming conditions had to write about either what (they 
think) it is like to care for a child (child nurturing prime); or what a typical child is 
like (child prime).  In the comparison prime conditions participants had to write about 
what they think it is like to care for an elderly person (elderly nurturing prime); or 
what a typical elderly person is like (elderly prime).  There was a final control 
condition in which participants received no prime.  Using participants recruited from 
the UK, USA and India, Maio et al., (2012) found that the child prime condition lead 
to significantly greater endorsement of self-transcendent values than the control 
condition, whereas the differences in self-transcendent value endorsement between 
the other three priming conditions (child nurturing, elderly nurturing, and elderly 
prime) and the control were non-significant.  This provides evidence that our mental 
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representations of children per se are spontaneously associated with pro-social value 
orientations independently of activating nurturing motivations; highlighting the 
importance for studying the ways in which adults represent children, to better 
understand the wider impact on adult social behaviour.    
Key Questions in this Dissertation 
My research began with the aim of understanding the effects of adult mental 
representations of children on how adults perceive other ethnic and religious groups, 
then it moved to a focus of the effects of these mental representations on perceptions 
of individuals, and finally it turned to closely examining the content of adult mental 
representations of children.  The reasons for this progression will be made clear in 
each portion of the thesis.  For now, it is useful to given a brief outline of each topic. 
Effects of children on attitudes toward groups.  I began my research by 
testing whether inclusion of children in the conceptual representation of a prejudiced 
outgroup can affect attitudes towards that outgroup.  In what ways might our attitudes 
towards children be expected to affect an overall group attitude? This might depend 
on the way in which we represent children.  Are they agentic and independent, or 
cultural cut-outs of their parents?  Could thinking about children in the context of 
prejudiced others increase feelings of affinity and familiarity, or reduce prejudice 
towards that outgroup?  Do children spontaneously elicit a need to protect?  If 
inclusion of children in thinking about outgroups could affect attitudes towards the 
target group, it might do so for the following reasons: 
Longstanding perspectives in social psychology indicate that common 
category membership facilitates more positive attitudes.  For example, it is possible to 
reduce feelings of prejudice by incorporating immigrants as part of the ingroup by 
highlighting common identity (Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser, & Wilbur, 2006).  The 
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explanation for this finding is that ingroup members receive positive bias (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) and so categorizing immigrants as ingroup members based on a 
common group identity serves to impart ingroup positivity on previously outgroup 
members (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000).  This process may backfire however if the 
new common identity is threatening to the initial identities (Hewstone, 1996; 
Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doojse, 1999; Esses et al., 2006).  Inclusion of 
children in evaluative judgements of an outgroup might give rise to a common group 
identity because all humans were members of this group in early life, and so lead to 
more positive attitudes of the outgroup.  This positivity would be a direct result of the 
common category membership. 
Another way in which children might affect attitudes towards outgroups when 
they are explicitly included in conception of others is because of the representative 
distinctions of the child as “an apprentice” vs. “a person in their own right” (Mills & 
Mills, 2000, pp. 19, 21; see also Jenks, 2005).  To view cultural transmission in the 
hands of adults, such that children learn their culture from their parents and replicate 
it, rather than help create it, is to expect children to be relatively similar to the whole 
outgroup.  From this perspective, inclusion of children in judgements of outgroups 
may have no effect on overall attitudes, because the children are essentially being 
evaluated by the same criteria as the adults.  In the case of prejudiced outgroups this 
may exacerbate negative attitudes as the children could represent a resurgence or 
continuation of, for example, values or cultural norms which are the root of the 
prejudice.  On the other hand, if children are viewed as independent persons to their 
adult population, then there is at least the possibility of discontinuation of those values 
which generate the prejudice, as well as room for the emergence of new value systems 
to take their place (when the prejudice is not based solely on ethnicity). 
P a g e  | 22 
I used immigrants as the target outgroup, because they often receive prejudice 
from citizens of host nations, and for the historical focus of using immigrants as the 
target group in other empirical studies interested in intergroup attitudes.  I 
manipulated whether children were likely included in attitude judgements toward 
immigrant outgroups by including or excluding information relating to immigrant 
children from a larger body of information about immigration prior to participant’s 
attitude ratings. 
 Effects of children on attitudes toward individuals.  To follow from the 
investigations of child salience on attitudes towards groups, I hoped to simplify the 
picture by focusing on how child salience might affect perceptions of individuals.  It 
turned out that the picture was actually more complicated, with child salience 
manipulations interacting with implicit evaluations of children, and perceptions of the 
target (that were independent of the prime) that had moderating influences on whether 
primed category information would be assimilated or contrasted from implicit 
evaluations in way that adds to the picture of previous research on these effects (e.g., 
Lepore & Brown, 1977; Gaertner and Mclaughlin, 1983). 
A fine-grained analysis of adult mental representations of children.  I will 
end this dissertation with a more exploratory investigation into the ways in which 
children are mentally represented by adults.  After the first two experimental 
paradigms failed to find straight forward effects of children salience on attitudes 
towards groups (Chapter 2), and individuals (Chapter 3), it seemed prudent to return 
to a ground up investigation of the composition of adult beliefs, emotions and 
behaviours associated with children.  Starting out by defining exactly what is meant 
by “a typical child”, participants were asked to provide age boundaries to different 
stages in early life (e.g., infancy, childhood, adolescence, etc.).  These age boundaries 
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helped to standardize what participants imagined when asked to provide their 
emotions, behaviours and beliefs towards different age groups of children.  After 
collecting a wide range of statements within these three domains, – and for each age 
subgroup of children, – any synonymous emotion, belief or behaviour responses were 
collated into a set of unique responses.  Different participants then rated their 
agreement that these unique emotions, beliefs, and behaviours are indeed associated 
with their respective age group of childhood.  Analysis on ratings of agreement to the 
applicability of associated emotions beliefs and behaviours within each age group 
indicated the most consensually held components to our mental representations of 
children.  Exploratory factor analysis revealed the structure of associations of these 
components to latent factors, and allowed for a reductionist approach to creating a 
scale from a consensual subset of emotions, beliefs, and behaviours (this was done for 
children only, and not for the other age groups: babies, toddlers and teenagers).  This 
scale I called the Child Attitude Component Scale (CACS), and it can be used as a 
measure of stereotype content endorsement towards children.  This scale might help 
improve predictive power of future studies interested in understanding child salience 
and priming effects by providing a measure of participants’ endorsement of particular 
aspects of their representations of children.  The formation of the CACS, as well as 
convergent and discriminant validity of the scale with other measures is discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 2 Prejudice and Immigration 
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This chapter summarizes an investigation into whether attitudes towards 
children can affect attitudes towards larger outgroups to which the children belong.  I 
argue that, if one were to conceptualize groups of people, for example, based on 
nationality, race or faith, the mental representations of the outgroup (or ingroup) will 
consist of prototypical adult members of the group.  People will rarely incorporate 
children into these mental representations of outgroups, unless situational factors 
prompt them to do so. 
Nonetheless children are valid members of many groups, whilst existing also 
as members of their own distinct subgroup (e.g. Jenks, 2005; Mills & Mills, 2000).  It 
is possible that attitudes towards outgroup children could be different from attitudes 
toward outgroup adults, and from attitudes toward the outgroup as a whole.  If this is 
the case, then perhaps the explicit incorporation of the child in the outgroup 
representation might affect attitudes toward the outgroup.  
 One important possible effect of this integration of children into an outgroup 
representation is reduced prejudice toward the group.  This effect could emerge in at 
least two ways.  First, it may be helped, in part, by the representation of childhood as 
a transitory and inclusive time of growth, which everyone has experienced (Jenks, 
2005).  As a result, similarities can be drawn between ingroup and outgroup children 
through their joint existence as “children”.  In addition, adults could draw similarities 
with their own past existence as children.  Because all adults were once children, 
inclusion of children in outgroup concepts may increase perceptions of similarity, 
familiarity, and experience with the outgroup.   
According to Social Identity Theory (SIT, Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Self 
Categorization Theory (SCT, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987), there 
is not a fixed conception of self, rather “the self” can be categorized at various levels 
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of abstraction (such as personal identity, “I”; or the social self, “we”).  The 
categorization of the self will fluctuate between groups to which we belong depending 
on salient contextual factors such as perceiver readiness (past experience, current 
motivations), and comparative fit with other members of salient groups(the degree to 
which we see ourselves as similar to other members of the group, and different from 
members of another group; Turner et al., 1987).  When ingroup-outgroup 
categorization is salient, people engage in efforts to maintain ingroup superiority 
relative to the comparative outgroup, by emphasising the differences that confer 
positive advantages to the ingroup (such as greater prestige, image or entitlements) 
while derogating the outgroup (e.g., Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002).  In particular, 
when group identity is salient, and the outgroup poses a threat to group identity, 
increased prejudice and discrimination is more likely (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, 
& Doosje, 1999).  However, the effects of intergroup prejudice can be reduced by re-
categorizing self and other into a common group identity based on shared 
superordinate social category distinctions that include both the outgroup and the 
ingroup together (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000).  This common identity model posits 
that creating an inclusive common social identity will allow for ingroup positivity 
biases to be conferred to the (previously) outgroup members, and serves to make 
attitudes more favourable towards these members (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).  In an 
experiment to test the effects of inducing a common identity on German and Canadian 
nationals’ attitudes towards immigrants, Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser and Wilbur, 
(2006) made salient either participants’ national identity, or induced a common 
national ingroup identity that included immigrants.  They also took a measure of 
social dominance orientation (SDO, Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), a 
measure of preference for maintaining intergroup inequalities, as individuals with 
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higher social dominance orientation are more prejudice against immigrants (Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1999).   
Participants in the national identity condition were asked how important it is to 
them to be Canadian/German and how much they identify with being 
German/Canadian.  Participants in the common national ingroup condition were asked 
to think about the percentage of Canadians/Germans that have parents who were not 
born in Canada/Germany, and to what extent they thought Canadian/German 
nationals and immigrants goals and values were the same.  There was also a control 
condition in which participants were asked about TV and newspaper consumption 
rates among the general public.   
For Canadian participants, higher social dominance orientation predicted more 
negative attitudes towards immigrants for the participants in the national identity and 
control conditions, but not the common national ingroup condition.  For participants 
especially high in social dominance orientation (+1 SD), the common national 
ingroup manipulation lead to significantly more favourable attitudes towards 
immigrants than the other conditions, but there was no effect of experimental 
manipulation for participants low in social dominance orientation in the Canadian 
sample.  For Canadian participants, inducing a common ingroup identity that included 
immigrants worked to reduce prejudice in participants with high social dominance 
orientation (who are most likely to hold prejudiced attitudes).  However the less 
favourable attitudes of the national identity and control conditions indicate that a 
common ingroup identity does not happen spontaneously, but needs to be prompted 
for an inclusive identity to guide social cognition (Esses et al., 2006). 
For the German participants, social dominance orientation did not predict 
more negative attitudes towards immigrants in the control and national identity 
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condition, but did predict more negative attitudes in the common national ingroup 
condition.  For the German sample, there were no significant differences in 
favourability towards immigrants between the conditions for participants who were 
low on social dominance orientation.  Participants who scored relatively high on SDO 
in the German sample reported significantly more negative attitudes towards 
immigrants in the common national ingroup condition, than the other two conditions.  
For the high SDO participants from the German sample, the manipulation to create a 
common identity backfired leading to greater prejudice towards immigrants.  The 
explanation for this effect given by Esses et al., (2006) is that an attempt to induce a 
common inclusive ingroup in German participants with their immigrant population 
was threatening to their sense of national identity. 
Important to explaining the different effects of the same manipulation for 
Canadian and German participants is an understanding of the historical context of 
immigration within these nations.  Canada has had policies that support 
multiculturalism for over 30 years, and has historically considered immigration an 
important part of national development (Knowles, 2000, as cited in Esses et al., 2006).  
Germany, on the other hand, and despite having a large immigrant population, has an 
establishment discourse of denying being a nation of immigrants (Graßler, 2005, as 
cited in Esses et al., 2006); perceiving its immigrants as guest workers despite the fact 
that many immigrants become permanent residents (Zick, Wagner, van Dick, & Petzl, 
2001, as cited in Esses et al., 2006); and possessing relatively strict processes to 
naturalization. 
Strategies to improve intergroup attitudes using the common identity model 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) therefore need to take into consideration the contextual 
factors that will influence the efficacy of an inclusive identity, if the desired outcome 
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of reducing prejudice, rather than heightening it, is to be achieved (Hewstone, 1996; 
Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doojse, 1999; Esses et al., 2006). 
A second mechanism that could decrease prejudice involves spontaneous 
effects of children on social values.  Recall from Chapter 1 that there is evidence of an 
increase in self-transcendence values after child priming (Maio et al., 2012).  Maio et 
al., (2012) argue that the increase in importance of self-transcendent values was a 
particular effect of activation of representations of children per se, independent of 
activating a motivation for nurturing, or activating representations of vulnerable 
groups in general (i.e., the elderly).  Therefore inclusion of children as part of an 
outgroup concept while forming evaluations of the larger group might lead to more 
positive attitudes because of the activation of self-transcendent values such as 
benevolence and universalism that promote caring and tolerance towards others.   
Nonetheless, it is also possible that integration of children into an outgroup 
representation increases prejudice toward the group.  This possibility arises because 
children are also seen as more animalistic than adults (Loughman & Haslam, 2007; 
Mills & Mills, 2000; Jenks, 2005).  In the study by Loughnan and Haslam, (2007) 
children were perceived to possess many human nature traits, such as being friendly 
or aggressive, but few uniquely human traits, such as humility and broadmindedness. 
This animalistic representation could influence attitudes towards outgroups, which are 
often derogated by representations of animalistic nature.  The salience of children 
might reinforce prejudicial attitudes by further reducing the extent to which the 
groups are seen as possessing uniquely human qualities.  
A third potential effect of including children is more nuanced; it depends on 
the valence of attitudes toward children.  Specifically, people may project their 
attitudes toward children on to their attitudes toward the outgroup.  Recall from 
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Chapter 1 that people vary in their attitudes toward children, often with greater 
negativity detected in implicit measures of attitude toward them than in explicit 
measures of attitude toward them.  It is conceivable that negative attitudes towards 
children will act to increase the negativity of attitudes towards the outgroup, while 
positive attitudes toward children will act to increase the positivity of attitudes toward 
the outgroup.   
These mechanisms raise three separate possibilities.  First, the common 
category and self-transcendence activation mechanisms may cause people to express 
more positive attitudes towards outgroups when children are salient members of the 
outgroup than when they are not.  Second, the children-as-less-uniquely-human 
mechanism may cause people to express more negative attitudes toward outgroups 
when children are salient members of the outgroup.  Third, the projection of attitude 
mechanism may cause people to develop more negative attitudes towards the 
outgroup when their attitudes to children are negative, while developing more positive 
attitudes toward the outgroup when attitudes towards children are positive. 
The Present Research 
To examine the effects of integrating children into perceptions of outgroups, I 
wished to use outgroups that were known to be targets of prejudice among the British 
public.  This was preferable to using a neutral or positively-appraised outgroup for 
two reasons.  First, it would be important to avoid ceiling effects with positively 
regarded groups.  An upward change in favourability toward the outgroup would be 
difficult to detect if the group is already favourably regarded.  Second, the inclusion 
of a negatively evaluated target group has applied ramifications for interventions to 
reduce prejudice.  
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With these issues in mind, I chose to use “immigrants” as the target group. 
Immigration is a controversial topic in the UK and public opinion is divided between 
prejudice and acceptance of immigrants.  Worry over immigration takes the form of 
fear of declining national standards, less employment opportunity to nationals, and 
fear of social loafing.  Even a cursory glance at the UK border agency website reveals 
an emphasis on “controlling,” “strengthening” and “enforcing” immigration law 
(http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk).  Previous studies on prejudice and immigration 
(e.g., Esses et al., 2006) have found that immigrant groups are the targets of more 
prejudice when there is a perceived threat to the ingroup.  
I conducted two experiments to examine whether making salient that children 
are a constituent subpopulation of immigrant groups would have any effect on 
attitudes towards the group as a whole, compared to attitudes towards immigrant 
groups when children were not salient.  Salience of children as outgroup members 
was manipulated by including or omitting statistics pertaining to rates of child 
immigration in a larger body of text about general immigration statistics.  Self-report 
attitudes towards two immigrant groups, asylum seekers and migrant workers; attitude 
strength ratings, and experience with the outgroups were measured (Experiment 1).  
Implicit measures of attitudes towards immigrants, and an order effect manipulation 
were also added in Experiment 2. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 I wished to investigate whether including children in representations of the 
outgroup can affect later attitude judgements towards the group, using immigration as 
the focal issue.  In the contemporary UK context, it made sense to distinguish between 
two immigrant groups: migrant workers and asylum seekers.  Participants were 
presented with statistics released from the Home Office, UK (2009) about current 
levels of immigration.  These statistics related separately to the immigration of 
migrant workers from other EU countries and to the immigration of asylum seekers.  
The Home Office release also contained statistics relating to asylum seekers under the 
age of 18, and the number of underage dependents living with migrant workers.  
These statistics relating to children were presented or removed as a manipulation of 
the inclusion of children in the outgroup representation.  Participants then rated their 
attitudes and strength of their attitudes towards the outgroups. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-five Cardiff University students participated in this study for course 
credit or £3.  Analyses excluded two participants of Eastern European nationality (for 
whom the experimental outgroups were not outgroups) and five participants who 
failed to complete all parts of the questionnaire properly, leaving a final sample of 68 
students (54 women; 14 men; Mage = 21 years). 
Design 
The experiment utilized a 3 (condition: child absent, child present, child 
rights) x 2 (outgroup: Asylum seekers, Migrant workers) mixed-model design, with 
condition as a between-subjects variable and outgroup as a within-subjects variable. 
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Procedure 
Participants were tested one or two at a time.  They were told that the research 
was examining people’s attitudes towards Migrant workers, Asylum seekers, and UK 
Immigration in general.  The experimenter indicated that people often do not know 
much about the issue and, therefore, he was providing summary information from the 
Home Office in 2009.  Each participant then received a booklet containing the 
experimental manipulation, followed by measures of attitudes toward either asylum 
seekers or migrant workers and then measures of the strength of these attitudes.  
Participants first read the passage containing the manipulation and then completed all 
the measurements towards one outgroup before doing the same for the other outgroup. 
Participants were then debriefed. 
Presentation order for the different outgroups was counterbalanced.  Because 
the passage was on the inside page of the booklet, the experimenter was also blind to 
the experimental condition.   
Experimental Manipulation 
The manipulation passage described statistics regarding immigration in the 
UK.  The passage was an actual press release from the Home Office in the first 
quarter of 2009, with some of the material deleted for the purpose of the experiment.  
The passage highlighted recent changes in immigration from the eight newest 
accession countries to the European Union: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  The passage identified the 
percentage of these immigrants that find employment.  The statistics also indicated 
the number of applications for political asylum from outside the EU, the number of 
asylum applications with decisions, and the percentage of asylum applications that 
were successful.  Conveniently, this distinction in the statistics gave rise to the two 
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outgroups used in the experiment: Migrant workers and Asylum seekers.  Both groups 
are stigmatized to a certain extent in the current British culture, with fear of loss of 
job opportunity on the one hand, and fear of “free-loading” on social welfare on the 
other. 
In the original press release, the statistics also contained information on the 
number of young dependents (children under 18) living with European migrants in the 
UK, as well as the number of asylum applications from persons under the age of 18.  
This information was included in the child-present condition, but not in the child-
absent condition.  In the child rights condition, the information about child applicants 
was followed by a statement from The Children’s Society claiming that the 
Government could do more to protect the rights and welfare of children, particularly 
with respect to detaining child asylum seekers awaiting assessment.  
Attitude Valence 
 Participants rated their attitudes toward each outgroup using five 7-point (1 to 
7) bipolar scales anchored by bad-good, harmful-beneficial, foolish-wise, negative-
positive and worthless-valuable.  These five measures had good inter-item reliability 
for both the Migrant Worker (α = .91) and Asylum Seeker (α = .91) outgroups.  
Scores were therefore collapsed across the measures to a single measure.  This new 
measure is the first of three general attitude ratings towards the outgroups. 
 The second general attitude measure asked participants to indicate their 
general attitude towards the outgroup, using a 7-point scale from extremely 
unfavourable (1) to extremely favourable (7).  The third general attitude measure was 
an attitude thermometer (Campbell, 1971; Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993), with 
responses ranging from 0 (negative) to 100 (positive).  A space was provided for 
participants to indicate any number between 0-100.  
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 Responses to the three general attitude measures were highly correlated, rs > 
.75, ps < .001.  Thus, scores on each measure were converted to z-scores and then 
averaged in order to form one overall indicator of general attitude for each outgroup.   
Attitude Strength 
Participants rated the strength of their attitudes toward each outgroup by 
indicating the certainty, strength, accessibility, knowledge, personal relevance, 
extremity, and importance of their attitude (Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & Petty, 
1995).  Participants used a 9-point scale from 0 (not at all) to 8 (extremely) to rate 
how certain, strong, personally relevant, and important their attitudes were.  
Knowledge was measured on the same 9-point scale, but using a novel item that asked 
“How closely do you pay attention to information about Asylum Seekers/Migrant 
workers?” which had significant positive correlations with the other attitude strength 
items for both target groups.  Attitude accessibility was measured using the item 
“How frequently do you think about Asylum Seekers/Migrant workers?” using a 5-
point scale from 1 (Never) to 5 (Very often).  Scale reliability for the attitude strength 
measures were α=.85 in the case of asylum seekers and α= .88 in the case of migrant 
workers.  For ease of analysis, z-scores were calculated for the strength items, and 
then a mean z-score strength rating towards asylum seekers and migrant workers was 
calculated.   
Experience with Outgroup 
Participants rated their experience with the outgroup using 4-point response 
scales from 1 (none at all) to 4 (A lot).  Participants indicated their ambivalence on a 
dichotomous item that asked if their feelings were certain or mixed. 
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Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses revealed no simple effects or interactions involving sex 
of participant.  Therefore, sex of participant was not included as a factor in the 
analyses below. 
Attitude Valence 
As shown in Tables 1 (asylum Seekers) and 2 (migrant workers), attitudes 
were mildly favourable toward towards asylum seekers and migrant workers  
 
 
Table 1. Mean attitude rating scores and standard deviations towards asylum 
seekers, by condition 
Child Inclusion Mean Semantic 
Differential  
General 
Favourability 
Thermometer 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Child Absent 4.32 .80 4.32 1.25 57.62 16.18 
Child Present 4.34 1.14 4.43 1.70 59.78 23.47 
Child Rights 4.43 1.26 4.52 1.53 58.96 23.77 
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Table 2. Mean attitude rating scores and standard deviations towards migrant 
workers, by condition 
Child Inclusion Mean Semantic 
Differential  
General 
Favourability 
Thermometer 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Child Absent 4.91 .65 4.77 1.15 65.55 13.08 
Child Present 4.56 .99 4.48 1.37 63.04 20.62 
Child Rights 4.97 .94 4.87 1.29 64.26 19.87 
 
 
 
Effects of the Experimental Manipulations 
A mixed model ANOVA was conducted on the combined z-score of the three 
general attitude measures (here on referred to as total attitude score), with outgroup 
(asylum seekers, migrant workers) as a within-subjects factor and the experimental 
manipulation as a between-subjects factor (child rights salient, child salient, child 
absent).  No significant effects were obtained, ps > .05.  For extra rigor, I repeated the 
ANOVA separately for the semantic-differential scale scores, the overall favourability 
judgment, and the attitude thermometer.  These three ANOVAs also failed to reveal 
significant effects, ps > .05.  
The Role of Attitude Strength 
Means and standard deviations for the strength items can be found in Table 3 
(composite mean for the 9-point attitude items, and the 5-point attitude accessibility 
item given separately). As shown in the table, participants tended to report only weak 
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strength in their attitudes towards asylum seekers and migrant workers.  Participants 
also tended to be more ambivalent in their attitudes towards both outgroups, with 73.5 
% of participants reporting ambivalent attitudes towards asylum seekers, and 66% of 
participants reporting ambivalent attitudes towards migrant workers. 
 
 
Table 3. Means and standard deviation of attitude strength towards asylum seekers 
and migrant workers by condition 
Child 
Inclusion 
Attitude strength asylum seekers Attitude strength migrant 
workers 
9-point items Attitude 
accessibility 
9-point items Attitude 
accessibility 
Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Child 
Absent 
3.56 1.32 2.09 0.68 4.1 1.55 2.45 0.80 
Child 
Present 
3.42 1.48 2.22 0.95 4.10 1.55 2.30 0.76 
Child 
Rights 
3.45 1.48 2.17 0.58 4.01 1.67 2.57 0.95 
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Two regression analyses were conducted to test whether the effects of the 
manipulation were moderated by the self-reported strength of attitudes toward each 
immigrant group.  These analyses regressed either attitudes toward asylum seekers or 
attitudes toward migrant workers on experimental condition (dummy coded), and 
mean attitude strength (centred separately for attitudes towards asylum seekers and 
migrant workers) and their interaction. 
For asylum seekers, the regression revealed no significant effects or 
interactions, ps > .10.  For Migrant workers, the regression analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of attitude strength, R² Change =.128, F(3,64) = 3.12, p=.03, 
such that more positive attitudes were rated as stronger.  There was no significant 
difference between the child absent and child present, t(3,64)=-.96, or child rights 
conditions, t(3,64)=.08, ps >.10.  The interaction of experimental manipulation with 
attitude strength, R² Change = .01, F(2,62) = .19 p>.1, was non-significant. 
The Role of Experience with the Outgroup 
 Experience with the target outgroup, child inclusion and their interaction were 
regressed on total attitude scores towards Asylum Seekers and Migrant Workers.  
There were no significant effects or interactions, ps > .1. 
Summary 
 The experimental manipulation of including children in statistics relating to 
immigration did not affect attitudes towards the larger immigrant population 
compared to when the statistics relating to children were omitted.  When strength of 
attitudes was entered as a predictor into a regression on attitudes towards  migrant 
workers, there was a significant main effect such that participants felt more strongly 
about positive attitudes.  This effect was not found for asylum seekers, and all 
interactions of attitude strength with experimental manipulation were non-significant. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 was primarily a replication of Experiment 1, using a simplified 
approach to remove potential confounding factors: Migrant workers were dropped as 
a target outgroup in Experiment 2, and only asylum seekers were used as the attitude 
target.  As implied by the name, migrant workers were a group defined by their 
eligibility to work, which cannot legally include children. For participants that 
received the migrant worker group first, it’s possible that exclusion of children from 
the group concept carried over to their judgements of asylum seekers.     
The Child Rights condition was also dropped for Experiment 2.  This 
condition did not differ from the others in Experiment 1, and I was more interested in 
potential spontaneous effects of inclusion of children in the group concept, without 
leading participants too much on the duty to care for children.  
This experiment also included a supplementary manipulation of  child 
inclusion by varying the order of question items.  In past research, the order in which 
participants are asked to rate their attitudes to different attitude objects can affect 
responses (e.g., Haddock & Carrick, 1999; Schwarz, Strack & Mai, 1991; see also 
Schwarz, 1999, for attitude self-report issues other than question order).  For instance, 
Schwarz et al (1991) asked participants to rate both marital and general life 
satisfaction, as either part of the same conversational context, or in two separate 
contexts.  When the questions were asked in separate contexts there was a higher 
correlation between high marital satisfaction and high life satisfaction, than when the 
questions were asked as part of the same context.  The authors attribute this to the 
inclusion of one’s marital satisfaction in judgements of life satisfaction when the 
questions are given in separate contexts (Schwarz & Bless, 1992a, b).  On the other 
hand, when the participants are asked to serially rate marital then life satisfaction, 
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marital satisfaction is excluded from the judgement of life satisfaction, because the 
participant has already provided this information and assumes that the experimenter is 
looking for something qualitatively different (Schwarz et al, 1991; Schwarz & Bless, 
1992b).  The conversational maxim of quantity is violated by asking again for 
information that has already been provided (Grice, 1975, as cited in Haddock & 
Carrick, 1999), so people exclude information that has already been provided from 
subsequent judgements. 
  This effect exists also for attitude judgements towards individuals and groups 
(Haddock & Carrick, 1999).  When attitudes towards the Queen Mother were 
provided on the same page as attitudes towards the Royal Family, correlations 
between the two attitudes were low and the Royal Family was appraised less 
favourably as a result of the Queen Mother’s exclusion.  When the two attitude 
judgements appeared as part of two separate questionnaires, the correlations between 
the attitudes toward the Queen Mother and the Royal Family were higher (Haddock & 
Carrick, 1999). 
Experiment 2 therefore included a supplementary manipulation of question 
order as a means of examining the effect of child inclusion: half of participants in the 
child absent condition were asked to indicate their attitude toward children prior to 
their indicating attitudes towards asylum seekers.  This was to test the assumption that 
children are not naturally included as part of outgroup concepts.  If children are 
generally included in the concept of the outgroup when making attitudinal ratings, 
then asking about attitudes towards children prior to rating the group as a whole 
should lead to their exclusion from the secondary rating towards the whole group.  As 
a result, there should be lower correlations between the two attitude ratings than when 
attitude ratings towards children are provided by participants subsequent to the group 
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attitude (Haddock & Carrick, 1999).  If children are not included in the outgroup 
concept, then this latter correlation should be non-significant and weaker than the 
former correlation.  
 Experiment 2 also included both an explicit measure of attitudes towards 
children, as well as an implicit child attitude measure, adapted from the pen-and-paper 
IAT developed by Mori, Uchida, and Imada (FUMIE test, 2008).   Tests of implicit 
evaluations tend to be better predictors of spontaneous behaviour than self-report 
measures (Dovidio et al., 2002).  Implicit measures of attitudes towards children also 
tend to be more negative than explicit measures (Maio et al., 2009).   As these 
experiments were concerned with the spontaneous effects of child inclusion in group 
concepts, the FUMIE test was included to explain the direction of effects if 
differences arise in attitudes towards the group as a whole between the child inclusion 
and exclusion conditions.  If including children in outgroup concepts causes attitudes 
towards the group as a whole to shift based on spontaneous activation of implicit 
evaluations, then this effect should be more pronounced for participants with more 
extreme scores on implicit measures of attitudes towards children.   
 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-eight participants took part in this study for £3 payment.  Participants 
were staff and students at Cardiff University, sampled via reply to an email 
announcement asking for participants to help in psychological research.  There were 
49 women and 49 men.  
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Design 
The experiment utilized a between-subjects design of child inclusion 
manipulation on attitudes to asylum seekers. There was a supplementary manipulation 
of child-first vs child-second attitudinal rating order for participants in the child 
absent condition.  
Procedure 
As in Experiment 1, participants were informed that we were interested in 
their attitudes towards Asylum seekers and UK immigration in general, and that the 
Home Office (2009) statistics were there to help inform them.  Participants then 
completed the same series of questionnaires as in Experiment 1, as well as an explicit 
measure of attitude towards children, measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1, 
Extremely unfavourable, to 7 Extremely favourable.  A mean for the five semantic 
differential perception scales (α=.91) of asylum seekers items was calculated and used 
as an attitude measure.  Correlations between the mean attitude rating, the 
favourability rating and the attitude thermometer were all very high, rs>.84, ps< .001. 
The internal consistency of the average of the three z-scores was excellent, α=.95.  
Therefore, the z-scores were combined into a single measure of attitude towards 
asylum seekers (total attitude score). 
Next in the questionnaire were instructions for a paper IAT. This measure was 
an adapted version of Mori, Uchida, and Imada’s (2008) FUMIE test, where positive 
and negative words are arranged in thirteen columns.  After the first column, 
subsequent columns contained combinations of the positive and negative words and 
five child-related (target) words, interspersed in the set: child, kid, girl, boy, and 
infant.  Instructions explained that the task for the first column was to tick as many 
positive words, and cross as many negative words as possible in 20 seconds, working 
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down the column.  The task for the second column would be to mark as many child-
related words with a cross, in addition to the ticking of positive words, and the 
crossing of negative words, as possible in 20 seconds.  For the following (third) 
column, the participants’ task was to tick child-related words, as well continuing the 
same pattern of marking for the positive and negative words.  The ticking and 
crossing of child-related words was then alternated for a further eight columns, for a 
total of eleven columns including the first three just described (i.e., tick child words in 
columns five, seven, nine and eleven; cross child words in columns four, six, eight, 
and ten).  Of the ten target columns (two through eleven), there were five word order 
presentations, repeated once each, and arranged such that each order would be part of 
a child-negative and a child-positive trial.  Columns twelve and thirteen were dummy 
columns to prevent participants trying harder on the last trial.  Before each column, I 
(as the experimenter) described the pattern of marking to be used for the current 
column (ticking or crossing child-related words), and made sure the participant was 
ready before timing them on the column. 
Results and Discussion 
 Preliminary analyses revealed no effect of participant gender, and so gender 
was not included for further analysis.  
Order Effects 
 General favourability towards Asylum Seekers and Children were not 
significantly correlated in both the child attitude first, r(18)=.02, and the Asylum 
Seeker attitude first, r(31)=-.09, conditions, and the general favourability ratings were 
not significantly different between the conditions, t(47)=1.46, p=.15.  Therefore, the 
data were combined into a single “child absent” condition for the remaining analyses.  
 
P a g e  | 45 
Attitude Valence  
Mean ratings for the combined semantic-differential scales, general favourability, 
attitude thermometer are presented in Table 4 below.  
 
Table 4. Means and standard deviations for attitude measures by child inclusion 
condition 
Child 
Inclusion 
Mean Semantic 
Differentials 
General 
Favourability 
(Asylum 
Seekers) 
Thermometer General 
Favourability 
(Children) 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Child 
Absent 
4.51 1.09 4.53 1.42 58.49 19.09 5.76 1.18 
Child 
Present 
4.65 0.92 4.86 1.27 63.90 19.07 5.24 1.30 
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Effects of Experimental Manipulations 
Independent samples t-test revealed a significant difference only for general 
favourability towards children t(96)=2.03, p=.05, such that participants were more 
favourable toward children in the child absent condition than in the child present 
condition (all other ps >.1).  The t-tests were repeated for the individual semantic 
differential scales, but no significant differences were obtained, ps>.1. 
The Role of Attitude Strength 
Mean strength ratings of the 9-point strength measures and the 5-point attitude 
accessibility measure are presented in Table 5 below.  Inclusion or exclusion of 
children from the group concept did not lead to any significant differences in mean 
attitude strength in an independent sample t-test, p>.1.  I then conducted a regression 
analyses that entered z-mean attitude strength, child inclusion condition and their 
interaction as predictors of attitudes towards asylum seekers.  Results indicated a 
significant main effect of mean attitudes strength, R² Change = .26, F(2,95)= 16.35, 
p<.01, such that more positive attitudes towards asylum seekers tended to be rated as 
being stronger attitudes.  The main effect of child inclusion condition, t(3,97)=.84, 
p>.1, and the interaction, R² Change = .001, F(1,94)= .17, p>.10 were not significant. 
 
Table 5. Mean attitude strength scores and standard deviations, by condition 
Child inclusion Mean attitude strength on 9-
point items  
Attitude accessibility 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Child absent 3.71 1.40 2.31 0.82 
Child present 3.88 1.16 2.43 0.74 
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The Role of Experience with Asylum Seekers 
 Frequencies for ratings of experience with Asylum Seekers were 37 for None 
at all, 44 for Very Little, 15 for A Moderate Amount and 2 for A lot.  When experience 
was entered into a regression analyses with child inclusion condition as predictors on 
attitudes to asylum seekers, there were no significant main effect of experience, 
β=.16, t(2,95)=1.54, p>.1, or experimental manipulation, β=.10, t(2,95)=0.99, p>.1.  
However, there was a significant interaction effect, R² Change = .05, F(1,94)=2.91, 
p=.03 (shown in Figure 1 below).  Greater experience with asylum seekers was 
associated with more positive attitudes towards them, particularly for the child absent 
condition.  An independent sample t-test revealed no significant differences in ratings 
of experience with Asylum Seekers between the child inclusion conditions, t(96)=-
1.06, p>.1. 
 
 
Figure 1.  2-way interaction of experience with outgroup and child inclusion 
condition on mean z-attitude scores. 
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Implicit and Explicit Attitudes towards Children 
There were no significant correlations between explicit attitudes towards 
children and attitudes towards asylum seekers, ps>.1.  General favourability towards 
children was entered as a predictor into five multiple regression analyses with 
different combinations of child inclusion condition, attitude strength, experience with 
asylum seekers, FUMIE test scores, and their interactions on total mean z-attitude 
scores, but no main effects or interactions involving general favourability towards 
children were found, all ps>.1 
 Implicit attitudes towards children (FUMIE) were also entered into four 
regression analyses with child inclusion condition, attitude strength, experience with 
asylum seekers, and their interactions on total mean z-attitude scores, but no main 
effects or interactions involving FUMIE test scores reached significance, all ps>.1. 
Summary 
 Experiment 2 also failed to find an effect of child inclusion on attitudes 
towards an immigrant group.  Stronger attitudes predicted more positive attitudes 
towards asylum seekers, as it had done for migrant workers in Experiment 1.  Neither 
explicit, nor implicit measures of favourability towards children were able to predict 
attitudes towards asylum seekers.  There was evidence that greater experience with 
asylum seekers is predictive of more positive attitudes towards them; however this 
was only for participants in the child absent condition.  The pattern of results 
presented in Figure 1 is a potentially promising finding that attitudes towards groups 
can be made more favourable when child membership is made salient, but only when 
experience with the outgroup is not already accounting for the effect.  However, this 
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interpretation should be made cautiously because only two participants (one in each 
experimental condition) reported having a lot of experience with asylum seekers.  
General Discussion 
 I wanted to investigate whether including children as part of an outgroup 
representation when making evaluative judgements would affect attitudes towards the 
group.  In both Experiments 1 and 2, the experimental manipulation of including or 
excluding children from the immigration statistics had no effect on attitudes towards 
migrant workers (Experiment 1) and asylum seekers (Experiments 1 & 2).  Including 
children in the outgroup concept did not lead to attitudes towards immigrants 
becoming either more positive or more negative.  In addition, the valence of attitudes 
towards children did not interact with the manipulation of child inclusion to shift 
attitudes towards the whole group.  In other words, there was no evidence that 
inclusion of children in the outgroup caused individuals to project their attitudes 
toward children on to their attitudes toward the outgroup. 
 Notwithstanding these null results, the interaction with child inclusion 
condition found in Experiment 2 provides provocative support for the hypothesis that 
including children in the concept of the outgroup can increase positivity of attitudes 
towards the group as a whole, but perhaps only when experience with the group is 
lower.  This is important because, as shown in Figure 1, the inclusion of children 
brought attitudes up to the level of positivity shown by participants with higher 
outgroup experience.  Hence, there may be more room for attitudes to children to 
influence outgroup attitudes when these attitudes are not already made positive by 
outgroup contact.  The outgroup contact might also entail some experience with child 
members of the ougroup, making the further inclusion of children superfluous.  
Nevertheless, this pattern is somewhat incongruent with the lack of effects of explicit 
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or implicit attitudes towards children on attitudes towards the outgroup.  It is 
important for future research to further investigate whether the impact of child 
inclusion depends on familiarity with outgroup members.  Furthermore, experience 
with the target outgroup in this study was low (only two participants reporting a lot of 
experience with asylum seekers), it is possible that actual positive experiences some 
participants in the child absent condition have had that explained this effect.  I also do 
not preclude the possibility that inclusion of children had the effect of reducing 
attitudes towards asylum seekers for participants who also rated higher experience 
with asylum seekers in the child inclusion condition.  The lack of significant 
differences in attitudes towards asylum seekers as a result of experimental 
manipulation means a more likely explanation is that the manipulation failed to 
adequately lead to inclusion of children in evaluations of immigrant outgroups. 
 Given the null effects obtained, it is uncertain whether inclusion of children as 
part of a group concept usually defined by adult members can influence attitudes 
toward the group.  It is perhaps more likely that the manipulation used in these 
experiments failed to successfully incorporate the child into the outgroup 
representation.  It may also be the case that people base their attitudes towards 
immigrants on economic concerns—where the relative influence of children is less 
than that of adults—or moral obligations (particularly in the case of asylum seekers), 
where the rights of immigrants to enter this country are the basis of the evaluation.  If 
children are seen as less relevant to the attitudinal bases of attitudes toward 
immigrants, then the impact of children on these attitudes should be small, even if 
they are included in the group representation.   
The order effect manipulation used in Experiment 2 supported the assumption 
that children are not typically included in conceptions of general outgroups, because 
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there was no significant correlation between attitudes towards asylum seekers and 
children in both order conditions.  Haddock and Carrick (1999) demonstrated attitudes 
towards subordinate and superordinate groups can vary as a function of question 
order: if children were included in the outgroup concept then asking participants about 
their attitudes towards children prior to their attitudes towards the entire group should 
lead participants to exclude them from the subsequent judgement.  There were 
however, no differences and no significant correlations between judgements 
regardless of question order, suggesting that children are indeed not part of typical 
outgroup concepts.  In hindsight, it would have been informative to have included the 
same question order manipulation for the child present condition.  If correlations 
between attitudes towards children and the wider group had varied as a result of 
question order when participants were supposedly induced to include children in the 
whole group representation, this would have provided stronger evidence that the 
experimental manipulations had succeeded.  It would also have been interesting to 
potentially include open-ended measures that prompt participants to offer the 
demographics of the outgroup, in order to detect whether they spontaneously include 
younger age groups.  Such a device might help to further check the spontaneous 
incorporation of children in mental representations of an outgroup. 
In addition to these methodological issues, there are theoretical reasons why 
the inclusion of children may be less powerful than anticipated.  For instance, the 
dominant representation of children in our culture is that of children as ‘apprentices’ 
(Mills & Mills, 2000; see Jenks, 2005 ‘the social child’), whereby children directly 
learn their traits, skills and culture from their parents and adults.  From this 
perspective, one might expect that children will grow up endorsing the same values of 
their group, and so inclusion of children adds nothing new to the evaluative 
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dimensions of the outgroup representation which gives rise to the attitudes. This 
possibility fits Western societies’ emphasis on the emergent adult within the child (see 
Chapter 1), whose progress towards complete development is tracked and examined 
in education and social relations.  Future investigation would benefit from examining 
the representations of children (e.g., social apprentice, more virtuous than adult, 
tabula rasa) endorsed while making evaluative judgements and whether multiple 
representations are active simultaneously.  
In sum, the research presented in this chapter failed to find evidence that 
inclusion of children into the representation of an outgroup can affect attitudes 
towards the group as a whole, compared to when children are not included in the 
concept at evaluation.  Due to methodological limitations, it is not possible to 
ascertain fully whether children are able to affect attitudes towards a superordinate 
outgroup, and there are important theoretical issues regarding the exact nature of child 
representations (and how these might affect the contribution of children to outgroup 
attitudes).  Future research could include measures of the representations of children, 
perceptions of similarity and familiarity between ingroup and outgroup children, and 
perceptions of expected change in values or attributes between one generation of 
outgroup members and the next, in order to help better understand this issue.   
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Chapter 3  Child Priming and Attitudes towards Individuals 
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Chapter 3 Summary 
Western children tend to be treated with ambivalence by their adult 
populations.  As a group, they are both cared for, and discriminated against, and 
attitudes towards children tend to be more positive on explicit, but not implicit 
measures (Maio et al., 2009).  If spontaneous mental representations of children have 
negative associations, what is the effect of priming the concept of children on 
impressions of an ambiguous target?  This chapter describes two experiments that 
examined this question.  Participants were primed with either children or adults, using 
a modified Stroop task, prior to receiving neutral information about an individual 
whose age was unspecified.  Using this design, the experiments tested the hypothesis 
that nonconscious negativity toward children as a group is spontaneously mapped on 
to new targets.  Evidence across experiments failed to consistently support this 
hypothesis.  Discussion considers potential future tests that may be more rigorous. 
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The research described in the prior chapter revealed that the impact of children 
on perceptions of other groups of people may be complex.  The research in this 
chapter attempted to detect effects of children by simplifying the aim.  Instead of 
focusing on effects of children on perceptions of groups, I sought to examine the 
effects of children on perceptions of individuals.  By restricting the focus in this way, 
I sought to obtain clearer information on adult mental representations of children.  
The Case for Studying Representations of Children 
While the psychological development of children has received vast empirical 
study (see, e.g., Siegler, DeLoache, & Eisenberg, 2010), relatively little attention has 
been paid to adults’ views about children.  One potential reason is that explicit 
attitudes towards children are generally positive.  Our young represent our future; we 
perceive a psychological, and a social obligation to care for and protect them.  Indeed, 
evolutionary scientists emphasize the role of nurturing instincts in promoting the 
survival of our genes in the face of environmental challenges (Buss, 1996). 
At the same time, however, there is widespread evidence of discrimination 
against children in society.  Children are often marginalised and neglected within law, 
policy, healthcare and social norms (Gilbert et al., 2009; Webb, 2004).  In fact, 
implementation of the United Nations Convention for the Rights of the Child has been 
fought in many Western nations (see Reading et al., 2009). The discrepancy between 
these observations and the evolved need to care for children raises an important issue: 
what are adult attitudes toward children?   
In light of the institutional biases mentioned above, adults’ cultural 
environment may include many negative associations with children as a group, 
independently of any personal experiences with particular children.  As a result, 
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implicit measures of attitude, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT, e.g., 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the Simple Association Test (SAT, 
Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales & Christie, 2006), may reveal ambivalence or negativity 
toward children, because of the potential for such implicit measures to tap broader 
cultural associations (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2004).  In contrast, 
explicit, self-report measures of attitude may suggest more positive attitudes, because 
responses to these measures can be overtly controlled to reflect personal experience, 
motives, and social desirability concerns.   
Several recent studies have supported this reasoning: Explicit, self-report 
measures of attitude toward children reveal significantly more positive attitudes 
towards children than toward adults (Maio et al., c.2009).  At the same time, however, 
implicit tests (e.g., IAT, SAT) reveal that automatic attitudes towards children tend to 
be negative or ambivalent (Maio et al., 2009).  That is, the implicit measures reveal 
relatively more negative attitudes towards children than adults, even among parents 
(Maio et al., 2009).  This negativity even occurs irrespectively of the respondents’ 
assessed risk for perpetrating child abuse (Risser, Skowronski & Crouch, 2011).  
Risser et al. suggest that there is a general out-group bias among adults against 
children, at least as reflected in knowledge structures and schemas assessed implicitly.   
An independent line of enquiry corroborates this view.  Specifically, research 
on infrahumanization of outgroups has shown that outgroups may be denied uniquely 
human traits (and so likened to animals) or denied human nature traits (and so likened 
to automata; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007).  Saminaden, Loughnan, and Haslam (2010) 
note a relationship between animal-like and child-like perceptions of outgroups. 
Children as a group are reported as possessing relatively fewer uniquely human traits 
(Loughnan & Haslam, 2007).  
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 These findings raise interesting questions about the content of people’s mental 
representations of children.  These mental representations may encode a mix of 
ambivalent goals, feelings, beliefs, and behaviours, only some of which become 
included (in some form) within responses to explicit measures.  Moreover, these 
spontaneous, potentially nonconscious mental representations of children may 
influence judgment and behaviour in ways that have gone undetected thus far.  
One method for detecting a global impact of such representations is to 
examine the effects that occur when the group is “primed” – a procedure that makes 
people temporarily aware of the group but not consciously mindful of the group.  A 
well-known example of a relevant group priming effect is provided by Bargh, Chen, 
and Burrows, (1996). In their experiment, participants were primed with an elderly 
stereotype by unscrambling sentences that contained words stereotypically related to 
the elderly such as “Florida, lonely, grey, wise” or neutral words (e.g., “thirsty”). 
Participants who completed the task involving words related to the elderly then 
walked significantly slower down the hallway after the experiment.     
 It is difficult to know the precise reason for Bargh et al.’s (1996) effects, 
except that the answer lies within mental representations of elderly people.  We may 
stereotype them as being slow, leading us to automatically incorporate the slowness in 
our own thinking.  We may store a goal to move more slowly around them, in order to 
make things easier for them.  We may mentally represent them as possessing more 
depressed mood, and assimilate ourselves to that mood state, which slows us down.  
Regardless of which possibility is correct, it is clear that mere salience of the category 
itself is exerting an important impact.  
 There is an important practical reason for wondering too about the effects of 
priming the age group at the opposite end of the age spectrum from the elderly.  Like 
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the elderly, children are often excluded from adult environments.  If their inclusion, 
either in presence or in thought, can affect behaviours, then there may be important 
implications for practices that include or do not include children.  Inducements to 
include or think of children might lead to different outcomes in decision making, 
particularly for policy makers, health care professionals, educators, and social 
workers.  It is also possible that interpersonal behaviour and perceptions are 
influenced by whether or not children are salient.   
Priming and Impression Formation 
Of note, however, there are both the positive and negative aspects of adults’ 
behaviours and attitudes towards children, and there is the possibility for both 
assimilation and contrast of primed concepts.  Both of these complications are 
revealed by considering classic effects in priming research.  One of the best-known 
priming paradigms is the “Donald” paradigm (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; 
Srull & Wyer, 1989).  In this paradigm, participants are primed with a concept of 
interest.  This is typically a stereotype trait or an exemplar of that trait (e.g., hostility, 
a tiger, Hitler).  Participants then read a paragraph explaining a day in the life of an 
ambiguous target (i.e., Donald), and provide their impression of the target.  
In the original Higgins et al., (1977) study, participants were primed with the 
traits “reckless” or “adventurous” prior to reading a paragraph about the daily 
activities of “Donald”, in which his behaviour could equally be described as either 
adventurous or reckless.  When asked to ascribe trait terms to Donald, participants’ 
impressions of Donald were congruent with the traits that had been primed.  
Subsequent studies using this paradigm replicated this result using different traits 
(e.g., Higgins et al., 1977; Srull & Wryer, 1979).  These findings illustrate the 
assimilation of primed information into the characterization of ambiguous characters 
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(Schwarz & Bless, 1992a).  It would appear that recently activated information is 
more accessible and so more readily used to explain ambiguous behaviour (e.g., 
Bargh, 1994). 
However, it was quickly noted and demonstrated by other research that this 
assimilation effect does not always occur; in some conditions, this effect is replaced 
by a contrast effect (e.g., Herr, 1986; Lepore & Brown, 1997). Instead of integrating 
primed information in the perception of an ambiguous target (as in assimilation), a 
contrast effect arises from the exclusion of primed information from the perception of 
an ambiguous target.  This exclusion lowers the likelihood that ambiguous 
characteristics will be interpreted in a manner consistent with the primed information.  
For example, a contrast effect resulting from hostility primes means that the target 
will be rated as less hostile than after neutral primes.  
Many factors determine whether assimilation or contrast effects occur.   The 
original studies used trait words (e.g., aggressive, reckless) for primes (e.g., Higgins 
et al., 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979), and found assimilation effects.  Herr, (1986) was 
able to show that priming moderate person exemplars (e.g., Alice Cooper for 
hostility) will lead to assimilation effects of the primed trait (hostility) on impressions 
of an ambiguous target (i.e., Donald is rated as being more hostile).  On the other 
hand, priming with extreme person exemplars (e.g. Hitler for hostility), leads to 
contrast effects in impressions of an ambiguous target (i.e. Donald is rated as being 
less hostile; Herr, 1986).  This is because, rather than affecting the encoding of the 
target, extreme exemplars serve to act as a comparison standard for the target (Stapel, 
Kooman, & Van der Plight, 1997).  Priming moderate exemplars of traits, therefore, 
seems to affect the interpretation of targets by activating traits that are used to frame 
the impression of the target (Stapel et al., 1997), whereas using extreme exemplars 
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makes the target seem less involved with the trait by contrast.  This comparison 
affects the judgement of the target, and causes the final evaluation of the target along 
the dimension of interest to be significantly lowered (Stapel et al., 1997).
1
 
Mussweiler’s Selective Accessibility Model (SAM; Mussweiler, 2001c, 2003) 
posits another explanation for obtaining assimilation or contrast effects from similar 
information: when participants engage in target comparison they first make a 
judgement on target-standard (trait) similarity.  As a result of determining that the 
target is either similar to the standard, or different from the standard, participants then 
engage in more thorough hypothesis testing of the target-standard comparison along 
the determined dimension of either similarity or dissimilarity.  That is, participants 
who form an initial judgement of target-standard similarity then engage in similarity 
testing, generating reasons that the target is similar to the dimension of interest.  
Alternatively, if the initial target-standard comparison is one of differences, people 
may generate reasons that the target is dissimilar on the dimension of interest.  
Engaging in similarity testing will lead to assimilation effects of target impression to 
the standard (or dimension/trait of interest), while dissimilarity testing leads to 
contrast effects.  
Mussweiler (2001c) was able to manipulate this effect by first asking 
participants to either spot the similarities or note the differences between two nearly 
identical pictures.  Following this prime, participants then read a description of a 
student like themselves and their experience of moving to university.  After which, 
participants were asked to rate their own experiences of university life.  Those who 
had picked out similarities in the pictures rated their experience of university in an 
                                                         
1
 The authenticity of Stapel’s work is now unclear because he admitted to charges of later academic 
misconduct.  Nonetheless, his theoretical explanation of interpretation vs. judgement of information 
about an ambiguous target can nonetheless be applied as a potential explanation for the results found in 
Herr, (1986).   
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assimilative fashion, that is, similar to the experiences of the student they had 
previously read about.  Participants who picked out differences in the pictures rated 
contrastive patterns to the experience of the fictional person whose experience of 
university life participants read about.  The manipulation had engaged participants 
into a mind-set of similarity or dissimilarity hypothesis testing (respectively) leading 
to assimilative or contrastive judgments of their experiences with those of a fictional 
other.  
Prejudice and Endorsement 
 Devine (1989) demonstrated that both high and low prejudiced persons have 
knowledge about the negative aspects of a stereotype, and that priming these negative 
stereotype associations can cause assimilation effects for both high and low 
prejudiced people, when the stereotype is automatically (as opposed to consciously) 
activated.  Devine (1989) argued that conscious control processes were necessary to 
inhibit negative automatic processing in order to preserve a non-prejudiced identity.  
 However, Lepore and Brown (1997) argued that methodological issues with 
Devine’s study led to stereotype assimilation even among low prejudiced participants 
because both the stereotype and category were primed.  Specifically, in the case of 
Devine’s study, all participants were primed with stereotype content words (usually 
negative), which were associated with Blacks (e.g., poor, lazy).  Because even low-
prejudiced participants have knowledge of the stereotype, these and related 
associations were activated and assimilation effects were likely (Lepore & Brown, 
1997).  Priming the category, on the other hand, should lead to different impressions 
among high and low prejudice perceivers, because the negative and positive 
characteristics of a stereotype are differentially associated with the category among 
high and low prejudiced people (e.g., Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983).  When the 
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category is primed, participants that endorse the negative associations between the 
category and the stereotype (i.e., high-prejudice individuals) should show assimilation 
effects (i.e., greater prejudice), to the stereotype information.  When the negative 
aspects of a stereotype are not endorsed, priming the category should lead to greater 
activation of remaining endorsed associations, typically positive, and lead to contrast 
and lower levels of prejudice.   
Lepore and Brown (1997) obtained support for these predictions across three 
experiments that separately manipulated stereotype and category priming.  When only 
negative stereotype words were primed, all participants rated a target more negatively 
on a subsequent impression judgement, showing that both high- and low-prejudiced 
people understand the negativity (in this case) of the stereotype (Experiment 1).  
However, if the category labels were also included in the prime, then participants had 
an opportunity to incorporate their other beliefs (i.e. that do not match typical 
stereotypes) about the category in question into their judgement, because these 
relevant beliefs became active, and not only the (negative) stereotype content.  Thus, 
participants whose extant beliefs about the category were different from the (negative) 
stereotypes being primed (i.e., the low-prejudiced group in Lepore & Brown, 1997) 
used this information in judgements when the category was also primed (leading to 
more favourable impressions). 
The Current Research 
 As a first step toward detecting the spontaneous associations embedded in 
mental representations of children, I conducted three experiments that tested whether 
there are any systematic effects of priming both the category of children and the 
stereotype of children on impressions of novel targets.  Specifically, does the 
activation of the category and stereotypes of children bias judgments of a new, novel 
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target in a particular negative or positive direction, just as simultaneously priming 
other social categories and stereotypes (e.g., Lepore and Brown, 1997) can bias 
subsequent actions and behaviour?  Using a modified version of the Donald paradigm 
(Higgins et al., 1977), participants were primed with either child, or adult related 
words, and read a paragraph about Donald, which was ambiguous regarding 
Donald’sage, and then rated their attitudes toward Donald. 
 EXPERIMENT 3 
Child prime words included child, kid, boy, girl, naïve, and adult prime words 
included adult, grown-up, man, woman, and mature. The primes focused primarily on 
the category, for which common labels for the category members were chosen, with 
only one word reflecting a trait (i.e., naïve or mature), and the trait word was closely 
related to actual age-dependent behaviour.  In this way, I tried to ensure that the child 
stereotype was more negative than the adult stereotype, but not in a manner that was 
dependent on a lot of a priori knowledge about exact stereotype content in 
participants.  
Priming occurred immediately prior to reading the paragraph about Donald.  I 
expected that the spontaneous representations of the stereotype content associated 
with the prime would affect impressions of Donald.  Based on past evidence that 
implicit attitudes towards children tend to be more negative than implicit attitudes 
towards adults (i.e., Maio et al., 2009), I expected assimilation effects of the primed 
content, such that those participants primed with children would report more negative 
attitudes towards Donald than participants primed with adults. 
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Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Forty psychology undergraduates from Cardiff University took part in this 
experiment (34 women; 6 men, Mage= 19) for course credit.  Participants took part 
individually in an ostensible memory experiment, which contained the priming 
manipulation.  Participants then completed an impression formation task, which 
contained the dependent measure.  Participants were then probed for suspicion, 
debriefed, and thanked for their participation.  
Priming Manipulation 
 A modified version of the Stroop task was used to deliver the priming 
manipulation.  There were 21 trials in this task.  Each trial presented white crosses in 
the centre of a black computer screen (1500 ms).  These were followed by a colour 
word (e.g., yellow) appearing in a discordant font colour (e.g., red) on the same black 
background (1000 ms), and finally a message saying “Please respond now!” in blue 
font in the centre of the screen (1200 ms).  While the fixation crosses appeared on the 
screen, participants heard a word spoken via headphones connected to the laptop.  
These words related to adults (e.g., man, woman, grown-up, adult), children (e.g., 
child, boy, girl), or inanimate objects (e.g., desk).  Participants were instructed to say 
aloud, at the end of each trial, the auditory word that had been presented during the 
fixation screens (i.e., prime and neutral words) and then the colour of the letters used 
for the word. 
Measure of Impression Formation 
 I measured stereotype activation using a classic procedure developed by 
Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977).  Participants read a paragraph describing the daily 
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events of a person named Donald.  As in the original paragraph, the description was 
ambiguous on key trait dimensions; it highlighted positive and negative traits. 
 
Donald likes to keep himself busy. When he gets home, rather than to sit and 
watch TV, Donald prefers to take a long bike ride, often going to the library to 
read something interesting. On weekends, Donald plays football in a local 5-
a-side league with friends but also enjoys other sports. His favourite sport is 
tennis and he is a member at his local club. Donald practises tennis year 
round and enjoys watching the tennis “Opens” on TV. He takes part in tennis 
tournaments but always seem to place better in the ‘Doubles’ competition with 
his partner. Donald doesn’t understand why, because he feels he is a much 
better player than his partner, so should generally do better on his own. 
Donald’s other hobbies include baking and writing.  His room is always messy 
and disorganized because he is always too busy doing something else to tidy 
it. This means he loses his keys and phone at least once a week.  
Despite being generally popular with his peers, Donald can also be selfish at 
times, and often requires a lot of motivation when it comes to doing something 
that doesn’t interest him. Winter is Donald’s favourite season because he also 
gets the opportunity to go skiing and ice skating, which he particularly enjoys, 
as his town is at high altitude and it snows there every year. 
 
Participants then read a questionnaire asking about Donald.  Among the items were 
filler questions (e.g., what is Donald’s favourite sport?) and items asking participants 
to estimate Donald’s age (years) and height (inches).  In addition, participants used 7-
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point scales (-3 to +3) to rate the extent to which he was unlikeable-likeable, 
unapproachable-approachable, and friendly-hostile.  
Open-ended Perceptions 
 Participants also responded to an open-ended question: “Do you think that 
Donald is mature?”  This question was included to better understand participants’ 
impressions, and to check that the content of the passage was not affecting 
perceptions of Donald over and beyond the prime. 
Results 
Manipulation check. T-tests revealed that participants who were primed with 
children perceived Donald as being shorter (M=67.8) than participants primed with 
adults (M=70), t(38)= -2.12, p= .04.  In addition, participants primed with children 
perceived Donald as being younger (M=17.2) than participants primed with adults 
(M=21.6), t(34)=-1.97, p= .057.   
Impressions of Donald. T-tests revealed no significant differences in ratings of 
Donald’s likability, approachability, or hostility, all ps > .1 by condition.  Correlations 
between these measures are shown in Table 6 below.  Perceptions of Donald as 
hostile-friendly were negatively correlated with how likeable he seemed, and were not 
significantly correlated with how approachable he seemed.  After perceptions of 
Donald’s hostility were reverse scored (so higher scores meant more friendly), 
summation of the hostility scores with likeability ratings created a scale with 
moderate reliability, α=.77.  However, no significant effects of prime on this 
composite scale were found, p>.1 
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Table 6. Correlations between ratings of Donald 
 Likeable Approachable Hostile 
Likeable 1   
Approachable -.446** 1  
Hostile -625** .256 1 
 
Discussion 
Results from Experiment 3 indicated that the priming manipulation affected 
perceptions of Donald.  Donald was seen as being younger and shorter after the child 
prime than after the adult prime.  This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that 
impressions of Donald were assimilated to the primed stereotype.   
Despite these shifts, perceptions of Donald’s likeability, approachableness, 
and friendliness were unaffected by the manipulation.  If participants assimilated 
Donald to a negatively valenced stereotype of children, then I would expect scores on 
these measures to be lower (more negative) following the child prime than the adult 
prime.  In contrast, if participants contrasted Donald with a negatively valenced 
stereotype of children, then scores on these measures should be higher (more positive) 
following the child prime than following the adult prime.  Neither of these effects 
emerged in the data. 
Perceptions of Donald’s hostility were negatively correlated with how likeable 
he seemed.  I considered in my analyses that these measures taken together might 
provide a measure of Donald’s warmth, given the conceptual overlap of these positive 
attributes with perceptions of warmth in others.  Nonetheless, there were no main 
effects of prime on this composite measure.  
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It is possible that the null effects are due to no difference in participants’ 
attitudes towards adults and children, contrary to past research (Maio et al., 2009).  
However, there were problematic parts in the content of the passage describing 
Donald.  These may have made it difficult for the priming manipulation to influence 
perceptions of Donald.  Specifically, in response to the open-ended question “Is 
Donald mature?”, participants cited (primarily two) parts of the passage: “Donald 
doesn’t understand why, because he feels he is a much better player than his partner, 
so should generally do better on his own;” and “Donald can also be selfish at times,” 
as examples of arrogance and laziness.  These excerpts may have fixed a strong 
perception of Donald in participants’ minds, making it difficult to detect effects of the 
primes on perceptions of him.  To further investigate whether the lack of differences 
in attitudes towards Donald between priming conditions was due to no differences in 
attitudes towards adults and children, or type II error brought about by confounds of 
the Donald passage, Experiment 4 included a new version of the Donald paragraph 
and additional measures.  
EXPERIMENT 4 
Experiment 4 removed the portions of the Donald paragraph that implied some 
arrogance (or immaturity).  In theory, this would leave more room for participants’ 
impressions of Donald to vary, enabling the manipulation to exert a stronger effect.  
I also included measures of warmth and competence towards Donald.  
Loughnan and Haslam (2007) note the similarity between uniquely human traits with 
competence, and human nature traits with warmth – measures developed by Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick and Xu (2002) in the study of perceptions of outgroups.  It should 
follow then that children are rated higher in warmth than competence, and vice versa 
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for adults.  Thus, I opted to include measures of warmth and competence (Cuddy, 
Fiske, & Glick, 2008) in this experiment. 
For exploratory purposes, this experiment also included explicit measures of 
warmth and competence stereotypes of children and adults in general. 
I also included an implicit measure of participants’ attitudes toward children 
and adults (Greenwald et al., 1998). Based on the work of Lepore and Brown (1997), 
whether assimilation or contrast effects occur can depend on the valence of pre-
existing evaluations towards the target.  Rather than assuming the relative negative 
implicit evaluations towards children than adults found by past researchers (Maio et 
al., 2009) as I did in Experiment 3, assimilation or contrast to the negative child 
stereotype content should vary as a function of individual evaluations towards 
children and adults.  I felt the best way to measure this would be to use an implicit 
measure of evaluation, the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) towards children and adults 
to avoid social desirability responding.  
 The warmth and competence, and implicit measures were included after the 
primes and measures of impressions of Donald. .  
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Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Thirty-three participants (22 women; 11 men, M age = 38 years) were 
recruited via an email sent to staff at Cardiff University.  They took part individually 
and were told that they would be taking part in different studies.  The first study 
primed participants with words referring to adults, children, or control objects.  The 
second study contained our dependent measures, followed by an evaluative child-
adult IAT, and an item determining whether participants were parents.  Participants 
were then probed for suspicion, debriefed, and thanked for participation.  
Procedure 
Priming manipulation.  The prime was manipulated through the same Stroop 
task as in Experiment 3. 
Stereotype activation.  Stereotype activation was again measured using the 
Donald paradigm developed by Higgins et al., (1977), but with small modifications to 
the paragraph description that was presented to participants.  Specifically, I removed 
the portions that implied some arrogance in Donald.  The new Donald paragraph is 
below: 
 
Donald likes to keep himself busy. When he gets home, rather than sit and 
watch TV, Donald prefers to take a long bike ride, often going to the library to 
read something interesting. On weekends, Donald plays football in a local 5-
a-side league but also enjoys other sports. His favourite sport is tennis and he 
is a member at his local club. Donald practises tennis year round and enjoys 
watching the tennis on TV. He takes part in Doubles and Singles competitions 
with his tennis partner. They generally place well in the doubles competition, 
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but coaches say Donald underachieves in his singles games. Donald also likes 
baking and writing.  His room is always messy and disorganized.  His mum 
says he’s too lazy; he says he’s too busy. This means he loses his keys and 
phone at least once a month.  
Despite being popular with his peers, Donald can also be selfish at times, and 
often requires a lot of motivation when it comes to doing something that 
doesn’t interest him. Winter is Donald’s favourite season because he also gets 
the opportunity to go skiing and ice skating, which he particularly enjoys, as 
his town is at high altitude and it snows there every year. 
Perceptions of Donald.  Participants then completed the same set of filler 
questions, questions about height and age, and questions about Donald’s 
approachability, likeability, and friendliness as in Experiment 3.  
Using scales developed by Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2008), participants 
additionally rated the warmth (6 items: warm, friendly, good-natured, well-
intentioned, trustworthy, sincere) and competence (6 items: competent, intelligent, 
confident, efficient, skilful, capable) of Donald, and then children and adults 
(randomized order) on twelve 7-point Likert scales from (1 not at all) to (7 
Extremely).  Scale reliabilities for warmth items were good for Donald (α= .78), 
children (α=.79), and adult targets (α=.86), and so were collapsed into a single scale 
rating of warmth for each target.  Scale reliability of warmth measures for Donald was 
then improved by removing the trustworthy item (α=.84).  Scale reliabilities for 
measures of competence for Donald (α=.70), children (α=.83), and adults in general 
(α=.69) were good.  Scale reliability for Donald was then improved by removing the 
item “confident” (α=.77). 
P a g e  | 72 
Child-Adult Evaluative IAT.  The task involves categorizing adult- (e.g., man, 
woman, grown-up) and child-related (e.g., boy, girl, kid) words as adult or child 
terms, and evaluative words (e.g., pleasant, nice, terrible, horrible) as good or bad 
terms and was adapted from Maio et al., (2009).  Words to be categorized appear in 
the centre of a screen, with category labels in the upper corners.  Participants 
indicated which category the central word belonged to by pressing keys on either side 
of the keyboard.  The IAT includes 7 blocks.  Blocks 1 and 2 familiarized participants 
with the task of separately categorizing evaluative words as either good or bad (Block 
2); and child and adult related words as either child or adult (Block 1).  Blocks 3 and 
6 were practice blocks for the critical trials.  Block 4 was the first set of critical trials 
where the child category was paired with the bad category, and adults with good.  In 
Block 7 this pattern was reversed.  In the critical blocks, participants categorized both 
the adult/child related and good/bad words simultaneously, with category labels 
paired together on the same key press (e.g. adult-good, child-bad, and vice versa).   
The difference in speed of categorizing when the target categories (adult and 
children) are associated with negative vs. positive evaluations (Blocks 4 and 7) gives 
an indication of the valence of the evaluative associations with these groups.  I 
subtracted the speed of completing the block containing the child-positive and adult-
negative associations from the block containing the child-negative and adult-positive 
associations.  Consequently, higher scores indicated a longer time to respond to 
negative (than positive) associations with children (than with adults).  To further 
refine the IAT score, Greenwald’s improved d-score algorithm was utilized.  In this 
procedure, the d-score was calculated as the mean of the difference in mean latency 
from the practice blocks, divided by their pooled standard deviation, and the 
difference in mean latency for critical blocks divided by their own pooled latency.  
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Half of participants had the child-bad pairing as the first set of critical trials, and vice 
versa for the other half of participants. The IAT was run using DirectRT (Empirisoft, 
2006) on a Windows XP operating system. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Unlike Experiment 1, t-tests revealed no significant differences in estimations 
of Donald’s height, t(28)=1.54, p=.14, or age, t(31)=.27, p=.73, between the adult and 
child prime conditions.  Participants estimated Donald’s age at 21.1 years (SD=7.57, 
min-max=10-45 years), which was not significantly different from estimations of his 
age in Experiment 3, t(67)=-.77, p=.44.  
Perceptions of Donald 
 T-tests revealed no significant effects of the manipulation on ratings of 
Donald’s likeability, t(70)=-.10, p=.93, and approachability, t(70) = -.84, p=.41.  In 
contrast, there was a significant effect of the manipulation on ratings of Donald’s 
friendliness, t(70)=-2.28, p=.03, such that participants primed with children perceived 
Donald to be less friendly (M=0.69) than those primed with adults (M=1.56).   
Correlations between these measures are shown in Table 7, below. Perceptions 
of Donald’s approachability were negatively correlated with how likeable he seemed, 
and were not significantly correlated with how hostile-friendly he seemed.  After 
perceptions of Donald’s hostility were reverse scored (so higher scores meant more 
friendly), summation of the hostility scores with likeability ratings created a scale 
with low-moderate reliability, α=.62.  However, no significant effect of prime on this 
composite scale were found, t(31)= -1.27, p=.21.  As in Experiment 3, these measures 
together were not as reliable test of Donald’s warmth as I had hoped, which is why 
separate measures of warmth and competence were used. 
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Table 7 Correlations between ratings of Donald 
 
Likeable Approachable Hostile 
Likeable 1   
Approachable .166 1  
Hostile -.445* .200 1 
 
 
When parental status was entered as an additional factor in the analyses, there 
were no significant effects or interactions with parenting status.   
Warmth and Competence 
 Paired samples t-tests revealed that children (M=4.88, SD=.85) were rated as 
significantly warmer than adults (M=4.11, SD=.74), t(32)=4.00, p=.001.  Also, adults 
were rated as significantly more competent (M=5.04, SD=.44) than children (M=3.63, 
SD.84), t(32)=-8.95, p=.001.  There were no significant differences in ratings of 
warmth and competence for adults and children by priming condition, ps>.05, 
although child competence approached significance t(31)=1.96, p=.06, with children 
being rated as more confident in the child prime (M=3.90, SD=.84) than adult prime 
condition(M=3.34, SD=.76). 
Also, there were no significant main effects of prime on ratings of warmth or 
competence for Donald, children, or adults, all ps >.058, with only a marginal 
difference emerging for child competence, t(31) = 1.20, p=.059 (indicating slightly 
higher child competence after child priming). 
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Exploratory analysis  
Although the original intention was to use the IATs scores and manipulation 
checks as DVs in separate analyses of the effects of condition, the weak effects of the 
manipulation led me to consider the possibility that the effects of the manipulation 
were moderated by other factors.  In particular, I tested whether there were 
interactions between the manipulation, participants’ perceptions of Donald’s age, and 
their spontaneous attitudes toward children.  To examine this issue, I conducted a 
regression analysis that entered all three variables as predictors of the attitude and 
stereotype ratings of Donald, with the continuous variables (age, IAT scores) 
standardized and the manipulation dummy coded (Dawson & Richter, 2006; Aiken & 
West, 1991).  Results indicated a three-way interaction between estimations of 
Donald’s age, IAT scores, and the manipulation on ratings of Donald’s competence 
R² Change=1.55, F(1,24)=5.25, p=.03, shown in Figure 3.  Slope difference tests 
(Dawson & Richter, 2006) revealed when Donald was perceived as being older and 
they were primed with children, participants who exhibited more positive attitudes 
toward children rated Donald as significantly more competent than participants who 
imagined Donald as younger, t(25)= 2.28, p= .032; than participants who were primed 
with adults and imagined a younger Donald, t(25)= -2.22, p= .036; and than 
participants primed with adults and imagined an older Donald, t(25)= -2.67, p= .033.  
Spontaneous attitudes toward children did not significantly predict ratings of Donald’s 
competence in the adult prime conditions, ps >.05, but there was a significant effect of 
spontaneous attitudes in the child prime condition and when they saw Donald as being 
younger on ratings of Donald’s competence, t(25)=-2.19, p=.04, in the opposite 
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direction. 
 
Figure 2  3-way interaction of prime, IAT and estimations of Donald's age on perceptions of 
Donald's competence 
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Discussion 
As expected, children were perceived as relatively warmer and less competent 
than adults.  This finding is consistent with prior assumptions that children are seen as 
warmer but less competent than adults (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002; Loughnan & 
Haslam, 2007).  
Nevertheless, priming children did not exert a strong impact on perceptions of 
Donald.  Unlike Experiment 3, participants in Experiment 4 rated Donald as less 
friendly following a child prime than adult prime.  This result is consistent with past 
findings that spontaneous mental representations of children tend to be more negative 
than representations of adults (Maio et al., 2009).  This past result emerged in parents 
and non-parents, and parenting status exerted no significant effects in the present 
analyses.  Presumably, therefore, both the spontaneous negativity and the present 
finding reflect learned cultural associations, regardless of experience with children 
(Maio et al., 2009; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).  
However, these results should be taken with caution.  The effect was only 
obtained differences on one attitude dimension (friendly-hostile).  It remains unclear 
why the other attitude-relevant traits were unaffected.  Also, the effects of child 
priming on ratings of Donald’s warmth and competence were not consistent with this 
simple effect.  Instead, the prime interacted with the perceived age of Donald and 
spontaneous attitudes toward children (as recorded by the IAT).  When participants 
were primed with children and perceived Donald as being older, participants with 
more negative attitudes to children rated Donald as less competent.  This effect may 
have arisen because participants that had negative implicit attitudes towards children 
had the incompetent stereotype of children activated following the prime.  Upon 
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imagining that Donald is older, application of their low competence expectations may 
have made him seem particularly low in competence for his age.  In contrast, when 
participants had more positive implicit attitudes towards children, they were perhaps 
more willing to attribute higher competence to children following the prime.  
Applying this stereotype to the older target would have matched the age-appropriate 
competence expectancies.  This interpretation fits past research (e.g., Lepore & 
Brown, 1997), where category primes exerted differential effects for participants who 
were either implicitly positive or negative (in this case) in their attitudes toward the 
target group.  However, this interpretation does not explain why, when Donald was 
imagined to be younger, participants with positive implicit evaluations towards 
children rated Donald significantly less competent in the child prime condition than 
did participants with negative implicit attitudes towards children. It is also unclear 
why ratings of warmth were unaffected. 
The three-way interaction seems to suggest that the prime affected the 
judgement of Donald, rather than the interpretation of the information.  This is unlike 
the results in Experiment 3, where the primes made Donald seem younger and shorter 
to participants.  In contrast, in Experiment 4, judgements of his age and height were 
independent of the manipulation.   In Experiment 4, estimations of Donald’s age came 
before items about Donald’s competence, potentially allowing for it to interact with 
the prime and implicit associations to affect the judgement of competence, but not the 
encoding of the information.  What remains unclear is whether participants had a clear 
idea of Donald’s age before asked, and if asking them to estimate his age led to the 
creation of a more concrete idea of Donald that allowed his age to play a stronger role 
in judgments.  
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Experiment 5 
In Experiment 5, I placed the implicit measure of participants’ evaluations of 
children in a pre-test session several weeks prior to the main session.  The measure 
was the same as in Experiment 4, but Experiment 4 included the measure after the 
manipulation, making it conceivable that this measure was influenced in some 
(undetected) manner by the manipulation.  The new design helped to more robustly 
test the role of attitudes to children as a predictor.  
In addition, I changed the priming task to a sentence-unscrambling task.  This 
method has been used successfully in a number of past experiments (e.g., Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1996; Srull & Wyer, 1979), and I sought to apply it to using adult or children-
related statements. 
Method 
IAT Pre-Test  
Approximately 200 first-year psychology undergraduate students enrolled at 
Cardiff University participated in a battery of measurements during their induction to 
the course. During this session, participants completed the child-adult evaluative IAT 
described in Experiment 4.  
Participants 
 Fifty-nine first-year Cardiff psychology undergraduates (56 women; 3 men, 
Mage = 19) who volunteered after the pre-test took part in this experiment.  
Procedure 
 Priming manipulation. The priming task was changed to a sentence-
unscrambling task (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1996).  Participants were asked to 
rearrange seven scrambled words, drop one of them and make a cogent sentence with 
the remaining six words.  For example, “Horses hay to drink grass prefer eating” can 
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be rearranged, and the word “drink” dropped, to make the sentence “Horses prefer 
eating hay to grass”.  There were 15 scrambled sentences in total: five neutral filler 
sentences (e.g., “Paper mountains were walls thin the as”) and ten prime sentences 
that related to either children or adults.  Prime sentences described a child or adult in 
action (e.g., “the girl/woman brushed her long hair”), or described an irrelevant 
category (e.g., “clowns/drinks are popular at birthday/dinner parties”).  Sentences 
between child and adult prime conditions were matched as closely as possible. 
Stereotype activation. The Donald story used in Experiment 4 was used again 
for Experiment 5. 
Perceptions of Donald. Participants completed the same perception questions 
used in Experiment 4 (i.e., perceptions of how friendly, likeable, approachable Donald 
is, and measures of warmth and competence towards Donald), with the exception that 
Experiment 5 did not contain the warmth and competence items regarding adults and 
children generally.  High inter-item consistency for warmth and competence items 
towards Donald were obtained (competence, α = .73; warmth, α =.86).  Thus, the 
mean warmth and competence ratings were calculated for each participant.  
Attitudes towards children.  Participants completed an explicit measure of 
general favourability towards children, using a favourability thermometer.  As in past 
research using the thermometer to assess intergroup attitudes (e.g., Haddock et al., 
1993; Maio et al., 1996), participants rated their favourability to children on a 
thermometer-like scale from 0 (not at all favourable) to 100 (extremely favourable).   
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Results 
Manipulation Check 
 Mean age and height estimations of Donald are shown below in Table 7. T-
tests between conditions revealed no significant differences in these estimations of 
Donald’s height, t(53)=-.14, p=.90, or his age, t(53)=-.72, p=.42. 
 
Table 8.Means and standard deviations for estimations of Donald’s height (inches) and age (years) 
 
  M SD 
Height 
(Inches) -  
Child Prime                    
Adult 
Prime 
70.24 2.73 
70.35 2.94 
Age (years)           Child Prime                   
Adult 
Prime 
17.59 2.37 
18.35 5.14 
 
 
Perceptions of Donald 
 A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant effects of prime (child vs. adult) 
on perceptions of Donald’s likeability, approachability, and friendliness, all ps > .05.  
Regression analysis that entered prime, IAT d-scores, general favourability towards 
children, and their interactions as predictors of these variables revealed no significant 
effects. 
Warmth and Competence Ratings 
Regression analysis that entered prime, IAT d-scores, general favourability 
towards children, and their interactions as predictors of Donald’s warmth and 
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competence revealed no main or interaction effects of general favourability towards 
children on any perception measures.  However, there were significant interactions 
between IAT score and priming condition in the analyses of Donald’s warmth, R² 
Change = .084, F(1,50)=4.96, p=.03, such that participants primed with adults rated 
Donald as significantly less warm when they had more positive implicit attitudes 
towards children (than toward adults), t(50)=-2.98, p<.01.  
A significant interaction between IAT scores and priming condition on ratings 
of Donald’s competence was also found, R² Change = .10, F(1,50)= 5.71, p=.02, such 
that participants primed with adults rated Donald as marginally less competent when 
they had positive implicit attitudes towards children, t(50)=-1.83, p=.07, than 
participants primed with children.  These interactions are plotted in Figures 3 & 4 
below.  
There was also a significant three-way interaction of prime condition, IAT 
scores, and estimations of Donald’s age on ratings of Donald’s warmth, R² Change 
=.073, F(1,42)=4.29 p=.045.  Simple slope analysis revealed that, when participants 
were primed with Adults, had more positive implicit associations towards children 
(than to adults) and they saw Donald as being younger, they rated Donald as 
significantly less warm than the other three conditions, t(43)=-3.07, p<.01.  No other 
slopes in the interaction were significant. 
  
P a g e  | 83 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Negative IAT Positive IAT
D
o
n
a
ld
 W
a
r
m
th
n
Child prime
Adult prime
 
Figure 3 2-way interaction of IAT scores and Priming condition on ratings of Donald's warmth.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  2-way interaction of IAT scores and Priming condition on ratings of Donald's competence. 
P a g e  | 84 
 
 
Figure 5  3-way interaction of IAT scores, priming condition, and estimations of Donald’s age on 
ratings of Donald’s warmth 
 .
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Discussion 
 Experiment 5 replicated none of the effects obtained in Experiment 3.  There 
were again no main effects of prime on ratings of Donald’s warmth and competence.  
The prime was not sufficient in itself to lead to different perceptions of Donald, 
without also taking into account implicit associations towards adults and children.  
The main reliable results were the interactions between implicit associations 
towards children, and priming condition.  In the three-way interaction, ratings of 
Donald’s warmth were affected in a prime assimilative direction – adult primes lead 
to lower ratings of warmth – but only for the participants with relatively stronger 
positive associations towards children.  As with Experiment 4, this interaction also 
relied on participants’ estimations of Donald’s age: when Donald was imagined as 
younger, he was perceived as less warm if participants had been primed with adults – 
so assimilation of the prime was greater when his perceived age was further from the 
prime category, and incongruently matched with greater implicit positivity towards 
children – but contrasted to the primed category of adults (greater warmth) when 
matched with greater implicit negativity towards children.  When implicit evaluations 
were relatively more negative towards the age group with which participants had been 
primed (adults), participants more often rated Donald’s warmth in a prime 
assimilative direction, when Donald was seen as younger.  However, when there was 
a relative implicit positivity in evaluations towards the group with which participants 
had been primed, then the ratings of competence and warmth were contrasted from 
the prime, and more in line with expected ratings given the estimated age of Donald.  
Therefore, following a priming manipulation, it is the constructed implicit 
associations towards an attitude object that becomes activated and can influence later 
judgements.  Past research suggests that priming the category of children to 
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participants with positive implicit evaluations of children should lead them to rate 
Donald as warmer, and less competent than participants who had more negative 
implicit evaluations of children.  Especially as category priming should lead to 
activation of non-conscious evaluative content, namely participants’ implicit 
evaluations of children, which I expected to lead to congruent evaluations of Donald 
(Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Lepore & Brown, 1997).  As category priming 
should lead to attitudinal differences towards a target based on people’s pre-existing 
prejudices (more so than stereotype trait priming, Lepore & Brown, 1997) there 
should have been a congruent interaction between implicit evaluations of children-
adults and priming category.  However the incongruent interactions suggests that 
implicit evaluations may be counteracting the stereotype content when implicit 
evaluations are positive towards the category which was primed and the age of target 
is mismatched, and reinforcing them when implicit evaluations are negative. 
General Discussion 
These results show that impressions of a target can be simultaneously both 
assimilative to the prime, and incongruent in terms of implicit evaluations of the 
target category.  These findings differ from those of Lepore and Brown (1997; see 
also Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983): priming the category does not always lead to 
implicit evaluation-congruent impressions of the target.  When implicit evaluations 
were relatively more negative towards the age group with which participants had been 
primed, participants more often rated Donald’s competence (Experiment 4) or warmth 
(Experiment 5) in a prime assimilative direction, (i.e., child prime and relative 
negativity towards children lead to lower ratings of competence, Experiment 4; adult 
prime and relative negativity towards adults lead to lower ratings of warmth, 
Experiment 5), even against the congruency of Donald’s imagined age (where the 
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older age should be associated with greater competence, and younger age with greater 
warmth).  However, when there was a relative implicit positivity in evaluations 
towards the group with which participants had been primed, then the ratings of 
competence and warmth were contrasted from the prime, and more in line with 
expected ratings given the estimated age of Donald.  
Unlike the findings of Lepore and Brown (1997), participants with negative 
implicit evaluations towards the target age group (i.e., relative negativity towards 
children and younger Donald) are more likely to reject the negative stereotype 
content, but the picture is more complicated here, because this only occurred when the 
age of Donald was incongruent to the prime (young Donald-adult prime; older 
Donald-child prime) to which they have more positive implicit evaluations.  Positivity 
of implicit evaluations towards the primed category, therefore, seems to have the 
effect of mitigating the stereotype content, leading to contrast to the prime, when the 
perceived age of the target is incongruent with the primed age group, but not when the 
age of the target is congruent with the prime.  In this scenario (prime-evaluation 
congruency, but prime-age of target mismatch) participants are more likely to take 
into account their perceptions of the target’s age, and decide to rate against the 
commonly held stereotypes if the prime and age of target do not match, and concede 
to the stereotypes when the prime and age of target are matched.  Furthermore, the 
judgement of the target can be affected in prime-assimilative directions, and 
contrastive directions, but this does appear to depend on the interpretation of other 
information (Donald’s age) not affected by the prime.  
Methodological issues with the prime words used in Experiments 3 and 4 
could have been improved by pretesting common labels for the child and adult 
categories, to confirm that the categorical labels used were indeed typical.  
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Furthermore, the valence of adult and child primes respectively was not well 
controlled, with greater negativity associated with the word “naïve” used in the child 
primes relative the more neutral or positive “mature” that was included in the adult 
prime.   
Furthermore, the concept of “child” (and “adult” too, to an extent), that were 
used for the prime categories, and as the targets of the warmth, competence, and 
general favourability measures, were poorly defined.  On the one hand, I was 
interested in the spontaneous effects of activating the general categories of children 
vs. adults on impressions of a novel target, without providing a concrete instantiation 
of a category member, even if the subtle priming paradigm could allow for it.   On the 
other hand, there is no way to control whether “children” is conceptualized and 
instantiated in the same way between participants.  The same issue arises for the 
dependent measures towards children: are participants providing ratings towards a 
consistent instantiation of “a child,” or are the targets qualitatively different? 
In retrospect, it seems clear that the effects of priming children on impressions 
would be easier to deduce if there were solid empirical bases for divining the traits 
that adults associate with children, as well as what exactly is meant by “a child”.  A 
study into the positive and negative traits associated with children and adults may be 
crucial for assessing differences in stereotype content.  Obtaining a set of 
stereotypical associations will allow for better exploration of the issue as priming 
effects on impressions of novel targets can be investigated along more relevant 
dimensions than those used (e.g., approachability) in this study. 
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Chapter 4  Mental Representations of Children and the Child Attitude 
Component Scale 
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Chapter 4 Summary 
In the previous chapters, five experiments attempted to predict 
impressions of ambiguous targets following child versus adult primes, and the 
effects of inclusion of children in outgroup representations on attitudes towards 
the group as a whole.  The designs were based on prior work on implicit and 
explicit evaluations of children and sociological studies of representations of 
children, but they failed to yield consistent results.  I therefore decided to take a 
different approach to understanding mental representations of children.  Instead 
of seeking priming effects based on past theory and indirectly relevant evidence, 
I decided to directly investigate the traits that adults typically associate with 
children, their behaviours towards children, and the emotions experienced 
through interaction with children.  As a first step, I empirically examined adults’ 
preferred grouping of children into different age categories.  I then assessed the 
traits, behaviours, and emotions associated with children in each age range.  In 
this way, the research has helped to set the foundation for determining 
individual differences in mental representations of children, and for further 
examining the potential effects of priming children on our judgments and 
behaviour.  
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Previous investigations into the representations of children have focused 
on analysis of language used by parental diarists (Pollock, 1983), trying to 
picture the world from the child’s perspective (Waskler, 1991).  Other studies 
have brought together discourse on the parental-child relationship, religious 
views towards children, and other historically relevant contexts (e.g., children in 
the workplace), to inform and speculate on (un)changing representations of 
children (Heywood, 2001; Jenks, 1996; Mills and Mills, 2000; Pollock, 1983). To 
my knowledge, there has not been a systematic investigation that asks 
participants to provide their stereotypically held representations of children by 
self-report. 
Without this solid base in understanding the ways in which adults 
mentally represent children, and individual differences in endorsement of these 
different representations, my attempts to predict effects of attitudes towards 
children, or priming the child concept on participant attitudes of previous 
chapters was to some degree less well guided than had I taken approach of first 
fully exploring the way adults represent children from the ground up.  With a 
better understanding of the way in which adults conceptualize children and the 
implications of interaction with children on adults’ own behaviour and feelings it 
may be possible to begin to address this issues of dissociation between positive 
explicit and negative implicit evaluations of children (Maio et al., c.2009); and the 
gaps in dutiful care of children’s welfare and rights in policy and legislation (e.g., 
Webb, 2004) raised in Chapter 1. 
Part of the issue may be due to certain assumptions about the universality 
of representations and attitudes towards children.  As explained in Chapter 1, 
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assumptions about the universality of representations of children may have lead 
to a kind of institutionalized “childism,” which has presupposed the exploration 
of this area (Heywood, 2001).  Coupled with children not having a voice for 
themselves, it is easy to imagine why assumptions about shared views of 
children have led to their neglect in legal and societal discourse (e.g., Webb, 
2004).  If we take for granted our views of children as being socially shared, 
there is little motivation to hold these truisms up to inspection.  This seems 
equally true in the psychological literature, where there has been no systematic 
study of mental representations of children.   
The Present Research 
To tackle this issue of assumptions about shared conceptions of children, I 
commenced two new studies to address this issue.  In the first study, participants 
were invited to list aspects of their own representations of children in an open-
ended listing exercise.  I was interested not only in the traits and beliefs typically 
associated with children, but also in how interacting with children affects the 
emotions that adults experience and the behaviours they perform.  These 
cognitions, emotions, and behaviours help to gain a broader understanding of the 
ways in which adults think about children than focusing on one set of 
psychological elements alone, consistent with contemporary tripartite models of 
human evaluative judgment (e.g., Breckler, 1984).  
With this broad list of attitude components of adults’ mental 
representations of children in hand, it was then feasible to develop a scale to 
measure the endorsement of this attitude content.  The first stage of this scale 
development entailed administering a large set of items to several hundred 
participants, and then using exploratory factor analysis to discover key 
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dimensions in individuals’ mental representations of children.  Exploratory 
factor analysis of participants’ responses facilitated mapping of key dimensions 
in a way that escapes any a priori assumptions about the way in which children 
are represented.   
To be useful, it was important to conduct the exploratory factor analysis 
on responses to items that vary in the extent to which they are endorsed.  The 
open-ended listing method may yield many traits, emotions, and behaviours that 
are universally associated with children and other traits, emotions, and 
behaviours that are often but not always associated with children.  To form the 
Child Attitude Component Scale that can be useful as a predictive or explanatory 
tool, attitude components that are endorsed almost always or very rarely is not 
useful.  To facilitate predictions for individuals’ attitudes and behaviour, it is 
necessary to have individual variability in stereotype endorsement.  I therefore 
sought to produce a Child Attitude Component Scale out of the more variably 
endorsed attitude content of resulting emotions, beliefs and behaviours 
associated with children. 
 
EXPERIMENT 6 
We tend to break up childhood into a series of distinct age ranges (e.g., 
infancy, childhood, adolescence, etc.) which typically reflect boundaries that 
account for different developmental stages for the child.  These boundaries, 
however, also represent distinct subgroups of childhood to which adults have 
different behavioural tendencies, and possibly also different representations.  As 
a first step to understanding adult mental representations of children, it is 
imperative to probe the age ranges that people contemplate when they imagine 
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“a child.”  Before establishing a shared conception of children, we must 
determine whether people regard different age groups in qualitatively different 
ways.  Also, by establishing shared age ranges, it may be possible to elicit more 
concrete perceptions of children when people provide their ratings of emotions, 
beliefs and behaviours towards children.   
In a pre-test measure, participants provided start and end ages for the 
different “age groups” younger than adults.  Participants could add as many age 
groups as they felt were necessary until they reached the group “adults,” along 
with labels for these groups.  
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-two participants (Mage = 47 years; 19 women, 10 men, 3 
unspecified) were recruited via Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com) and linked 
to the survey which was hosted on Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com). 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to list when different stages of life (from birth to 
thirty years) start and end, and what they would label these stages.  To begin 
with, participants were asked: “Starting from birth, when does the first age group 
end?”  Participants indicated when they thought the first age boundary ended using a 
sliding bar that as you moved the pointer from left to right showed greater numbers 
which represented ages in years (it was possible to leave the pointer between whole 
years, and though this provided a decimal feedback to participants, as it was not 
possible to program twelve points between each whole year to represent the months, 
participants nonetheless were comfortable in using less than whole year ages as 
boundaries, particularly for the younger age groups).  After providing the end age of 
the first age boundary, participants were asked to provide a label for this age group in 
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an open-ended response box.  For subsequent age boundaries participants were 
provided with two sliding bars, one for start age, and the other for end age of a given 
boundary.  Participants typically set the start slider to the age at which they ended the 
age boundary that preceded it, but there was some flexibility.  After each set of start 
of boundary and end of boundary sliders, participants were prompted to provide a 
label for what they would call the age group they had just defined.  The maximum 
value on the sliders was 30, and participants were instructed to keep adding age 
boundaries until they reached adults, but there was no limit to how many times they 
could create an age group prior to reaching that end, and participants were free to 
make as many or few age groups as they felt necessary.  All participants listed eight 
early life age groups, or fewer.  
Results and Discussion 
The analysis proceeded in three stages.  I first explored the labels at each 
consecutive response (e.g., 1
st
, 2
nd, …8th), to determine what the most common label 
for (e.g.,) the first stage was.  I then cross referenced the minimum, and maximum age 
participants had given for the most common label with age ranges for this label if it 
appeared in later responses.  This achieved two things: firstly it provided the most 
typical order of common age labels up to adulthood.  Secondly, after having explored 
each unique label inferences could be drawn, based on the age ranges, about when 
participants were considering the same age group, but under different labels. 
  As an example, “babies” was the most common (N=13) label given in the 
first response, with “infants” the second most common (N=9).  Based on the reported 
age at which this stage ended, some participants evidently were conceiving the same 
age group but calling it different things, while others clearly imagined a broader age 
group of children (min-max baby = .13 – 5 years, Mendage = 1.66 years; min-max 
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infant = 1-10 years, Mage = 3.36).  For the second response, infant again appeared 
(N=2), with a minimum start age of 1.7 years (Mstartage = 2.6 years), and a minimum 
end age of 4.8 years (Mendage = 5.4 years).  “Toddler” (N=10) was the most common 
label given for the second response (min-max start age = 1.1-2 years, Mstart = 1.46 
years; min-max end age = 2.8 – 4 years, Mend = 3.33 years).  Babies is selected as the 
label for the earliest age group on the basis that it was more commonly given as a 
label, but we can also be confident in selecting toddler as the label for the next age 
group because, although it was given one instance less often, the age ranges better 
match up with the end of the baby age group, with less overlap.  I can therefore be 
more confident that this age group is distinct from babies. 
The third step to this process was to look at the frequency of label usage and 
age ranges provided for labels across all responses.  This allowed me to confidently 
excluded labels such as “young adult” or “early adolescent” which were quite 
common labels among participants that split birth to adulthood into a greater number 
of responses; where other participants (who were more numerous in this approach) 
had provided fewer labels but included the age ranges ascribed to (e.g.,) “young 
adults” in their label “teenagers”.  
The most common age group labels were babies (M age range = birth-1.5 
years); toddlers (M age range = 1.5 – 3.5 years); children (M age range = 4 – 11 
years); and teenagers
2
 (M age range = 12- 18 years). Less common age group labels 
worth mentioning were “infant” (synonymous with toddlers in upper age boundary 
but often including from birth as a lower boundary), and young adults (M age range = 
18 – 21 years). 
                                                         
2
 Adolescence was given equally frequently as a label for this group, but teenagers was chosen for the 
follow up experiments because participants who chose the adolescent label were more likely to also 
define an early adolescence and late adolescence period, but these labels were not as frequent as the 
singular teenage or adolescent stage. 
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EXPERIMENT 7 
Experiment 7 presented participants with open-ended measures of the traits, 
emotions, and behaviours they associate with children.  Open-ended measures have 
been successfully used to help elucidate many stereotypes.  For instance, Haddock, 
Zanna, and Esses, (1993) used an open-ended measure of past experiences with 
homosexuals which helped improve the prediction of later attitudes towards this 
group; and Maio, Esses, and Bell (2000) used open ended measures to separately 
assess the components (emotions, stereotypes, and symbolic beliefs) of participants 
attitudes towards Oriental people (for review see, Esses & Maio, 2002).  
I used the most frequently used labels for the names of the groups in future 
studies, and the mean start and end ages for these labels to help define “a child” for 
the belief, behaviour and emotions listing task.  Thus, participants completed the 
open-ended measures for different child age groups, enabling the detection of 
similarities and differences between the groups. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and nineteen participants (M age = 49.2 years; 87 women, 31 
men, one unspecified) were recruited via Mechanical Turk. 
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four age groups in a 
between-subjects design. 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were asked to provide their emotions, their behaviours and beliefs 
about the four age groups obtained from the pre-test: babies, toddlers, children, and 
teenagers.  Each age group was defined with the age ranges obtained from the pre-test 
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to guide participants.  The response format was open-ended, with new response boxes 
that would appear at the completion of the previous response, prompting participants 
to provide as many or as few responses as necessary.  The order in which participants 
provided their emotions, beliefs and behaviours to a given age group was randomized 
between participants.   
Results 
The data were coded independently by two raters. Many beliefs about the 
target group were listed in the emotion-listing portion of the open-ended measures. 
These beliefs were kept as part of the overall beliefs towards these groups if they were 
not already repeated in the beliefs section later.  The same approach was employed 
when behaviours were encountered in the emotion or belief sections, or an emotion 
was encountered in the behaviour or belief sections. 
Synonymous words and phrasing (e.g., they make me feel “glad”, “happy”) 
were collapsed into conceptual clusters between participants, and synonymous 
responses by participant were not counted twice.  Responses were reduced to the 
simplest form of expression (e.g. “they make me laugh” and “they amuse me” became 
“[toddlers] are amusing”).  Contradictory responses (e.g., “they are smarter than you 
might initially give them credit for”; “[teens] have lots of energy, but not in the 
morning”) in a single statement were omitted because the content of the attitude 
component was unclear (i.e. are children smart or dumb? Are teenagers energetic or 
lazy?), or could not be split into two (i.e., “Teens are lazy” and “teens are energetic”) 
with confidence.  However, contradictory information (e.g., “teens are lazy”; “teens 
are energetic”) given as separate responses were included.  Other responses that were 
vague as to the particular emotion, behaviour or belief, or to the possessor of the 
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emotion, behaviour or belief, were also omitted (e.g., “precious” and “attention” listed 
as emotions). 
The two raters discussed their lists of emotions, beliefs and behaviours for 
each target age group until consensus was reached to reduce the responses to the 
smallest list of unique emotions, behaviours and beliefs listed for each target group. 
The inter-rater reliability (the number of matching clusters created by each rater, out 
of the total number clusters) per age group per construct (emotions, beliefs or 
behaviours) is given in Table 8, alongside the type of discrepancies. 
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Table 8  
Inter-rater reliability of response reduction and notes on inter-rater discrepancies. 
 
Babies; Emotions 
Inter-rater 
reliability (not 
including cluster 
naming 
discrepancies 
94 %   
 
Number of 
discrepancies 
(including cluster 
naming) 
2 (3)   
 
Type of 
discrepancy 
2 clusters dropped for being too vague. 
Fear cluster renamed to “feel scared” 
 
Additional 
Information 
 
“Standoffish” removed as it was a unique response, 
probably a better description of a behaviour, with 
underlying emotions such as “hate”, “disgust” and “anxiety” 
which were already in the pool. 
“Strong” too vague and a unique response. 
 Babies; Behaviours 
Inter-rater 
reliability (not 
including cluster 
naming 
discrepancies 
88% 
Number of 
discrepancies 
(including cluster 
naming) 
2 
Type of 
discrepancy 
Removed “maternal” cluster as mothering, like fathering, 
consists of many distinct behaviours. 
Unpacked “I am friendly” and “I am loving” 
Additional 
Information 
 
 Babies; Beliefs 
Inter-rater 
reliability (not 
including cluster 
naming 
discrepancies 
96% 
Number of 
discrepancies 
(including cluster 
naming) 
1 
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Type of 
discrepancy 
 
Babies are… “responsive” and “tactile” clustered together 
 
Additional 
Information 
 
  
Toddlers; Emotions 
Inter-rater 
reliability (not 
including cluster 
naming 
discrepancies 
95% 
Number of 
discrepancies 
(including cluster 
naming) 
1 
 
Type of 
discrepancy 
 
“Wary” unpacked from “worried” 
 
Additional 
Information 
 
Wary was an emotion directed towards interactions with 
toddlers, while worry was concern for the toddlers. 
 Toddlers; Behaviours 
Inter-rater 
reliability (not 
including cluster 
naming 
discrepancies 
100% 
Number of 
discrepancies 
(including cluster 
naming) 
 
Type of 
discrepancy 
 
Additional 
Information 
 
 Toddlers; Beliefs 
Inter-rater 
reliability (not 
including cluster 
naming 
discrepancies 
100% 
Number of 
discrepancies 
(including cluster 
naming) 
 
Type of 
discrepancy 
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Additional 
Information 
A number of participants wrote that “toddlers are hard 
work” in the emotion section. This was added to the beliefs 
about toddlers. The emotions associated with finding 
toddlers hard work might include “frustrated” which was 
listed. Unfortunately other emotions that might be 
associated such as “stressed” were not given. 
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 Children; Emotions 
Inter-rater 
reliability (not 
including cluster 
naming 
discrepancies 
91% 
Number of 
discrepancies 
(including cluster 
naming) 
2(3) 
Type of 
discrepancy 
1 Cluster naming; Caring and protective unpacked into 2 
clusters; 1 vague emotion dropped 
Additional 
Information 
 
 Children; Behaviours 
Inter-rater 
reliability (not 
including cluster 
naming 
discrepancies 
81% 
Number of 
discrepancies 
(including cluster 
naming) 
3(5) 
Type of 
discrepancy 
“Enjoying” dropped – not a behaviour; “knowing” dropped 
– too vague; “Paternalistic” – vague or inconsistent items; 
 
“Intolerance” cluster renamed from “need to escape” 
 
“Being kind” cluster renamed from “giving” 
Additional 
Information 
“Knowing” included items such as “my friends have 
children” and “interacting with siblings” which were too 
vague with respect to an actual behaviour. 
“Paternalistic” was the best fit word for responses such as 
“slightly paternal” and “with parent’s consent” which we 
felt was not descriptive enough of a particular behaviour.  
 Children; Beliefs 
Inter-rater 
reliability (not 
including cluster 
naming 
discrepancies 
97% 
Number of 
discrepancies 
(including cluster 
naming) 
1 
Type of 
discrepancy 
“Not positive” dropped as a cluster 
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Additional 
Information 
[Children are] “positive” already a cluster. 
 
 Teenagers; Emotions 
Inter-rater 
reliability (not 
including cluster 
naming 
discrepancies 
91% 
Number of 
discrepancies 
(including cluster 
naming) 
2(4) 
Type of 
discrepancy 
“Anger” and “Frustration” unpacked into 2 clusters; 
“Concern” unpacked into self vs. other focus clusters; 
cluster name changed from “lively” to “enthusiasm”; 
“confident in their future” relabelled “hopeful” 
Additional 
Information 
 
 Teenagers; Behaviours 
Inter-rater 
reliability (not 
including cluster 
naming 
discrepancies 
100% 
Number of 
discrepancies 
(including cluster 
naming) 
 
Type of 
discrepancy 
 
Additional 
Information 
 
 Teenagers; Beliefs 
Inter-rater 
reliability (not 
including cluster 
naming 
discrepancies 
100% 
Number of 
discrepancies 
(including cluster 
naming) 
 
Type of 
discrepancy 
 
Additional 
Information 
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EXPERIMENT 8 
 
The open-ended methodology of Experiment 7 had allowed for the collection 
of emotions, behaviours and beliefs towards babies, toddlers, children and teenagers, 
but is not informative about whether any given statement is a consensually held 
component of representations of children.  To explore this issue, new participants 
were recruited to provide ratings of endorsement of the emotions behaviours and 
beliefs provided by participants in Experiment 7.  This allows the determinations of 
which statements are more typical associated with each age group, and provide a first 
basis for reducing the number of items, for the end goal of producing a variably 
endorsed set of stereotypical content about children. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Seven hundred and seventeen participants (364 women, 278 men, 
75=unstated, M age= 35 years) recruited via three online surveying websites: 
Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com), Social Psychology Network 
(www.socialpsychology.org), and Online Psychology Research 
(www.onlinepsychresearch.co.uk).  
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned one of four target age groups: babies, 
toddlers, children, and teenagers in a between-subjects design. 
Materials 
Using a 7-point scale from strongly disagree (-3) to strongly agree (+3), 
participants responded to items describing beliefs, emotions, and behaviours 
regarding each target group.  Because these beliefs came from the open-ended 
measures in Experiment 7 (where participants were asked to generate the associated 
emotions, beliefs and behaviours associated with each of the age groups), the number 
of statements for each construct was different across the target groups.  
 
 
Results and Discussion 
The mean and standard deviations of endorsement of the emotions, behaviours 
and beliefs of each of the age groups is presented in Tables 9-12 below.  Before 
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conducting an exploratory factor analysis, I first removed those items with extreme 
high or low endorsement:  M >± 2.00 or low variability SD <± 1.00.  Such items offer 
less predictive power in the final Child Attitude Component Scale because they are 
typically endorsed or not endorsed by most participants. 
 
Table 9. Mean and standard deviation of agreement to emotions, beliefs and self-behaviours 
associated with babies.  
 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Babies make me feel caring 1.59 1.652 
Babies make me feel happy 1.25 1.721 
Babies make me feel love 1.41 1.746 
Babies give me mixed feelings -.05 1.880 
Babies make me feel pride .32 1.901 
Babies make me feel protective 1.62 1.579 
Babies make me feel scared -1.21 1.697 
Babies make me feel warm 1.33 1.632 
Babies make me feel affectionate 1.45 1.681 
Babies make me feel amazed 1.14 1.737 
Babies make me feel annoyed -1.11 1.774 
Babies make me feel anxious -.57 1.772 
Babies make me feel concerned .56 1.811 
Babies make me feel indifferent -1.42 1.729 
Babies make me feel hatred* -2.35* 1.303* 
Babies make me feel optimistic 1.14 1.666 
Babies make me feel bored -1.44 1.662 
Babies make me feel amused 1.34 1.595 
Babies make me feel disgusted -1.95 1.576 
Babies make me feel supportive 1.26 1.599 
Babies make me feel responsible 1.41 1.767 
Babies make me feel enthusiastic .91 1.823 
Babies make me feel excited .76 1.793 
Babies make me feel tired .15 1.832 
Babies make me feel fascinated 1.16 1.775 
Babies make me feel hope .99 1.765 
Babies make me feel nostalgic .38 1.980 
Babies make me feel frustrated -.95 1.768 
Babies make me feel overwhelmed -.11 1.795 
Babies make me feel playful 1.37 1.672 
Babies make me feel fragile -.75 1.856 
Babies make me feel defensive -1.04 1.944 
A babies’ behaviour reflects their care 1.24 1.338 
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Mean Std. Deviation 
Babies require consistency of care* 2.43* 1.054* 
Babies are cute 1.84 1.497 
Babies are innocent* 2.24* 1.162* 
Babies are totally dependent* 2.09* 1.708* 
Babies are vulnerable* 2.46* .996* 
Babies are demanding* 2.08* 1.274* 
Babies are intelligent 1.32 1.484 
Babies are noisy 1.86 1.219 
Babies are often crying 1.58 1.355 
Babies are messy 1.90 1.254 
Babies are a source of wonder 1.79 1.472 
Babies are instinctive 1.81 1.226 
Babies are endearing 1.70 1.472 
Babies are open to learning* 2.04* 1.233* 
Babies are empathic .40 1.674 
Babies are resilient 1.23 1.385 
Babies smell nice .85 1.739 
Babies are life changing* 2.45* 1.090* 
Babies are emotionally driven 1.48 1.470 
Babies are our future* 2.14* 1.201* 
Babies are responsive 1.94 1.160 
Babies are tactile 1.38 1.386 
Babies need stimulation* 2.22* 1.137* 
Babies are not a blank canvas .33 1.886 
I am protective towards babies 1.78 1.607 
I am caring towards babies 1.77 1.561 
I am interested towards babies 1.11 1.791 
I play with babies 1.26 1.782 
I try to avoid babies -1.04 2.035 
I am friendly towards babies 1.89 1.402 
I am supportive towards babies 1.66 1.477 
I am enthusiastic towards babies 1.08 1.885 
I coo at babies .56 2.068 
I feed babies .41 2.260 
I worry around babies .37 1.921 
I behave childlike towards babies .42 1.772 
I behave responsibly towards babies* 2.15* 1.288* 
I try to educate babies .97 1.687 
I am exhausted by babies .16 1.787 
I am irritated by babies -.93 1.876 
I am loving towards babies 1.66 1.595 
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Mean Std. Deviation 
N 133 
* indicate items removed for high or low agreement or low deviation in agreement/disagreement. 
 
Inspection of the emotions provided for babies in Table 9 shows a prevalence 
of positive emotions associated with love and affection, with few items describing 
negative emotions towards babies, and these typically receive strong disagreement 
from most participants about experiencing them.  The beliefs and behaviours 
associated with babies principally centre around their need to be nurtured and cared 
for, included the more negative aspects associated with this, such as babies being 
noisy and messy (but unlike the negative emotion items, these receive greater 
endorsement as being true). 
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Table 10. Mean and standard deviation of agreement to emotions, beliefs and self-behaviours 
associated with toddlers.  
 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Toddlers make me feel amused 1.44 1.495 
Toddlers make me feel happy 1.19 1.643 
Toddlers make me feel caring 1.36 1.554 
Toddlers make me feel excited .35 1.784 
Toddlers make me feel scared -1.60 1.727 
Toddlers make me feel curious .49 1.672 
Toddlers make me feel worried -.58 1.831 
Toddlers make me feel frustrated -.20 1.800 
Toddlers make me feel annoyed -.34 1.798 
Toddlers make me feel adoration .72 1.780 
Toddlers make me feel warm 1.10 1.670 
Toddlers make me feel friendly 1.29 1.541 
Toddlers make me feel creative .24 1.771 
Toddlers make me feel patient .01 1.704 
Toddlers make me feel innocent .07 1.838 
Toddlers make me feel positive 1.16 1.603 
Toddlers make me feel envy -1.81 1.414 
Toddlers make me feel wary -.78 1.853 
Toddlers make me feel pride -.10 1.852 
Toddlers make me feel sad* -2.05* 1.329* 
I am caring towards toddlers 1.66 1.543 
I am curious when around toddlers .53 1.689 
I am playful with toddlers 1.37 1.603 
I am friendly toward toddlers 1.74 1.510 
I am kind towards toddlers 1.96 1.327 
I am engaging towards toddlers 1.10 1.606 
I am humorous with toddlers 1.28 1.575 
I teach toddlers .67 1.961 
I am patient towards toddlers 1.21 1.586 
I get annoyed at toddlers -.25 1.857 
I am anxious around toddlers -.58 1.842 
I am happy towards toddlers 1.56 1.545 
I am practical with toddlers 1.28 1.233 
Toddlers are hard work* 2.14* 1.180* 
Toddlers are curious* 2.52* .709* 
Toddlers are energetic* 2.49* .802* 
Toddlers are adorable 1.58 1.494 
Toddlers are naïve 1.94 1.313 
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Mean Std. Deviation 
Toddlers are difficult 1.30 1.487 
Toddlers have a desire to learn* 2.17* 1.124* 
Toddlers are developing* 2.60* .839* 
Toddlers are fun 1.59 1.386 
Toddlers are dependent 1.91 1.608 
Toddlers are loving 1.83 1.214 
Toddlers are trusting 1.72 1.309 
Toddlers are naughty .31 1.711 
N 144 
* indicate items removed for high or low agreement or low deviation in agreement/disagreement. 
 
Inspection of the emotions provided towards toddlers reveals they are predominantly 
warm and affectionate, with a focus also on the curious, exciting and creative aspects 
of interaction with toddlers.  The behaviours also emphasise this interaction with 
toddlers in play (I am… “playful”, “friendly”, “engaging”, “humorous”; “I teach”).  
Beliefs about toddlers focus around their development, learning, energy, and also 
difficulty to manage.
P a g e  | 112 
Table 11.  Mean and standard deviation of agreement to emotions, beliefs and self-
behaviours associated with children.  
 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Children make me feel active .94 1.599 
Children make me feel amused 1.33 1.335 
Children make me feel annoyed -.51 1.812 
Children make me feel frustrated -.48 1.709 
Children make me feel anxious -.59 1.824 
Children make me feel protective 1.56 1.482 
Children make me feel curious .81 1.529 
Children make me feel exhausted .35 1.729 
Children make me feel love 1.40 1.633 
Children make me feel friendly 1.37 1.447 
Children make me feel happy 1.42 1.511 
Children make me feel kind 1.38 1.483 
Children make me feel angry -1.30 1.526 
Children make me feel carefree .12 1.790 
Children make me feel hopeful 1.12 1.665 
Children make me feel sad -1.71 1.442 
Children make me feel nostalgic .65 1.711 
I am caring towards children 1.92 1.372 
I am protective towards children 1.88 1.402 
I am playful with children 1.53 1.580 
I talk with children 1.60 1.475 
I smile at children 1.95 1.445 
I am friendly towards children 1.90 1.369 
I teach children 1.06 1.865 
I am helpful to children 1.72 1.394 
I am kind to children 1.97 1.267 
I am patient with children 1.46 1.509 
I am intolerant towards children -1.22 1.844 
I am encouraging towards children 1.75 1.403 
I discipline children .30 1.794 
Children are positive 1.47 1.302 
Children are happy 1.62 1.086 
Children are fun 1.59 1.409 
Children are innocent 1.84 1.226 
Children are naïve 1.64 1.300 
Children are good learners 1.77 1.201 
Children are vulnerable* 2.13* 1.084* 
Children are impressionable* 2.15* 1.060* 
Children are selfish .52 1.487 
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Mean Std. Deviation 
Children are loving 1.76 1.144 
Children are important* 2.21* 1.232* 
Children are disrespectful -.30 1.425 
Children are expensive 1.90 1.279 
Children are mischievous 1.07 1.229 
Children are energetic* 2.21* .977* 
Children are carefree 1.50 1.361 
Children are noisy 1.60 1.233 
Children are deserving of happiness* 2.44* .985* 
Children are deserving of care* 2.49* .960* 
Children are well behaved .15 1.261 
Children have more opportunities than 
when I grew up 
.99 1.723 
Children dislike anger 1.56 1.378 
Children are challenging 1.74 1.229 
Children are interesting 1.62 1.393 
Children are lazy -.58 1.566 
Children are independent -.56 1.591 
Children are kind 1.03 1.292 
N 156 
* indicate items removed for high or low agreement or low deviation in agreement/disagreement.  
 
Inspection of the emotions towards children reveals that positive emotions 
such as happiness and love are still among the most highly endorsed.  Relative to 
babies, and similar to toddlers, however, there is less of a rejection of negative 
emotions such as anxiety or frustration.  Behaviours towards children centre on 
nurturing them, being friendly, and teaching them.  The beliefs about children is more 
mixed in terms of the positive aspects of character, as well as the more negative 
aspects such as being selfish, challenging, lazy, noisy and disrespectful.  
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Table 12. Mean and standard deviation of agreement to emotions, beliefs and self-behaviours 
associated with teenagers.  
 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Teenagers make me feel curious .01 1.497 
Teenagers make me feel happy .00 1.436 
Teenagers make me feel hopeful -.07 1.505 
I feel misunderstood when 
communicating with teenagers 
-.44 1.599 
Teenagers give me mixed feelings .67 1.517 
Teenagers make me feel neutral .02 1.476 
Teenagers make me feel pride -.44 1.425 
Teenagers make me feel confused -.64 1.619 
Teenagers make me feel sympathy -.08 1.563 
Teenagers make me feel envy -.95 1.644 
Teenagers make me feel intimidated -1.22 1.580 
Teenagers make me feel anger -.94 1.651 
Teenagers make me feel anxious -.67 1.630 
Teenagers make me feel concern .34 1.692 
Teenagers make me feel concerned for 
their future 
.92 1.468 
Teenagers make me feel sad -.88 1.602 
Teenagers make me feel amused .54 1.421 
Teenagers make me feel frustrated -.01 1.607 
Teenagers make me feel energized -.38 1.464 
Teenagers make me feel annoyed .18 1.663 
Teenagers make me feel excited -.58 1.397 
I am encouraging towards teenagers 1.05 1.349 
I get annoyed towards teenagers .27 1.656 
I am friendly towards teenagers 1.48 1.108 
I treat teenagers as adults .32 1.581 
I try to understand teenagers 1.03 1.452 
I am prepared to listen to teenagers 1.45 1.239 
I am prepared to talk to teenagers 1.38 1.343 
I try to reason with teenagers .85 1.359 
I am wary of teenagers -.10 1.804 
I am willing to interact with teenagers 1.39 1.389 
I am keen to share in the interests of 
teenagers 
.12 1.578 
I am condescending towards teenagers -.94 1.618 
I try to ignore teenagers -.67 1.625 
I am amused by teenagers .75 1.537 
I am sympathetic towards teenagers .82 1.395 
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Mean Std. Deviation 
I praise teenagers .30 1.456 
Teenagers are at a difficult stage in their 
lives 
1.86 1.293 
Teenagers are good .84 1.025 
Teenagers are caring .66 1.131 
Teenagers show a lack of respect .93 1.080 
Teenagers are inconsiderate .83 1.162 
Teenagers are self-centred 1.48 1.028 
Teenagers are misrepresented .80 1.088 
Teenagers are immature 1.57 1.154 
Teenagers are noisy 1.46 1.156 
Teenagers are image conscious* 2.02* 1.064* 
Teenagers are insecure 1.42 1.140 
Teenagers are under a lot of academic 
pressure 
1.38 1.259 
Teenagers are arrogant 1.13 1.130 
Teenagers are hard working .37 1.189 
Teenagers are hormonal* 2.01* 1.075* 
Teenagers are creative* 1.31* .914* 
Teenagers are lazy .67 1.326 
Teenagers are under a lot of peer 
pressure 
1.95 1.092 
Teenagers are misunderstood .78 1.202 
Teenagers are carefree .91 1.389 
Teenagers are certain .09 1.428 
Teenagers are polite .07 1.301 
Teenagers are irritating .77 1.373 
Teenagers are intimidating -.60 1.858 
Teenagers need to be respected 1.02 1.355 
Teenagers need to be liked 1.52 1.283 
Teenagers want to have fun* 2.23* .859* 
Teenagers are confused* 1.53* .990* 
Teenagers are rebellious 1.36 1.019 
Teenagers are secretive 1.06 1.345 
Teenagers are careless 1.00 1.141 
Teenagers are facing future problems 1.68 1.168 
Teenagers are impatient 1.45 1.028 
Teenagers are unreliable .72 1.253 
Teenagers are challenging 1.38 1.059 
Teenagers are sociable 1.47 1.129 
Teenagers are lacking guile .38 1.122 
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Mean Std. Deviation 
Teenagers are blinkered .41 1.047 
N 130 
Inspection of emotions towards teenagers reveals more negativity towards 
them than the other three age groups, with new emotions such as “concern” and 
“intimidated” appearing, as well as the first positive endorsement of feeling 
“annoyed” (which appeared in the emotions towards the other age groups, but was not 
typically endorsed).  The behaviours towards teenagers also suggest something 
qualitatively different about behavioural approaches to members of this group.  
Specifically, the presence of a number of “I try…” items suggests an implicitly 
understood expectation that behavioural interactions with this group is less one-sided 
in terms of expected outcomes than the other age groups.  Beliefs about teenagers are 
also a lot more mixed in terms of positive and negative content than beliefs towards 
the other age groups, with higher endorsement of the negative characteristics 
attributed to this group (such as “arrogance,” “self-centred[ness]”, “rebellious[ness]”), 
and weaker endorsement of the positive beliefs. 
Comparison of the composition of emotions, beliefs about, and behaviours 
towards the four age groups seems to portray a trend away from predominantly 
positive representations of the group to an increasingly mixed set of positive and 
negative aspects as the age group gets older.  Endorsements of the overarching 
positive components tend to get weaker; at the same time negative components 
become more numerous and more typically endorsed. 
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Exploratory Factor Analysis 
The remaining stereotype content was explored for its latent structure through 
exploratory factor analyses. The exploratory factor analysis utilized a scree plot and 
the minimum-eigenvalue-of-one criterion to select factors.  These were then rotated 
using Varimax rotations.  
Items were retained if they loaded heavily on one factor with at least a .42 
value difference between their loadings on other factors.  Also, if an item loaded on 
one factor, it could not load too negatively (< -.30) on a second factor.  I wanted to 
keep the number of emotions, beliefs and behaviours roughly equal.  However, 
emotions tended to load most heavily on their factors, followed by behaviours and 
finally beliefs.  Consequently, I decided to require that emotion items possess a 
loading greater than .725, while behaviours (because they were fewer) and beliefs 
(because they loaded less heavily) required a loading greater than .60 for retention.  
Although they appear arbitrary, these levels helped to distinguish between clusters of 
items that I found to be dissimilar in structure and relevance to the factors, while 
preserving the demand for very high loadings.  (Many researchers rely on loadings as 
low as .25 or .30 for factor interpretation and item selection.)  
As described in more detail below, the factor structure for each age group 
were best described by two factor solutions, with positive and negative attitude 
components loading on each factor respectively.  As there were fewer negative items, 
the heuristics above were relaxed somewhat for the negative items; the alternative was 
to keep the same criteria and have very few negative items for some groups, reducing 
the value of the final item lists.  To avoid this consequence, items were retained if 
they had >.40 loading on the second factor, with a value difference greater than .20 
between the loadings on factor 1 and 2  
A few items were also dropped because I retrospectively noticed inadequate 
item specificity, or a lack of similarity to other items loading on a given factor (e.g., 
“Children make me feel active,” “Children are expensive”).  The remaining items 
were then explored using an Oblimin rotation and compared with the original 
solution; any further items that failed the criteria were removed. For each table of 
factor loadings, items not in bold were removed for failing to meet the criteria.
3
 
                                                         
3
 Some items were inadvertently retained when they should have been rejected in the construction of 
this scale. They are marked with an asterisk on the Table 15 below. In the end I decided to keep them 
through the convergent and discriminant validity testing, and confirmatory factor analysis because they 
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 Attitude components for babies For the target group “babies”, the initial scree 
plot seemed to suggest that a three-factor solution would best describe this pattern of 
results, however the third factor was ill-defined with only two items loading onto the 
third factor more than on the other two factors: “Babies are noisy” and “Babies are 
emotionally driven”. I decided to remove “Babies are emotionally driven” due to its 
lack of specificity and then test the two-factor solution. “Babies are noisy” then 
loaded strongly on the second factor (.575), and the factor loadings for a number of 
other items that were less well defined in the three-factor solution were improved in 
the two factor solution. Table 13 shows the two-factor solution to the statements about 
babies after Varimax rotation.  
 
 
Table 13 Item loadings for emotions, beliefs, and behaviours towards babies. 
Rotated Factor Matrix
a
 
 Factor 
1 2 
Babies make me feel caring .936 -.045 
Babies make me feel happy .907 -.173 
Babies make me feel love .914 -.090 
Babies give me mixed feelings -.046 .534 
Babies make me feel pride .745 .012 
Babies make me feel protective .919 .040 
Babies make me feel scared -.108 .597 
Babies make me feel warm .909 -.101 
Babies make me feel affectionate .945 -.073 
Babies make me feel amazed .856 -.046 
Babies make me feel annoyed -.588 .654 
Babies make me feel anxious -.103 .669 
Babies make me feel concerned .476 .303 
Babies make me feel indifferent -.555 .433 
Babies make me feel optimistic .889 -.069 
Babies make me feel bored -.528 .496 
Babies make me feel amused .822 .004 
Babies make me feel disgusted -.508 .407 
Babies make me feel supportive .887 .003 
Babies make me feel responsible .852 .039 
Babies make me feel enthusiastic .870 -.050 
Babies make me feel excited .890 -.081 
                                                                                                                                                                 
loaded on to the negativity towards children factor, which had fewer items. As indicated above, a more 
relaxed set of criteria was employed for the negative items.  
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Babies make me feel tired .035 .533 
Babies make me feel fascinated .895 -.121 
Babies make me feel hope .844 -.082 
Babies make me feel nostalgic .592 -.037 
Babies make me feel frustrated -.319 .648 
Babies make me feel overwhelmed .063 .667 
Babies make me feel playful .891 -.075 
Babies make me feel fragile .200 .348 
Babies make me feel defensive -.050 .385 
A babies’ behaviour reflects their care .282 .185 
Babies are cute .835 .012 
Babies are intelligent .670 .141 
Babies are noisy .080 .575 
Babies are often crying .062 .514 
Babies are messy .081 .526 
Babies are a source of wonder .880 .054 
Babies are instinctive .448 .244 
Babies are endearing .761 .115 
Babies are empathic .268 .264 
Babies are resilient .469 .298 
Babies smell nice .690 -.076 
Babies are emotionally driven .289 .354 
Babies are responsive .640 .188 
Babies are tactile .373 .249 
Babies are not a blank canvas .015 .127 
I am protective towards babies .868 .042 
I am caring towards babies .906 .001 
I am interested towards babies .884 -.192 
I play with babies .840 -.162 
I try to avoid babies -.589 .631 
I am friendly towards babies .845 .004 
I am supportive towards babies .915 .025 
I am enthusiastic towards babies .879 -.148 
I coo at babies .683 -.117 
I feed babies .682 -.119 
I worry around babies .346 .249 
I behave childlike towards babies .499 .153 
I try to educate babies .718 .018 
I am exhausted by babies -.078 .563 
I am irritated by babies -.509 .588 
I am loving towards babies .918 -.032 
*Items in bold should be retained in scale creation 
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Naming Factors 1 and 2: 
Positive rewards from interaction with babies (Factor 1; 35 items): 
There are 18 positive emotion items. Ten of these emotions centered on the positive 
emotional rewards to self, received through interaction with babies (e.g. happy, 
amazed); and the other 8 associated with emotions that are positive to both adult and 
child (e.g. feeling caring, loving, protective).  Six positive belief items: similarly, 
these belief items largely focus on the aspects of babies that make them appealing to 
adults (e.g. source of wonder), with fewer emphasising positive characteristics of 
babies separate from what appeals to us as adults (e.g., babies are responsive). The 11 
positive behaviour items are associated with caring for babies. 
Babies are hard work to care for (Factor 2; 10 items): There are six negative 
emotions associated with worry, frustration, and the overwhelming aspects of caring 
for a baby. The three beliefs loading onto this factor (babies are messy, noisy, often 
crying) tie neatly with emotions also loading on this factor. And the one behaviour 
that loads on this factor (I am exhausted) further add to the picture of babies being 
hard work 
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Attitude components for toddlers. The factor analysis on responses to items 
about the group “toddlers,” also yielded a two-factor solution. Table 14 below shows 
the two-factor solution with Varimax rotation for the statements about toddlers. 
 
 
Table 14. Factor loadings for emotions, beliefs and behaviours towards "toddlers" using Varimax 
rotation. 
Rotated Factor Matrix
a
 
 Factor 
1 2 
Toddlers make me feel amused .809 -.101 
Toddlers make me feel happy .911 -.105 
Toddlers make me feel caring .863 -.203 
Toddlers make me feel excited .791 .035 
Toddlers make me feel scared .050 .655 
Toddlers make me feel curious .772 .046 
Toddlers make me feel worried .073 .689 
Toddlers make me feel frustrated -.213 .660 
Toddlers make me feel annoyed -.479 .639 
Toddlers make me feel adoration .811 .068 
Toddlers make me feel warm .880 -.073 
Toddlers make me feel friendly .851 -.122 
Toddlers make me feel creative .729 .040 
Toddlers make me feel patient .604 -.087 
Toddlers make me feel innocent .512 .090 
Toddlers make me feel positive .882 -.081 
Toddlers make me feel envy .046 .396 
Toddlers make me feel wary -.330 .708 
Toddlers make me feel pride .685 .102 
I am caring towards toddlers .785 -.336 
I am curious when around toddlers .742 -.050 
I am playful with toddlers .795 -.281 
I am friendly toward toddlers .754 -.331 
I am kind towards toddlers .734 -.313 
I am engaging towards toddlers .827 -.277 
I am humorous with toddlers .791 -.234 
I teach toddlers .725 -.182 
I am patient towards toddlers .689 -.447 
I get annoyed at toddlers -.469 .572 
I am anxious around toddlers -.047 .400 
I am happy towards toddlers .847 -.281 
I am practical with toddlers .222 -.214 
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Toddlers are adorable .786 -.156 
Toddlers are naïve -.069 -.090 
Toddlers are difficult -.366 .325 
Toddlers are fun .780 -.233 
Toddlers are dependent -.121 -.121 
Toddlers are loving .624 -.160 
Toddlers are trusting .231 -.217 
Toddlers are naughty -.117 .355 
*Bold items to be retained for scale creation 
 
Naming factors 1 and 2: 
Positive experiences of Toddlers (Factor 1; 24 items): 
Thirteen positive emotions and eight positive behaviours expressing positive ways to 
interact with toddlers and the emotional benefits gained. Three positive beliefs 
express an affectionate relationship. 
 
Negative emotions associated with caring for Toddlers; or Worry and anxiety 
about toddlers (4 items):  
Three emotion items associated with worry and frustration at the task of caring for 
toddlers, and one similar behaviour item of acting anxiously around toddlers.  
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Attitude components for children. Table 15, below, shows the Varimax-rotated 
matrix of child attitude component items and their loadings on each factor. As noted 
above, positive emotions, beliefs and behaviours loaded onto Factor 1, with negative 
aspects of the group attitude components loading on Factor 2.  
 
 
Table 15. Factor loadings for emotions, beliefs and behaviours towards "children" using Varimax 
rotation.  
Rotated Factor Matrix
a
 
 Factor 
1 2 
Children make me feel active .704 -.193 
Children make me feel amused .761 -.001 
Children make me feel annoyed* -.547* .624* 
Children make me feel frustrated -.258 .750 
Children make me feel anxious -.197 .538 
Children make me feel protective .777 -.096 
Children make me feel curious .726 .098 
Children make me feel exhausted .029 .701 
Children make me feel love .824 -.302 
Children make me feel friendly .807 -.345 
Children make me feel happy .860 -.300 
Children make me feel kind .832 -.220 
Children make me feel angry -.333 .571 
Children make me feel carefree .801 -.002 
Children make me feel hopeful .797 -.287 
Children make me feel sad -.158 .371 
Children make me feel nostalgic .400 .027 
I am caring towards children .873 -.188 
I am protective towards children .821 -.102 
I am playful with children .802 -.274 
I talk with children .861 -.214 
I smile at children .842 -.201 
I am friendly towards children .879 -.260 
I teach children .665 -.196 
I am helpful to children .890 -.200 
I am kind to children .887 -.171 
I am patient with children .779 -.292 
I am intolerant towards children -.442 .253 
I am encouraging towards children .844 -.152 
I discipline children .456 -.087 
Children are positive .654 -.262 
Children are happy .672 -.224 
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Children are fun .829 -.256 
Children are innocent .601 -.102 
Children are naïve -.013 .315 
Children are good learners .608 -.010 
Children are selfish -.185 .391 
Children are loving .732 -.198 
Children are disrespectful* -.337* .473* 
Children are expensive -.007 .500 
Children are mischievous .161 .419 
Children are carefree .561 .088 
Children are noisy -.048 .625 
Children are well behaved .499 -.225 
Children have more opportunities then when I grew up .281 .052 
Children dislike anger .418 .205 
Children are challenging .348 .332 
Children are interesting .789 -.192 
Children are lazy -.349 .435 
Children are independent .144 .124 
Children are kind .683 -.143 
Items in bold were included in the final scale. * denotes oversight items, see footnote above 
 
 
Naming factors 1 and 2: 
Positive experiences with Children (19 items): 
There are five positive emotion items.  There is more of an even split with this age 
group on whether the emotions refer to emotional boons- to-self of interaction (e.g. 
amused) and emotional benefits to the child (e.g. make me feel protective); eight 
behaviour items about caring for children, and making them feel liked; six beliefs. 
 
Negative experiences with Children (7/8 items): 
Four or five negative emotions associated with frustration and anxiety; three negative 
beliefs about children’s naughtiness.   
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Attitude components for teenagers: The exploratory factor analysis conducted on the 
responses to statements about “teenagers” led to more complex results than for the 
other age groups.  The extraction criteria revealed that it was possible to extract a 
three-factor solution.  Using the three factor model, positive affect, beliefs and 
behaviours (e.g. “I am sympathetic to teenagers”) loaded on the first factor, with 
(predominantly) negative beliefs (e.g. “teenagers are noisy”) loaded on the second 
factor, and negative affect items loaded on the third factor (e.g. “teenagers make me 
feel sad”) 
However, in a three-factor solution, only three items would be kept on the third factor 
using the criteria listed above: “teenagers make me feel intimidated” (.621 loading), 
“teenagers make me feel anxious” (.600 loading), and “teenagers make me feel sad” 
(.618).  With only moderate factor loadings and a small number of defining items, I 
decided to explore the two-factor solution instead.  Table 16 below shows the 
Varimax rotation for the two-factor solution.  
 
Table 16. Factor loadings for emotions, beliefs and behaviours towards "teenagers" using Varimax 
rotation.. 
Rotated Factor Matrix
a
 
 Factor 
1 2 
Teenagers make me feel curious .460 .042 
Teenagers make me feel happy .752 -.287 
Teenagers make me feel hopeful .641 -.360 
I feel misunderstood when communicating with 
teenagers 
-.233 .534 
Teenagers give me mixed feelings -.069 .439 
Teenagers make me feel neutral -.365 .133 
Teenagers make me feel pride .548 -.375 
Teenagers make me feel confused -.067 .527 
Teenagers make me feel sympathy .367 .196 
Teenagers make me feel envy .108 .141 
Teenagers make me feel intimidated -.130 .279 
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Teenagers make me feel anger -.256 .528 
Teenagers make me feel anxious -.093 .435 
Teenagers make me feel concern .161 .409 
Teenagers make me feel concerned for their future .251 .217 
Teenagers make me feel sad -.154 .415 
Teenagers make me feel amused .449 .169 
Teenagers make me feel frustrated -.202 .630 
Teenagers make me feel energized .617 -.173 
Teenagers make me feel annoyed -.506 .509 
Teenagers make me feel excited .504 -.199 
I am encouraging towards teenagers .762 -.153 
I get annoyed towards teenagers -.441 .518 
I am friendly towards teenagers .725 -.227 
I treat teenagers as adults .414 .098 
I try to understand teenagers .768 -.162 
I am prepared to listen to teenagers .754 -.075 
I am prepared to talk to teenagers .722 -.190 
I try to reason with teenagers .572 -.050 
I am wary of teenagers -.352 .423 
I am willing to interact with teenagers .766 -.178 
I am keen to share in the interests of teenagers .484 -.050 
I am condescending towards teenagers -.508 .208 
I try to ignore teenagers -.650 .354 
I am amused by teenagers .588 -.020 
I am sympathetic towards teenagers .754 .032 
I praise teenagers .739 -.185 
Teenagers are at a difficult stage in their lives .441 .479 
Teenagers are good .490 -.194 
Teenagers are caring .459 -.100 
Teenagers show a lack of respect -.270 .514 
Teenagers are inconsiderate -.211 .739 
Teenagers are self-centered -.135 .558 
Teenagers are misrepresented .354 -.005 
Teenagers are immature -.107 .515 
Teenagers are noisy .116 .629 
Teenagers are insecure .160 .496 
Teenagers are under a lot of academic pressure .412 .156 
Teenagers are arrogant -.304 .569 
Teenagers are hard working .480 -.112 
Teenagers are lazy -.239 .574 
Teenagers are under a lot of peer pressure .459 .228 
Teenagers are misunderstood .425 .038 
Teenagers are carefree -.049 .166 
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Teenagers are certain .017 .028 
Teenagers are polite .213 -.310 
Teenagers are irritating -.271 .666 
Teenagers are intimidating -.216 .238 
Teenagers need to be respected .394 -.057 
Teenagers need to be liked .304 .392 
Teenagers are rebellious .175 .389 
Teenagers are secretive .110 .526 
Teenagers are careless -.128 .444 
Teenagers are facing future problems .163 .299 
Teenagers are impatient -.096 .609 
Teenagers are unreliable -.074 .590 
Teenagers are challenging .302 .394 
Teenagers are sociable .225 .200 
Teenagers are lacking guile .100 .177 
Teenagers are blinkered -.059 .224 
Items in bold are to be retained in scale creation 
 
Naming of factors 1 and 2: 
Positive interaction facilitators (12 items):  
Ten of these items referred to positive behaviours designed to facilitate interaction 
with teenagers.  The remaining two items were positive emotions experienced in 
interaction with teenagers.  No positive beliefs. 
Negative emotions and beliefs (14 items): 
Seven items on this factor refer to negative emotions experienced in interaction with 
teenagers.  The remaining 7 items refer to negative beliefs about teenagers’ 
dispositions. 
A third factor of negative affect items could exist, but needs further 
exploration. 
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Discussion 
 
The factor analyses revealed strong similarities in the way people think about 
each of the child age groups. For each group, emotions, beliefs, and our behaviours 
towards members of these groups can be divided into broadly positive and negative 
components of attitudes.  At the same time, some responses appeared in the content of 
all of the target age groups explored here (e.g. caring, loving and protective feelings).  
Notwithstanding these similarities, closer inspection of the composition of the factors 
from the remaining items revealed important differences.  
First, the emotional content changes from anxiety, frustration and worry in 
caring for individuals of the younger “babies” and “toddlers” target groups, to more of 
a focus on negative aspects of group individuals’ dispositions and anxiety towards 
interaction as the age of the target group increases (e.g., “teenagers make me feel 
concern”).  At the same time, there is a marked decrease in the number of positive 
“reward” emotions (emotions that would reinforce interaction with members of the 
target group because of pleasure gained) as the age of the target group increases (e.g., 
from the ten listed for babies, to the two listed for teenagers).  
Second, the behaviours that load on the positivity factors are qualitatively 
different at either end of the age ranges used in this study.  Behaviours are focused on 
the care and protection more for babies and toddlers than for older children and 
teenagers.  This difference reflects the greater levels of constant care required in the 
early years of life.  Simultaneously, however, the behaviours also reflect an increasing 
emphasis on trying to win over the target group as friends as they get older (e.g., 
being prepared to “talk to” and “smile” at children and being prepared to “listen” and 
“sympath[ise]” with teenagers; see Table 16.)  
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These differences in behavioural approaches may reflect the growing 
independence of character in the target individuals.  That is, the older the child, the 
less they are seen as less dependent, respectful, or even friendly towards adults.  
Instead efforts must be made for the relationship to flourish.  Of interest is that these 
behaviours could be seen as an effort to create a relationship where the emotions we 
see present for babies and toddlers could return.  Whatever the case, there is certainly 
the argument to be made that these age groups should be treated separately when 
testing for adults’ emotions, beliefs and behaviours associated with each group, and 
separate scales are needed to measure endorsement of attitude content for each age 
group.  
Even within a given group, further testing of the remaining items needs to be 
completed to test their validity as a combined measure of attitude content towards that 
group by examining the convergent and discriminant validity of the scale with other 
well-known measures that would be theoretically expected to be associated or 
disassociated with the scale.   
The following chapter will focus on assessing the validity of the scale towards 
the age group “children” only.   From the original 57 unique emotions, beliefs and 
behaviours towards children listed in the open-ended paradigm of Experiment 7, the 
scale was first reduced to 51 items by removing items with high or low endorsement.  
The exploratory factor analysis conducted in Experiment 8 further reduced the scale 
by 23 items based on the exclusion criteria described above.  The resulting set of 
emotions, beliefs and behaviours towards children consists of the 28 items found in 
bold in Table 15 above, and are hereafter referred to collectively as the Child Attitude 
Component Scale (CACS). 
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Chapter 5  Convergent and Discriminant Validity of the Child Attitude 
Component Scale 
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Chapter 5 
 
Using the “child” items from the exploratory factor analyses, I sought to test 
the convergent and discriminant validity of the Child Attitude Component Scale 
(CACS) by examining the correlations between the child positivity and negativity 
factor scores with measures of other relevant constructs.  Table 17 lists the scales that 
were examined.  These measures examined individual differences in beliefs about 
humans in general, beliefs about hierarchy in humans, emotional expression and 
regulation.  
Two scales examined beliefs about humans in general: the Humanity Esteem 
Scale, (HES; Luke & Maio, 2009) and the Polarity Scale (PS43; Stone & Schaffner, 
1997).  The HES examines people esteem for humanity as a whole (i.e., the positivity 
of their attitude toward humanity), whereas the 43-item Polarity scale examines two 
ideological life orientations, Humanism and Normativism, which integrate one’s 
world view, beliefs about human nature, and values.  Humanists see humans as 
basically good.  Humanists value openness, acceptance, and the human experience, 
and they emphasize the importance of emotional reactions to life experiences.  
Meaning and value is derived from the human experience.  Normatives, on the other 
hand, see human nature as basically flawed and evil.  Normatives judge human action 
by external standards and extol restraint in response to life experiences.  Meaning is 
derived from evaluation of experiences in relation to an external standard independent 
of space, time or action, and experiences that do not compare favourably to such 
standards are rejected.  Both the HES and the Polarity scale are relevant to the Child 
Attitude Component Scale because the measures tap positive vs negative beliefs about 
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the character of people in general, and, of course, children are a subgroup of people.  
Thus, favourability in attitudes towards children may be expressed in somewhat more 
favourability toward people in general.  Furthermore, Humanists tend to exhibit more 
positive emotions, less authoritarianism and more empathy, whereas Normatives 
express more negative emotions, fewer positive emotions, and are more authoritarian 
(Walter & Stone, 1997) suggesting that the child-positivity and child-negativity items 
might correspond to Humanist vs. Normative ideologies, respectively.   
Two measures examined beliefs about hierarchy in humans:  Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA, Altemeyer, 1996), and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO, 
Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).  Social Dominance Orientation measures 
individual differences in the preference for maintaining ingroup superiority over 
outgroups.  Right-Wing Authoritarianism is characterized by deference to authority 
and traditional values, and prejudice towards both outgroups and ingroup members 
who threaten the status quo. On the one hand, children can be characterized as an 
outgroup.  Consequently, high scores on RWA and SDO might predict higher 
agreement with the child-negativity items as a form of prejudice, especially for SDO, 
which is primarily concerned with maintaining ingroup-outgroup inequality and relies 
on faith in stereotypes as ‘hierarchy-legitimizing myths’ (p.741, Pratto et al, 1994).  
On the other hand, because we were all children at one time, children may also be 
partly viewed as ingroup members.  Furthermore, children possess no intrinsic 
capacity to challenge the status quo or to reduce group inequalities between children 
and adults.  This may make children less hierarchy-challenging and less relevant to 
RWA and SDO.  Thus, on balance, endorsement of positive or negative components 
of our attitudes towards children may be at best only moderately correlated with SDO 
and RWA profiles.   
P a g e  | 133 
Four measures examined processes of emotion regulation.  The PANAS-X 
(Watson & Clark, 1994), which assesses participant moods over a specified time 
period; the Affect Intensity Measure (AIM, Larsen, Diener & Emmons, 1986) 
measures the intensity of one’s emotional experiences; the Ambivalence over 
Emotional Expressiveness Questionnaire (AEQ; King & Emmons, 1990) examines 
individual differences in reluctance vs. willingness to express emotion when there 
could be consequences in how others view you; similarly, the Emotional Regulation 
Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) assesses individual differences in the use 
of cognitive reappraisal and suppression of emotion as strategies to regulating 
emotional expression.  In contrast to these measures, the Need for Affect Scale (NAS; 
Maio & Esses, 2001) examines respondents’ attitude toward approaching emotional 
experiences – the focus is less on how people react to emotion than on whether they 
seek it out in the first place.  The measure of mood was included because positive 
mood tends to lead to more positive attitudes to many things (e.g., Petty, Schumann, 
Richman, & Strathman, 1993), making it plausible that a relatively positive mood 
leads to greater endorsement of the child-positivity items than of the child-negativity 
items.  The other scales all tap individuals’ degree of openness to emotional 
experience to some degree.  Because children express emotion more readily than 
adults, while also eliciting strong emotional reactions from adults, I expected that 
participants who show more openness to emotion on these scales should also be more 
open to children’s emotional expressiveness, leading to more favourability in their 
attitudes towards children.  This prediction may hold most strongly when examining 
items relating to children’s emotion, which form a third of the CACS. 
Two measures assessed participants’ attachment styles: the Measurement of 
Attachment Qualities (MAQ; Carver, 1997), and the Relationship Structure 
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Questionnaire (ECR-RS; Fraley et al, 2006). These measures categorize people’s 
attachment styles along dimensions of security (confidence, or lack thereof, in the 
strength and sustainability of relationships), avoidance (comfort in becoming close 
and relying on others), and anxiety/ambivalence (worry that attachment partners do 
not wish to become as close as one would like).  The MAQ assesses adult attachment 
styles to other adults, and so may have a limited scope in relation to predicting scores 
on child attitude component endorsement.  Nonetheless, this characteristic makes the 
MAQ potentially informative for discriminant validity, assuming that high 
endorsement of child-positivity with low child-negativity endorsement is not 
reflective of attachment scores in the MAQ. The ECR-RS, however, assesses 
attachment styles to mother and father figures. An avoidant attachment style to a 
parental figure can emerge from a punitive parenting style, which may convey a 
parent’s negative attitude towards children in general.  To the extent that the child 
acquires and later maintains the same attitude, negative attitudes towards children 
should ensue.  Thus, assuming some parent-child transmission of attitude, there is 
more of a direct theoretical connection between endorsement of positive vs. negative 
attitude components in the CACS and ECR-RS scores than with the MAQ. 
Other scales were included for specific ancillary tests.  For instance, there is 
potential for weak associations with another personality measure: the Personal Need 
for Structure scale (NFS, Neuberg & Newsome, 1993; Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, 
& Moskowitz, 2001).  This scale assesses the degree to which individuals like to 
organize their information about their environment into less complex and more 
manageable arrangements. In their motivation to simplify the world around them, 
people who score highly on NFS necessarily discount information that is inconsistent 
with their structuring of their world. Hence, people who score highly on PNS are 
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more likely to endorse existing stereotypes (Neuberg & Newsome, 1993), make trait 
inferences about others (Moskowitz, 1993), and encode and form new stereotypes 
(Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, & O’Brien, 1995). This may lead to stronger endorsement 
of both the child-positivity and child–negativity items. Also, I included a measure that 
was intended to tap the positivity of participants’ attitudes to children.  The measure 
asked participants how they would divide £100,000 between no more than five 
charities of their choice from a list of nineteen possibilities.  Five of the charities from 
the list are children charities, with others that include as their target focus: animals, 
women, mental health support, tragedy relief, and the aged.  I expected small positive 
correlations between the total amount of money spent on charities for children and the 
child-positivity items, and small negative correlations to the child-negativity items, 
because willingness to donate money to children’s charities will also weakly reflect 
favourability to the group as a whole.  However, outside of the conclusions that can 
be drawn from the Budget Allocation Task itself, there is no way to know prior 
attitudes towards the other groups that may receive aid, or their importance to 
participants.  Further, endorsement of either the positive or negative items is not 
indicative of children’s relative need of aid relative to the other groups. 
 Other scales were included to develop a stronger nomonological net (i.e., map 
of associations) by including constructs that should have only weak or null 
associations with the CACS.  The Marlowe-Crowne short form C (Reynolds, 1982) 
assess the extent to which people like to provide answers likely to be seen as socially 
desirable, rather than necessarily truthful.  Publicly expressed positive attitudes 
towards children are probably more normative than negative attitudes, so this measure 
was included to check whether differences in endorsement of child-positivity vs. 
child-negativity items are linked to socially desirable responding. I expected a small 
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association, but any moderate or large association would be problematic for use of the 
scale.  Similarly, I did not expect a connection between endorsement of child attitude 
components and scores on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1979).  
Indeed, work on implicit social cognition has suggested that, if attitude objects are 
implicitly associated with the self, then they will be spontaneously evaluated in a 
manner congruent with self-esteem (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  Thus, if there is no 
relationship between CACS and RSE, then this is a good indicator that participants 
are rating children in general, as instructed, and not imagining their own childhoods, 
younger siblings, or their own children only.  Also, I expected few associations 
between CACS responses and basic dimensions of personality, as measured by the 
HEXACO-PI-R (Ashton & Lee, 2009).  Because of the multi-component nature of the 
CACS’ design (emotions caused by, beliefs about, and behaviours towards children), 
different personality dimensions might correlate, albeit weakly, with the overall 
CACS because of their potential relation to the components (i.e. Emotionality with the 
emotion component, Openness to Experience with the behaviour components).   
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Experiment 9 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 138 first-year psychology undergraduates, who had taken 
part in a pretest session at the beginning of the academic year.  This session included 
the Child Attitude Component Scale among many other scales included for research 
on other topics in the School of Psychology.  Participants were given a pre-test 
keycode to match responses from this session with responses for later experiments.  
Fourteen participants could not be included in the analyses because they had incorrect 
or missing keycodes; this left a final sample of 124 participants (112 female, 10 male, 
2 not stated. Mage = 18). 
Design and Procedure 
 Each session occurred in a computer lab.  Between 8 and 10 participants 
completed the measures, which were hosted on www.Qualtrics.com. Participants took 
between 24 minutes to 1 hour and 8 minutes to complete the measures, after which 
they were given a verbal and written debriefing.  The measures were presented in a 
single fixed order, as shown in Table 17.  Separate scores for the mean child-
positivity and child-negativity items were calculated before being correlated with 
other measures, in accordance with the two-factor solution from the exploratory factor 
analysis. 
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Table 17.  Comparison scales in order of presentation 
Scale Source Example items  
Affect intensity 
measure 
Larsen, Diener, & 
Emmons, (1986) 
 
-When I feel happy, it is a strong type of exuberance; 
-When I talk in front of a group for the first time my 
voice goes shaky and my heart races 
Ambivalence 
over Emotional 
Expressiveness 
King, & Emmons, 
(1990).  
-I try to control my jealousy concerning my 
boyfriend/girlfriend even though I want to let them 
know I am hurting. 
-Often I’d like to show others how I feel, but something 
seems to be holding me back. 
Emotion 
Regulation 
Questionnaire 
Gross & John, 
(2003 
-When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the 
way I’m thinking about the situation. 
-I keep my emotions to myself 
-When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to 
express them 
Need for Affect 
Questionnaire 
Maio & Esses, 
2001.  
-I think that it is very important to explore my feelings 
-It is important for me to know how others are feeling 
 
Measure of 
Attachment 
Qualities (MAQ) 
Carver (1997) - When I'm close to someone, it gives me a sense of 
comfort about life in general.  
-  I often worry my partner will not want to stay with 
me.  
Rosenberg Self- 
Esteem Scale 
Rosenberg, 
(1979). 
 
-On the whole, I am satisfied with myself 
-I certainly feel useless at times 
Marlowe-
Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale 
13-item 
(form C) 
Reynolds, 1982.  
 
-It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I 
am not encouraged. 
-I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of 
me. 
-I am always courteous, even to people who are 
disagreeable 
HEXACO-60 Ashton & Lee, 
(2009).  
-I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment 
rather than on careful thought. 
-I tend to be lenient in judging other people. –Even in an 
emergency I wouldn’t feel like panicking 
PANAS-x Watson & Clark, 
(1994).  
Participants rate their agreement with 20 emotion terms 
as descriptors of their current mood (e.g., cheerful, sad, 
active, angry at self etc.) 
Social 
Dominance 
Orientation 
Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & 
Malle, (1994). 
-It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than 
others 
-Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place 
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Scale Source Example items  
-We would have fewer problems if we treated people 
more equally 
Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism 
Altemeyer,. 
(1996).  
-Our country needs a powerful leader, in order to destroy 
the radical and immoral currents prevailing in society today. 
 
-God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage 
must be strictly followed before it is too late, violations must 
be punished. 
 
Satisfaction with 
Life Scale 
(SWLS) 
Diener, Emmons, 
Larsen, & Griffin 
(1985).  
-The conditions of my life are excellent 
 
-If I could live my life over, I would change almost 
nothing. 
Humanity 
Esteem Scale 
Luke, & Maio, 
(2009). 
-I feel that the human species is very valuable, at least on 
an equal plane with other species in the universe. 
-All in all, I am inclined to regard the human species as a 
failure 
The Polarity 
Scale 
 
Stone, & 
Schaffner, (1988).  
-In order to live a good life you must satisfy both yourself 
and others. 
-Human beings should be treated with respect only  
when they deserve respect 
-So-called mystical experiences have most often  
been a source of delusion 
Personal Need 
for Structure 
Scale 
Neuberg, & 
Newsom, (1993).  
It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what 
I can expect from it 
-I find a well-ordered life with regular hours makes my 
life tedious 
Budget 
allocation task 
 Participants have £100,000 to donate to 5 charities from 
a long list including charities for the old; children; the 
blind; search and rescue; RSPCA etc. 
Relationship 
Structure (ECR-
RS) 
Questionnaire 
Fraley, 
Niedenthal,  
Marks, 
Brumbaugh, & 
Vicary, (2006).  
-It helps to turn to this person in times of need.  
- I prefer not to show this person how I feel deep down. 
-I worry that this person won’t care about me as much as 
I care about him or her. 
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Results and Discussion 
  The description below focuses on the correlations with the child-positivity 
and child-negativity items, rather than inter-correlations of established measures.  For 
ease of presentation, the relationships of the two dimensions of the CACS with each 
set of related comparison scales are presented with a specific summary, with a more 
general summary of findings at the end of the chapter. 
Child Positivity and Child Negativity 
As expected from the factor loadings obtained from the exploratory factor 
analysis, participants’ scores on the child-positivity items were significantly 
negatively correlated with their scores on the child-negativity items, r=-.26, p < .01.  
Also, consistent with the earlier results, this correlation was only small-to-moderate in 
magnitude, according to the effect-size guidelines recommended by Cohen (1992).  
Thus, rather than combine the child positivity and child negativity factors in to a 
single dimension for evaluating components of attitudes towards children (i.e., 
positive vs. negative), the remaining correlation analyses continue to examine child 
positivity and child negativity separately. 
Beliefs about Humanity 
Child positivity.  Child-positivity endorsement was greater in individuals who 
have more positive Humanity Esteem, r=.21, p<.05. Child-positivity endorsement 
was also significantly negatively correlated with higher Normatism scores from the 
polarity scale r= -.19, p< .05. 
Child negativity.  Endorsement of the child-negativity items was not 
significantly negatively correlated with scores on the HES, r = -.02, p > .05, and 
higher child-negativity endorsement was associated with a more Normative ideology 
from the Polarity scale r=.19, p<.05.  
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Summary.  The low magnitude of the correlations suggests that attitudes 
towards children are at least somewhat independent of attitudes about humanity in 
general.  However, the significant correlations that were obtained are interesting from 
a few perspectives.  For instance, the finding that people with positive attitudes to 
humanity to endorse the positive attitudinal components and that people with negative 
attitudes to humanity endorse the negative components of attitudes towards children 
gives credence to the idea that children represent a universal human subgroup, and 
that evaluations of humanity in general are also applied to children (or vice-versa).  
Also, the tendency for people with Normative views of humanity to endorse the 
negative child stereotypes is reflective of Normatives’ view of people as essentially 
flawed.  Normative items on the Polarity scale such as “Children should be seen and 
not heard” and “Children should be taught to obey…” are conceptually related to 
child-negativity items from the CACS such as “Children are disrespectful” and 
“Children are noisy.” It is also interesting that there were no significant relationships 
between the Humanist responses on the Polarity scale and either the child-positive or 
child-negative items of the CACS.  While the humanism and child-positivity scores 
are positively skewed (skewness = -.46 & -2.21, std error= .217 & .218, respectively) 
the overall pattern of results is not explained by a ceiling effect for child-positivity (M 
= 32.38, sd= 15.92, variance = 253.27) which has greater variance than child-
negativity items (M= 1.47, sd=7.24, variance = 52.46); nor a ceiling effect on 
Humanism scores, which has greater variance than Normatism scores (M= 22.34 & 
4.36, sd= 7.30 & 3.55, variance= 53.35 & 12.59, respectively).  This result indicates 
that Normative vs. Humanist ideologies do not explain the full pattern of results on 
the CACS.  
Beliefs about Hierarchy 
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Child Positivity and Negativity. There were no significant correlations 
between either factor from the CACS and either SDO, or RWA.  
Summary. The lack of significant relationships between SDO and RWA with 
the child-positivity and child-negativity factors provides discriminant validity for the 
CACS as a measure of attitudes towards children, and not just a scale of outgroup 
prejudice; with children as the target outgroup.  This is probably because children are 
conceptualized as ingroup children, or an encompassing children-in-general concept 
while completing the CACS.  These findings help to convey the idea that there is 
something special about children in group dynamics: that not only can they be thought 
of as belonging to one’s ingroup, as well as an outgroup in their own right, with their 
own set of attitude content; but that oneself (at some point in the past) was included as 
an ingroup member of childhood – and this same group membership applies to 
everyone.  This last conceptualization may explain the significant correlations 
between the CACS and the broader humanity beliefs scales, HSE and Polarity scale 
which assess beliefs about self and others with a whole-humanity-focus, but not RWA 
or SDO which assess beliefs about differences between self and others, even when the 
dimensions of the Polarity scale are significantly associated with RWA and SDO 
(Walter & Stone, 1997).  Children may act as the universal equalizer in intergroup 
attitudes, thus children could be used as a reclassifying tool to create inclusiveness 
between groups and reduce intergroup conflict (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998; 
Wohl & Branscombe, 2005) while keeping existing beliefs about humanity in general 
intact. 
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Emotion Scales 
   Child positivity.  Endorsement of positive child attitude components was 
greater in individuals that experience emotions more intensely, r=.19, p<.05.  Mean 
scores on the child-positivity items were also positively correlated with scores on 
reappraisal items from the ERQ, r=.20, p<.05, such that individuals showing greater 
endorsement of the child-positivity items were more effective at reappraising their 
emotions to be more positive.  
Child negativity. Participants who scored higher on the surprise subscale of 
the PANAS-X, r= -.18, p<.05, were more likely to report endorsement of the negative 
components of child attitudes.  There were no other significant correlations with 
endorsement of the negative child attitude components.  
Summary.  Overall, there were few significant correlations with the emotion 
scales (AIM, ERQ, PANAS-X, AEQ).  Given that over a third of the items on the 
CACS were emotion components, the correlations with affect intensity and emotion 
reappraisal may not be surprising.  However, it is interesting that none of the other 
emotion measures were related to child attitude content, and there was only small and 
unexpected significant correlation with the child negativity items.  On balance, it 
appears that high endorsers of child-positivity are individuals who frequently 
experience a high degree of positive affect.  However, the lack of a relationship to the 
general positive affect dimension of PANAS-X (both reported below), and the small 
effect sizes, suggests otherwise.  Further, the lack of a negative correlation between 
child negativity items and reappraisal scores on the ERQ suggest that endorsement of 
components of attitudes towards children is not simply a function of positive and 
negative affect towards the group, but also dependent on belief and behaviour 
components as well.    
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Attachment 
 Child Positivity.  There were no significant correlations between endorsement 
of child-positive items on CACS and the attachment styles (MAQ) or attachment to 
parental figures (ECR-RS) 
 Child Negativity. Participants who had higher endorsement of child-
negativity items showed greater avoidance towards a father figure on the ECR-RS; 
r=.19, p<.05. 
 Summary.  These results are suggestive that at least some of the endorsement 
of child-negativity is the result of experience with father figures, where perhaps 
negative attitudes towards children conveyed by a father figure are adopted somewhat 
into the child’s conception of children, when the nature of that father-child 
relationship is an avoidant one; however, the effect size was small. 
Ancillary Measures: Budget Allocation Task  
Child positivity and Child negativity.  There were no significant correlations 
between money donated to children’s charities and either the Child-positivity or 
Child-negativity factors of the CACS 
Summary. Only small correlations were expected between child-positivity 
and monetary investment in the child based charities.  However, there  was no way to 
assess favourability towards children versus other groups that were represented in the 
Budget Allocation Task (which also included charities for animals, the aged, women, 
mental health problem sufferers, and tragedy relief) beyond the preference for 
investing in their charities using the measure itself, which make the lack of 
correlations difficult to interpret, as participant preference for the other target groups 
over children could have stifled any connection between child-positivity and child 
charity donation.  Furthermore, the budget allocation task required participants divide 
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£100,000 between charities without donating the same amount of money more than 
once.  This task proved difficult for many participants, 42% of participants failed to 
perform it correctly, and the problem of getting the budget to balance may have 
detracted from the intended use of this measure.  
Personal Need for Structure 
Child positivity and Child negativity.  There were no significant correlations 
between either child-positivity, or child-negativity items and scores on the Personal 
Need for Structure scale (ps > .05).  
Summary.  The lack of correlations of either CACS factor with PNS was 
somewhat surprising given past research findings on the relationship between PNS 
and stereotype endorsement, given that highly endorsed components of attitudes 
towards children must reflect, to some degree, child stereotyping (Moskowitz, 1993; 
Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Schaller et al., 1995).  This result might be explained by 
the number of items that comprise the child-positivity and child-negativity scales: 20 
and 8, respectively.  Specifically, stereotypes based on so many items might be too 
numerous for the simplicity preferred by high NFS participants, whose stereotypic 
conceptions of children might be better represented to them in fewer dimensions 
(Schaller et al, 1995).  Meanwhile, for participants low on NFS, children are too 
variable a social category to be represented as always possessing the traits, eliciting 
the emotions from interactions, and causing as narrow a range of behaviours towards 
them, as can be accounted for by the CACS.  Another possibility is that – because the 
CACS was formed from the most consensual emotions, beliefs, and behaviours, listed 
in an open-ended paradigm – the stereotype content is likely widely disseminated 
knowledge available to all, regardless of actual endorsement of individual items.  
Therefore, the content is independent of participants’ personal structuring or 
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formation, and can be rated item by item, rather than by comparing against ones’ 
structured conceptions (as a whole) of children, explaining the non-relationship to 
PNS.  That is, a person with high PNS, and so a simpler concept of children might 
prefer to use only few stereotypical aspects, rather than many, and so not endorse all 
the statements included on either the child-positive or child-negative dimensions. 
 Previous studies of PNS and stereotyping also differed from answering the 
CACS, by having provided a specific individual or (smaller) group of individuals as 
targets to be rated based on presented information about the individuals/groups recent 
difficulty with class electives (Neuberg & Newsome, 1993) or ability at solving 
anagrams (Schaller et al., 1995) about whom participants can form their own 
impressions, rather than being given a group category and asked to endorse stereotype 
content.  The differences in previous PNS and stereotyping studies, and the present 
one, in allowing participants to form their own stereotypes based on given attitudinal 
component information, rather than endorsement of items based on wider 
disseminated emotions, beliefs and behaviours without specific information likely 
accounts for the difference. 
Nomological Measures 
HEXACO-PI-R 
Child positivity.  Participants who scored higher on child positivity scored 
higher on trait emotionality from the HEXACO-PI-R, r=.20, p<.05.  However, 
analysis of the subscales of the Emotionality dimension reveal that this relationship is 
underpinned by a significant positive correlation between child-positivity items and 
the fearful subscale, r=.23, p<.01 (not listed), with higher endorsement of child-
positivity items associated with more fearful individuals; and no significant 
correlations to the other subscales of the Emotionality dimension.   
P a g e  | 147 
Child negativity.  Higher scores on child-negativity items were associated 
with lower scores on two subscales from the HEXACO inventory: sociability and 
prudence, r= -.18 and r= -.19 respectively, both ps<.05; not shown. 
Summary.  Lower sociability scores helps to explain higher endorsement of 
child-negativity items such as “Children make me feel frustrated, …angry,…annoyed; 
Children are noisy”’ but with small effect sizes, and the lack of a relationship to HES, 
there is more to the picture of endorsing the negative content of attitudes towards 
children than a preference to avoid people in general.  Similarly, the relationship of 
trait emotionality to child-positivity endorsement reflects a relationship to the fearful 
subscale, which suggests that endorsement of child-positive attitude components is 
not simply a result of greater general positive affect states, albeit, greater child-
positive endorsers are more emotional and feel emotions more intensely (see above).  
Self-Esteem 
Child positivity and Child negativity.  There were no significant correlations 
between either factor of the CACS and Self-Esteem on the RSE, all ps > .05.  
Summary.  Although the group “children” is a group to which we are all ex-
ingroup members,  these results suggest that it was not their own childhood 
participants imagined while providing their ratings to the CACS, as past research has 
found that when attitude objects are associated with the self, self-esteem affects 
ratings of the target in a congruent manner (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). This may 
weaken the argument above that children are a supra-inclusive group, however it 
should be possible to simultaneously conceptualize children as a humanity-
synonymous group, and as an outgroup which one no longer belongs to or associates 
with when considering the current self.  This adds to our confidence that the CACS is 
a measure of stereotypes of “the general child”.  
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Individual Components 
 Inter-correlations of the individual emotion, belief, and behaviour attitude 
components, separated by valence, to the other measures was also explored.  Positive 
child emotions were significantly positively correlated with the Affect Intensity 
Measure, r= .19, p<.05, emotional reappraisal items of the AEQ, r=.21, p<.05, and the 
ambivalence merger subscale of the MAQ, r= .19, p<.05.  Positive behaviour 
components were positively associated with the AIM, r= .19 p<.05, the reappraisal 
items of AEQ, r= .21 p<.05, the Fear and Sincerity subscales of the HEXACO-PI-R, 
rs= .19, ps<.05, and the Humanity Esteem Scale, r= .19 p<.05.  Positive behaviour 
items were also negatively associated with Normative scores from the Polarity Scale, 
r= -.18 p<.05.  Positive beliefs about children were positively associated with the 
Fear, r= .26 p<.01 and Emotionality, r= .22 p<.05 subscales of the HEXACO-PI-R.  
Positive beliefs were negatively associated with the Fairness subscale of HEXACO-
PI-R, r= -.18 p<.05, and Normatism scores on the Polarity scale, r= -.20 p<.05. 
 The negative child emotion components were associated with greater father 
avoidance, r= .21 p<.05.  The negative beliefs about children were negatively 
associated with the Surprise subscale of the PANAS-X, r= -.20 p<.05 
General Discussion 
The findings of this experiment provide good convergent and discriminant validity to 
the Child Attitude Component Scale. Endorsement of the subscales of the CACS is 
mostly unrelated to personality types as measured by the HEXACO. Child-positivity 
items are weakly related to trait emotionality, which reflects a tendency for high 
child-positivity endorsers to feel emotions more intensely and reappraise their 
emotions to be more positive. Child-negativity items are weakly negatively correlated 
with the sociability subscale of the HEXACO which highlights a general preference to 
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avoid people in general, but cannot fully account for the negativity towards children. 
Taken together it might seem that endorsement of child-positivity is for people who 
feel a lot of positive emotion, and endorsement of child-negativity is for people who 
like to avoid others in general, however, the correlations were weak only, and a lack 
of relationship to the general positive affect states of the PANAS for positivity 
endorsers suggests that endorsement of the attitude components is not simply a 
measure of general positivity or negativity.  
 Normative ideologies about humanity (that humans are essentially flawed, 
Stone & Schaffer, 1988) account for some of the variance in scores on the CACS, 
with positivity endorsers having a more positive outlook on humanity as a whole, and 
negativity endorsers taking a more normative view of humanity in general. However 
there is something particular about children as a subgroup of humanity that allows 
positivity vs. negativity endorsement to be associated with Humanity Esteem, but not 
Self-Esteem, and the extent to which one holds Normative views about humanity, but 
unrelated to Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and Social Dominance Orientation. This 
duality between the relation of child attitude endorsement to beliefs about Humanity 
in general, but not beliefs about the hierarchies that subdivide humanity indicates 
children as a special group that is both representative of humanity as a whole, as well 
as a group that does not threaten the status quo. Further research is needed to 
determine whether the non-relation to RWA and SDO is because children lack group 
mobility or because they are simultaneously conceptualized as related to humanity as 
a whole and to one’s own ingroup. 
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Chapter 6  General Discussion 
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Aims 
 The purpose of this thesis has been to explore adults’ mental representations of 
children, and the effect on adult social cognition and behaviour.  Though child 
development is its own sub-discipline of psychology, relatively little attention has 
been paid to what a child represents to adults, and the effects that child salience may 
have on adults’ behaviour, motivations, goals, perceptions and decision making.  
Given the evolutionary importance of motivations to nurture children (e.g., Buss, 
1996), the explicit positivity of attitudes towards children (Maio et al., 2009), and the 
importance of children to parents and society in general the lack of investigation in 
this area is somewhat surprising.  The reason for this may be, in part, (seemingly) 
global assumptions about the universality of representations and importance of 
children (Heywood, 2001).  Nonetheless, an understanding of the way in which adults 
think about children may help much needed acknowledgment of the failures of society 
to adequately protect the welfare of children (Gilbert et al., 2009), or adequately 
acknowledge their human rights, (Reading et al., 2009).   
I hope that the Child Attitude Component Scale developed in Chapters 4 and 5 
of this thesis will prove a useful tool in the exploration of individual differences in our 
representations of children, and the implications these differences may have on adult 
social cognition and behaviour. 
Discussion of Findings  
At the beginning of my Ph.D., I focused primarily on investigation potential 
beneficial effects of making children salient on reducing intergroup prejudice 
(Chapter 2) and affecting perceptions of individuals (Chapter 3), with mixed results.  
Based on past research on social categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) and the 
common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2002), I had hoped that making 
P a g e  | 152 
children salient as members of outgroups to which people tend to have prejudiced 
attitudes would help to reduce perceptions of intergroup differences and improve 
attitudes towards the prejudiced group.  Unfortunately, the manipulation failed to lead 
to the inclusion of children in representations of the outgroup, and so whether or not 
children are able to exert a prejudice reducing effect on inter-group attitudes via the 
mechanisms discussed in Chapter 2 remains unclear, but would certainly continue to 
be an interesting avenue of investigation for the social benefits of prejudice reduction.   
The focus of Chapter 3 was again interested in understanding the effects of 
child salience, this time on perception of individuals.  Unfortunately the picture was 
quite complicated.  Mere child salience was not sufficient in itself to lead to changes 
in perceptions of ambiguous targets, although this was likely due in part to limitations 
of the Donald paradigm for exploring targets across age ranges due to the distinct set 
of behaviours we associate with different stages of life.  Nonetheless, there were some 
promising interaction effects of child salience with implicit evaluations of groups and 
perceptions of the target.  Specifically, effects on perceptions of warmth and 
competence hint at the possibility that child salience, if manipulation could be 
improved, might lead to larger important social effects the way we perceive others, 
and might be applicable to group dynamics as well.   Interestingly, the findings of 
Chapter 3 shed new light on assimilation and contrast effects of primed categories 
interacting not just with implicit evaluations (Lepore & Brown, 1977) on judgments 
of novel targets, also being moderated by other perceptions of targets that are not 
influenced by the primed category.  Future research on the effects of primed 
information on perceptions of novel targets, in conjunction with implicit evaluations, 
should also focus on the possibility of participant generated assumptions to counteract 
or reinforce the expected direction of assimilation and contrast effects.   
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Having obtained fixed and complicated effects in Chapters 2 and 3, I sought to 
use the remaining time of my Ph.D to investigate adult mental representations more 
thoroughly without the a priori assumptions with which I based the hypotheses of my 
earlier research.  This led to a fruitful avenue of investigation that has helped to define 
exactly what we mean by “a child” (and a baby, a toddler, and a teenager).  Chapters 4 
focused on understanding the components of adults’ mental representations of 
different childhood age groups and found that within each group the representations 
span a wide range of both positive and negative emotions, behaviours and beliefs 
towards children, in line with past research that attitudes towards children are at least 
somewhat positive and negative (Maio et al., 2009).  Furthermore, Chapter 4 has 
highlighted the specific differences in representations of different age groups of 
children, which will have important implications on the way adults interact and regard 
children at different stages of development.   
Chapter 5 highlighted that the Child Attitude Component Scale developed 
from the open-ended responses to representations of children likely has explanatory 
power independent of scales that might reasonably be expected to measure similar 
constructs.  Future research should look to examine how individual differences on the 
Child Attitude Component Scale might predict differences in attitudes, behaviours 
and perceptions of children and related issues such as support for child rights 
legislation. 
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Limitations 
 Chapter 2 confirmed assumptions that children are not readily included as 
outgroup members, but failed to find evidence that including children in outgroup 
representations can adjust attitudes towards the group as a whole.  Past research has 
found evidence that attitudes towards children, at least on implicit measures, tend to 
be more negative towards children (Maio et al., 2009) and that child salience can 
increase the importance of self-transcendent values (Maio et al., 2012).  Given these 
findings, it seems unlikely that explicit inclusions of children into outgroup 
representations when they may not be spontaneously included should have no effect 
on attitudes towards the group as a whole.  Unfortunately, my manipulation seemed to 
have failed to properly induce the inclusion of children in the outgroup concept, or 
confounds of outgroup selection lessened the potential influence that child inclusion 
may have in that scenario.  Future studies into the effects of child inclusion on 
intergroup dynamics may benefit from starting not with the spontaneous effects of 
child inclusion, but with a more heavy-handed approach that asks participants to 
provide attitudes towards an outgroup explicitly comprising children and adults.   
The words used as the auditory prime in Experiments 3 and 4 raise a couple of 
potential issues: First, the valence of the primes between the adult and child 
conditions was not well controlled, with “naïve,” used in the child prime, being more 
negative in connotation than “mature”, which was included in the adult prime 
condition.   The valence of the primes should have been more closely matched and 
kept neutral, with just categorical labels for each group.  However, the second 
potential issue with the prime words used for Experiments 3 and 4 was that the 
categorical labels used were not pre-tested for representativeness of the category 
label.  Based on the age boundary labelling from Experiment 6,  “child” was a safe 
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choice of category label, “kid” was a more obscure label for the age group, being 
listed twice, whereas “boy” and “girl” were not given as labels at all, unsurprisingly, 
as the task requested participants provide labels to the age group as a whole.  Thus, 
“girl” and “boy” were perhaps inadequate priming material, although they made it 
easier to match primes across conditions with the inclusion of “man” and “woman” in 
the adult prime condition.  Arguably, “kid” was also inadequate as a word for priming 
the category of children; only given as a label twice.  However, there would be few 
other options to use as category labels, as the overwhelming majority of participants 
referred to this age group as children, and “kid” being among the most common 
alternative labels for this group alongside “preschool”, “junior”, and “school child.”  
Nonetheless, these would be more suitable words to use when interested in priming 
the category in future. 
 Experiment 4 found supporting evidence that children are seen as warmer, but 
less competent than adults (Saminaden et al., 2010).  Arguably, measures of warmth 
and competence might not mean the same thing when used in the context of different 
age groups.  For example, a child may be seen as competent unless explicitly 
compared with adults.  However, participants were asked to rate the warmth and 
competence of children generally, rather than a particular instantiation of a child, and 
so engaged in the same comparison to an extrinsic, normative standard of warmth and 
competence as would be expected of any group being rated.  I believe this to be the 
default judgement when asked to rate the competence and warmth of children, and 
that only in the case of some external standard by which we typically measure child 
competence (e.g., reading level) would participants engage in competence judgements 
to something other than a normative definition of competence.  To ascertain for 
certain whether this is the case, differences in child vs. adult warmth and competence 
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could be measured between subjects.  The differences and overall mean ratings on 
these measures may be comparable to those reported when participants are asked 
about adult and child warmth and competence within-subject.  I would expect ratings 
of warmth and competence of the general child when rated in isolation to be similar to 
the same ratings provided in the context of also rating adult competence and warmth.  
In the case of these experiments it was the relative differences between children and 
adults’ warmth and competence that were of interest.  
 One aspect of our representations of children that remains relatively 
unexplored is the situational variability in representations that may arise depending on 
relational aspects of the child concept.  That is, although the CACS appears to provide 
a measure of one’s attitudes towards children in general, endorsement of items of the 
CACS may vary when applying it to a particular child, or group of children.  For 
instance, to the extent that a child in your family is salient in memory, endorsement of 
the protective and caring items may be stronger, relative to a distant other or outgroup 
child.  Or perhaps the salience of a child (hopefully not one’s own!) whose behaviour 
leaves much to be desired, would lead to greater endorsement of the disrespectful and 
noisy.  In fact, varying the target of the CACS from general children to specific ones, 
for instance, British children vs. children seeking asylum, may be a way to predict 
whether including children in outgroup representations could have an affect on 
attitudes towards the group as a whole.  
 Different self-categorizations may also lead to relational variability in scores 
on the CACS.  For example, to the extent that one self-categorizes as a teacher,  
neighbour to a noisy child, or a parent might lead to differences in scores on the 
CACS by virtue of the different roles, and the behaviours that accompany them, that 
these different self-categorizations impart on our interactions with children.  The 
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positive and negative aspects of the CACS that are simultaneously endorsed to some 
degree emphasize the varied nature of the emotions, beliefs and behaviours we have 
towards children, and create a complex picture of representations of children, which 
are likely to vary depending on precisely which child we are interacting with.  More 
work needs to be undertaken to elucidate how changing the nature of the relationship 
between adult and the child, or group of children, at the focus of the CACS may lead 
to variability in patterns of responding. 
Future Directions 
 The Child Attitude Component Scale was designed primarily to understand the 
way in which we represent children in terms of our feelings, beliefs, and behaviour.  
The purpose of this information was to be a predictive tool for understanding the ways 
in which adult cognition and behaviour might be shaped in situations involving 
children; particularly where the needs of children may be overlooked.  The validity of 
the scale therefore needs to be explored in a variety of settings to test the usefulness as 
a predictive implement in situations where the inclusion of children might be 
important.  Such instances might include governmental ministries, policy bodies, and 
charitable organizations involved with welfare, healthcare, rights, and education of 
children; educational settings such as schools and extra-curricular activities; or to 
assess attitudes of persons directly involved with the care or education of children 
such as carers, teachers, and foster parents.  
 The Child Attitude Component Scale could also be used to explore how 
relational variability between adults and different children is represented.  The 
endorsement of positive and negative components of our attitudes towards children 
may differ between the abstract child relative to a particular child, such as a family 
member, or pupil.  This could have implications for the appropriateness of the CACS 
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to predict behaviours in different contexts, from support of child-related policies on 
the one hand, to implementation of different parenting or punitive styles on the other.  
Future research could investigate patterns of responding towards different children, be 
they familial or not, ingroup or foreign, cherished or stigmatized.   
 The natures of the multiple possible categorizations of the child as belonging 
to one’s ingroup, to an age-defined outgroup, or a supra-inclusive humanity related 
group merits further exploration.  When considering different age groups of children 
are the age subcategories representations of one’s ingroup, and subject to the same 
ingroup favouritism biases; or are the different age groups representative of an 
outgroup in the context of intergroup perceptions?  My suspicion is that both 
representations are true: different age groups can be articulated both in terms of 
special selection of ingroup members and distinct outgroup members.  In fact, 
readiness to represent different age groups in terms of ingroup membership relative to 
outgroup membership may be inversely proportional to the age of the target.  That is, 
due to evolutionary pressures to protect our vulnerable young, babies may be more 
easily represented as ingroup members, while teenagers seem altogether more foreign 
to adults in terms of their intergroup interactions.  The trend for the emotions, 
behaviours and beliefs gathered in Experiment 7, and their endorsement in 
Experiment 8, seem to corroborate this idea, with a reduction in the number of 
positive items, but an increase in the number of negative items, associated with the 
age groups as they get older.  Furthermore, for teenagers, there are more items that 
stress efforts to improve relations with this age group than are found for the younger 
age groups.  Under what conditions do our conceptions of children move fluidly 
between these representations of ingroup vs. outgroup members, and what are the 
implications for psychological distance in intergroup dynamics? 
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 Understanding our attitudes and representations of children might be most 
important in settings involving vulnerable or marginalised children.  It would 
therefore be useful to investigate how atypical children are represented.  For example, 
understanding the ways in which representations differ for disabled children, children 
with behavioural disorders, or children with histories of abuse could help design 
methods of attitude change towards stigmatized groups. They could also be used to 
better understand how care for particular groups of children is different, to better 
protect vulnerable children, and to better support adults involved in caring for these 
groups. 
 As other researchers have stressed (e.g., James & Prout, 1997; Jenks, 2005; 
Mills and Mills, 2000), cultural biases and assumptions about the universality of 
representations of children are deeply engrained in public and scholarly discourse.  It 
is important to investigate representations of children with reference to the particular 
cultural and social context which the child inhabits.  It would be fruitful, therefore, to 
explore the differences and similarities in representations of children cross-culturally. 
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Appendix I 
 
Inter-correlation matrix for the convergent and discriminant validity of the Child 
Attitude Component Scale with other measures
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* -.004 .019 .113 -.072 -.008 -.078 -.168 -.079 -.175 .070 .083 .147 -.074 -.088 -.165
HEXEmotionalit
y
.198
* -.033 .398
**
.216
* -.120 -.157 .218
* .056 -.243
**
.298
** .146 -.296
** -.018 .171 1 -.130 -.008 -.009 -.183
*
-.280
**
.260
** -.087 .093 -.087 -.079 .208
* -.123 -.149 -.029 -.005 -.029 -.131 .200
* .162 .152 .216
* -.042 .009
HEXExtraversio
n
.016 -.054 .336
**
-.281
**
.407
**
-.426
**
.377
**
.195
*
-.438
**
-.320
**
-.454
**
.730
**
.201
* -.097 -.130 1 .031 .060 .094 .600
**
-.377
** .117 .145 .582
**
.398
** .046 -.022 .030 -.234
*
-.249
**
-.381
**
-.189
* -.054 .075 -.015 .010 -.037 -.065
HEXAgreeablen
ess
-.016 -.062 -.052 .233
* .165 .101 .018 -.002 .183 -.161 -.083 -.012 .453
**
.360
** -.008 .031 1 .077 .242
** .033 -.188
* -.164 -.220
* .114 .162 .193
* -.069 -.087 -.116 -.138 -.194
* -.078 -.189
* -.070 .038 -.046 -.041 -.084
HEXConscienti
ous
.008 -.152 -.118 -.064 -.018 -.112 .013 -.013 -.045 -.204
* -.169 .148 .333
**
.261
** -.009 .060 .077 1 .050 .173 -.127 -.031 .056 .184
*
.272
** .036 .029 -.028 -.034 -.108 -.128 -.059 .558
** -.031 .051 -.027 -.133 -.115
HEXOpenExp -.025 -.019 .156 .110 .145 .022 .027 .071 .049 -.154 -.060 .036 .113 .010 -.183
* .094 .242
** .050 1 .271
** .022 -.277
**
-.326
** .127 .108 .232
*
-.370
** .073 .043 -.026 -.149 -.106 -.254
** -.031 -.012 -.029 .015 -.100
PositiveAffect -.022 -.033 .214
* -.036 .512
**
-.232
*
.219
* .116 -.082 -.218
*
-.247
**
.547
**
.244
** -.061 -.280
**
.600
** .033 .173 .271
** 1 -.236
** .049 .106 .467
**
.408
** .121 -.072 -.046 -.186
*
-.201
*
-.320
** -.074 -.178 .014 -.033 -.026 .003 -.108
NegativeAffect .086 -.135 .039 .254
**
-.254
** .169 -.218
* .028 .171 .390
**
.379
**
-.520
**
-.237
* -.026 .260
**
-.377
**
-.188
* -.127 .022 -.236
** 1 -.074 -.012 -.447
**
-.301
** -.020 .132 -.050 .151 .164 .206
* .096 .090 .097 .071 .064 -.110 -.117
SDO -.025 -.048 .031 -.035 .015 -.051 .013 -.087 -.041 .098 .065 .084 -.146 -.266
** -.087 .117 -.164 -.031 -.277
** .049 -.074 1 .448
** .017 .017 -.291
**
.201
* -.077 -.099 -.021 -.076 .101 .131 -.016 -.017 -.033 -.044 -.032
RWA .094 -.091 .152 -.064 .013 -.076 .128 .036 -.213
* .057 -.081 .112 -.148 -.182
* .093 .145 -.220
* .056 -.326
** .106 -.012 .448
** 1 .207
* .065 -.153 .254
** -.003 -.028 .179 -.238
* .036 .218
* .109 .055 .102 -.118 .033
SWLS -.044 .093 .191
* -.170 .294
**
-.306
**
.367
** .101 -.268
**
-.343
**
-.397
**
.640
** .136 -.004 -.087 .582
** .114 .184
* .127 .467
**
-.447
** .017 .207
* 1 .362
** .070 -.023 .087 -.295
**
-.313
**
-.250
** -.154 -.009 -.005 -.120 .055 .084 .063
HumanityEstee
m
.208
* -.022 .203
* .001 .315
**
-.205
*
.206
* .128 -.151 -.113 -.133 .361
**
.204
* .019 -.079 .398
** .162 .272
** .108 .408
**
-.301
** .017 .065 .362
** 1 .172 -.184
* -.051 -.056 -.210
*
-.317
**
-.258
** .096 .173 .190
* .177 .005 -.081
Humanism .075 -.077 .258
** .181 .032 -.070 .235
** .096 -.030 .128 .084 -.141 .241
** .113 .208
* .046 .193
* .036 .232
* .121 -.020 -.291
** -.153 .070 .172 1 -.118 -.492
** -.071 -.178 -.048 -.059 -.139 .086 .071 .040 -.076 -.035
Normatism -.189
*
.189
* -.088 -.247
** -.139 .019 -.247
** .015 -.081 .028 -.091 .015 .054 -.072 -.123 -.022 -.069 .029 -.370
** -.072 .132 .201
*
.254
** -.023 -.184
* -.118 1 -.322
** -.110 -.011 .067 .061 .108 -.098 -.182
*
-.195
* .155 .168
Polarity: Both -.007 -.063 -.137 .079 .072 .081 -.062 -.063 .031 -.150 -.016 .168 -.199
* -.008 -.149 .030 -.087 -.028 .073 -.046 -.050 -.077 -.003 .087 -.051 -.492
**
-.322
** 1 .194
*
.200
* -.019 -.081 .057 .012 -.043 .032 -.078 .016
motherAvoid .133 -.168 -.142 .130 .010 .298
**
-.194
* -.049 .113 .174 .173 -.213
*
-.231
* -.078 -.029 -.234
* -.116 -.034 .043 -.186
* .151 -.099 -.028 -.295
** -.056 -.071 -.110 .194
* 1 .556
**
.314
**
.199
* .106 .134 .118 .101 -.157 -.095
motherAnxiety .028 -.086 -.021 .062 -.044 .168 -.155 -.034 .084 .125 .212
*
-.208
*
-.261
** -.168 -.005 -.249
** -.138 -.108 -.026 -.201
* .164 -.021 .179 -.313
**
-.210
* -.178 -.011 .200
*
.556
** 1 .020 .445
** .058 .062 .059 -.058 -.103 .010
fatheravoid -.042 .193
*
-.257
** .152 -.193
*
.401
**
-.428
**
-.232
*
.228
* .092 .166 -.303
**
-.225
* -.079 -.029 -.381
**
-.194
* -.128 -.149 -.320
**
.206
* -.076 -.238
*
-.250
**
-.317
** -.048 .067 -.019 .314
** .020 1 .408
** .063 -.015 -.105 .047 .212
* .026
fatherAnxiety -.009 -.105 -.052 .087 -.099 .176 -.143 -.122 .131 .077 .164 -.199
* -.163 -.175 -.131 -.189
* -.078 -.059 -.106 -.074 .096 .101 .036 -.154 -.258
** -.059 .061 -.081 .199
*
.445
**
.408
** 1 -.085 -.029 -.015 .019 -.077 -.118
PNFS -.020 -.035 -.100 .094 -.185
* .055 -.122 .031 .061 .065 .068 -.001 -.062 .070 .200
* -.054 -.189
*
.558
**
-.254
** -.178 .090 .131 .218
* -.009 .096 -.139 .108 .057 .106 .058 .063 -.085 1 .056 -.023 -.068 -.019 -.055
ChPosEmo .839
** -.141 .188
* .143 .214
* .102 .040 .017 .054 .103 .189
* -.030 .023 .083 .162 .075 -.070 -.031 -.031 .014 .097 -.016 .109 -.005 .173 .086 -.098 .012 .134 .062 -.015 -.029 .056 1 .721
**
.544
**
-.196
* .089
ChPosBeh .932
**
-.295
**
.188
* .129 .205
* .010 .043 -.001 .093 .063 .047 -.084 .150 .147 .152 -.015 .038 .051 -.012 -.033 .071 -.017 .055 -.120 .190
* .071 -.182
* -.043 .118 .059 -.105 -.015 -.023 .721
** 1 .620
**
-.350
** .023
ChPosBel .820
**
-.185
* .122 .030 .110 -.111 .161 -.116 -.011 .031 .045 -.072 -.043 -.074 .216
* .010 -.046 -.027 -.029 -.026 .064 -.033 .102 .055 .177 .040 -.195
* .032 .101 -.058 .047 .019 -.068 .544
**
.620
** 1 -.296
**
.217
*
ChNegEmo -.338
**
.949
** -.035 -.158 -.073 .081 -.116 -.013 .104 -.104 -.058 .026 -.013 -.088 -.042 -.037 -.041 -.133 .015 .003 -.110 -.044 -.118 .084 .005 -.076 .155 -.078 -.157 -.103 .212
* -.077 -.019 -.196
*
-.350
**
-.296
** 1 .260
**
ChNegBel .112 .551
** -.081 -.120 .001 .058 .027 -.016 .062 .072 .131 -.017 -.025 -.165 .009 -.065 -.084 -.115 -.100 -.108 -.117 -.032 .033 .063 -.081 -.035 .168 .016 -.095 .010 .026 -.118 -.055 .089 .023 .217
*
.260
** 1
 
 
